The Necessity of Caution in Dealing with an Enemy
TIBERIUS a Roman Pro-consul fell into an ambuscade,
Fall of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus [Cons. B. C. 215 and 213] as he was advancing
from Lucania to Capua, by the treachery of the Lucanian Flavius, B. C. 212. Livy, 25, 16. |
and, after offering with his attendants a gallant
resistance to the enemy, was killed.
Now in regard to such catastrophes, whether
it is right to blame or pardon the sufferers is
by no means a safe matter on which to pronounce an opinion; because it has happened to several men, who have been perfectly correct in all their actions, to fall
into these misfortunes, equally with those
who do not scruple to transgress principles of right
confirmed by the consent of mankind. We should not however idly refrain from pronouncing an opinion: but should
blame or condone this or that general, after a review of
the necessities of the moment and the circumstances of
the case.
Fall of Archidamus, B. C. 226-225. |
And my observation will be rendered evident
by the following instances. Archidamus, king
of the Lacedaemonians, alarmed at the love
of power which he observed in Cleomenes,
fled from
Sparta; but being not long afterwards persuaded
to return, put himself in the power of the latter. The
consequence was that he lost his kingdom and his life
together,
1 and left a character not to be defended before
posterity on the score of prudence; for while affairs remained in the same state, and the ambition and power
of Cleomenes remained in exactly the same position, how
could he expect to meet any other fate than he did, if he
put himself in the hands of the very men from whom he had
before barely escaped destruction by flight?
Again Pelopidas of
Thebes, though acquainted
with the unprincipled character of the tyrant
Alexander, and though he knew thoroughly well that every
tyrant regards the leaders of liberty as his bitterest enemies,
first took upon himself to persuade Epaminondas to stand
forth as the champion of democracy, not only in
Thebes, but
in all
Greece also; and then, being in
Thessaly in arms, for the
express purpose of destroying the absolute rule of Alexander,
he yet twice ventured to undertake a mission to him.
Fall of Pelopidas in Thessaly, B. C. 363. |
The consequence
was that he fell into the hands of his enemies, did
great damage to
Thebes, and ruined the reputation he had
acquired before; and all by putting a rash and ill advised
confidence in the very last person in whom he
ought to have done so.
Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Asina with his fleet surprised
and captured at Lipara, B. C. 260. See I, 21. |
Very similar to these
cases is that of the Roman Consul Gnaeus
Cornelius who fell in the Sicilian war by imprudently putting himself in the power of the
enemy. And many parallel cases might be quoted.
Immense Exertions of Rome
The conclusion, then, is that those who put themselves
in the power of the enemy from want of proper precaution
deserve blame; but those who use every practicable precaution
not so: for to trust absolutely no one is to make all action impossible; but reasonable action, taken after receiving adequate
security, cannot be censured. Adequate securities are oaths,
children, wives, and, strongest of all, a blameless past. To be
betrayed and entrapped by such a security as any of these is a
slur, not on the deceived, but on the deceiver. The first
object then should be to seek such securities as it is impossible
for the recipient of the confidence to evade; but since such
are rare, the next best thing will be to take every reasonable
precaution one's self: and then, if we meet with any disaster, we
shall at least be acquitted of wrong conduct by the lookers on.
And this has been the case with many before now: of which the
most conspicuous example, and the one nearest to the times on
which we are engaged, will be the fate of Achaeus. He
omitted no possible precaution for securing his safety, but
thought of everything that it was possible for
human ingenuity to conceive: and yet he fell
into the power of his enemies.
In this instance
his misfortune procured the pity and pardon
of the outside world for the victim, and nothing but disparagement and loathing for the successful perpetrators. . . .
Rome and Carthage Continue to Covet Sardinia and Sicily
It appears to me not to be alien to my general
Sardinia reduced by T. Manlius Torquatus, B. C. 215. Marcellus took Leontini, B. C. 214 (autumn). Livy, 24, 30. |
purpose, and the plan which I originally laid down, to
recall the attention of my readers to the magnitude of the
events, and the persistency of purpose displayed by the two
States of
Rome and
Carthage. For who could think
it otherwise than remarkable that these two powers,
while engaged in so serious a war for the possession of
Italy, and one no less serious for that
of
Iberia; and being still both of them equally
balanced between uncertain hopes and fears for
the future of these wars, and confronted at the
very time with battles equally formidable to either,
should yet not be content with their existing undertakings: but should raise another controversy
as to the possession of
Sardinia and
Sicily; and not content with
merely hoping for all these things, should grasp
at them with all the resources of their wealth
and warlike forces? Indeed the more we
examine into details the greater becomes
our astonishment.
Marcus Valerius Laevinus commands a fleet off Greece, B. C. 215-214. Livy, 24, 10.
Publius Sulpicius Galba Cos. (B. C. 211.) sent to Macedonia. Livy, 26, 22; 27, 31.
Appius Claudius Pulcher, Praetor, sent to Sicily, B. C. 215. Livy, 23, 31,
Pro-praetor, B. C. 214. Livy 24, 33. |
The Romans had two
complete armies under the two Consuls on active service in
Italy; two in
Iberia in which
Gnaeus Cornelius commanded the land, Publius Cornelius the naval forces; and
naturally the same was the case with the Carthaginians. But besides this, a Roman
fleet was anchored off
Greece, watching it and the movements of Philip, of which first
Marcus Valerius, and afterward Publius Sulpicius was in command. Along with all
these undertakings Appius with a hundred quinqueremes,
and Marcus Claudius with an army, were
threatening
Sicily; while Hamilcar was doing
the same on the side of the Carthaginians.
Marcus Claudius Marcellus, Cos. III., B. C. 214. |
History of Universal Supremacy Must Be a Universal History
By means of these facts I presume that what I more than
once asserted at the beginning of my work is now shown by
actual experience to deserve unmixed credit. I mean my
assertion, that it is impossible for historians of particular places
to get a view of universal history. For how is it possible for
a man who has only read a separate history of Sicilian or
Spanish affairs to understand and grasp the greatness of the
events? Or, what is still more important, in what manner and
under what form of polity fortune brought to pass that most
surprising of all revolutions that have happened in our time, I
mean the reduction of all known parts of the world under one
rule and governance, a thing unprecedented in the history of
mankind. In what manner the Romans took
Syracuse or
Iberia may be possibly learned to a certain extent by means of
such particular histories; but how they arrived at universal
supremacy, and what opposition their grand designs met with
in particular places, or what on the other hand contributed to
their success, and at what epochs, this it is difficult to take in
without the aid of universal history. Nor, again, is it easy to
appreciate the greatness of their achievements except by the
latter method. For the fact of the Romans having sought to
gain
Iberia, or at another time
Sicily; or having gone on a
campaign with military and naval forces, told by itself, would
not be anything very wonderful. But if we learn that these
were all done at once, and that many more undertakings were
in course of accomplishment at the same time,—all at the cost
of one government and commonwealth; and if we see what
dangers and wars in their own territory were, at the very time,
encumbering the men who had all these things on hand: thus,
and only thus, will the astonishing nature of the events fully
dawn upon us, and obtain the attention which they deserve.
So much for those who suppose that by studying an episode
they have become acquainted with universal history. . . .
Hippocrates and Epicydes Take Over Syracuse
Hieronymus succeeded his grandfather, Hiero, in B. C. 216,
and was assassinated in Leontini thirteen months afterwards,
in B. C. 215. His death, however, did not bring more peaceful
relations between Syracuse and Rome, but only gave the Syracusans more able leaders (Livy, 24, 21). After the slaughter of
Themistius and Andramodorus, who had been elected on the
board of Generals, and the cruel murder of all the royal family,
Epicydes and Hippocrates,—Syracusans by descent, but born and
brought up at Carthage, and who had been sent to Syracuse on a
special mission by Hannibal,—were elected into the vacant places
in the board of Generals. They became the leading spirits in
the Syracusan government, and for a time kept up an appearance
of wishing to come to terms with Rome; and legates were actually
sent to Marcellus, at Morgantia (near Catana). But when the
Carthaginian fleet arrived at Pachynus, Hippocrates and
Epicydes threw off their mask, and declared that the other
magistrates were betraying the town to the Romans. This
accusation was rendered more specious by the appearance of
Appius with a Roman fleet at the mouth of the harbour. A rush
was made to the shore by the inhabitants to prevent the Romans
landing; and the tumult was with difficulty composed by the
wisdom of one of the magistrates, Apollonides, who persuaded the
people to vote for the peace with Rome (B. C. 215. Livy, 24, 21-28).
But Hippocrates and Epicydes determined not to acknowledge the
peace: they therefore provoked the Romans by plundering in or
near the Roman pale,2 and then took refuge in Leontini.
Marcellus complained at Syracuse, but was told that Leontini
was not within Syracusan jurisdiction. Marcellus, therefore,
took Leontini. Hippocrates and Epicydes managed to escape,
and by a mixture of force and fraud contrived soon afterwards to
force their way into Syracuse, seize and put to death most of the
generals, and induce the excited mob, whom they had inspired
with the utmost dread of being betrayed to Rome, to elect them
sole generals (Livy, 24, 29-32). The Romans at once ordered
Syracuse to be besieged, giving out that they were coming not
to wage war with the inhabitants, but to deliver them.
When Epicydes and Hippocrates had occupied
Syracuse,
Siege of Syracuse, B. C. 215-214. |
and had alienated the rest of the citizens with
themselves from the friendship of
Rome, the
Romans who had already been informed of the
murder of Hieronymus, tyrant of
Syracuse, appointed Appius
Claudius as Pro-praetor to command a land force, while
Marcus Claudius Marcellus commanded the fleet. These
officers took up a position not far from
Syracuse, and
determined to assault the town from the land at Hexapylus,
and by sea at what was called Stoa Scytice in Achradina,
where the wall has its foundation close down to the sea.
Having prepared their wicker pent-houses, and darts, and
other siege material, they felt confident that, with so many
hands employed, they would in five days get their works in
such an advanced state as to give them the
advantage over the enemy.
But in this they
did not take into account the abilities of Archimedes; nor calculate on the truth that, in certain circumstances, the genius
of one man is more effective than any numbers whatever.
3
However they now learnt it by experience. The city was strong
from the fact of its encircling wall lying along a chain of hills
with overhanging brows, the ascent of which was no easy task,
even with no one to hinder it, except at certain definite points.
Taking advantage of this, Archimedes had constructed such
defences both in the town, and at the places where an
attack might be made by sea, that the garrison would have
everything at hand which they might require at any moment,
and be ready to meet without delay whatever the enemy might
attempt against them.
The attack was begun by Appius bringing his penthouses, and scaling ladders, and attempting to fix the latter
against that part of the wall which abuts on Hexapylus towards
the east. At the same time Marcus Claudius Marcellus with
sixty quinqueremes was making a descent upon Achradina. Each
of these vessels were full of men armed with bows and slings
and javelins, with which to dislodge those who fought on the
battlements. As well as these vessels he had eight quinqueremes in pairs. Each pair had had their oars removed,
one on the larboard and the other on the starboard side, and
then had been lashed together on the sides thus left bare.
On these double vessels, rowed by the outer oars of each of
the pair, they brought up under the walls some
engines called "Sambucae," the construction
of which was as follows:—A ladder was made
four feet broad, and of a height to reach the top of the wall
from the place where its foot had to rest; each side of the
ladder was protected by a railing, and a covering or pent-house
was added overhead. It was then placed so that its foot
rested across the sides of the lashed-together vessels, which
touched each other with its other extremity protruding a
considerable way beyond the prows. On the tops of the masts
pulleys were fixed with ropes: and when the engines were
about to be used, men standing on the sterns of the vessels
drew the ropes tied to the head of the ladder, while others
standing on the prows assisted the raising of the machine and
kept it steady with long poles. Having then brought the
ships close in shore by using the outer oars of both vessels
they tried to let the machine down upon the wall. At the
head of the ladder was fixed a wooden stage secured on three
sides by wicker-shields, upon which stood four men who
fought and struggled with those who tried to prevent the
Sambuca from being made to rest on the battlements. But
when they have fixed it and so got above the level of the top
of the wall, the four men unfasten the wicker-shields from
either side of the stage, and walk out upon the battlements
or towers as the case may be; they are followed by their
comrades coming up by the Sambuca, since the ladder's
foot is safely secured with ropes and stands upon both the
ships. This construction has got the name of "Sambuca,"
or "Harp," for the natural reason, that when it is raised the
combination of the ship and ladder has very much the appearance of such an instrument.
Archimedes
With such contrivances and preparations were the
Romans intending to assault the towers.
But Archimedes
had constructed catapults to suit every range;
and as the ships sailing up were still at a considerable distance, he so wounded the enemy with
stones and darts, from the tighter wound and
longer engines, as to harass and perplex them to the last
degree; and when these began to carry over their heads, he
used smaller engines graduated according to the range required
from time to time, and by this means caused so much
confusion among them as to altogether check their advance
and attack; and finally Marcellus was reduced in despair to
bringing up his ships under cover of night. But when they
had come close to land, and so too near to be hit by the
catapults, they found that Archimedes had prepared another
contrivance against the soldiers who fought from the decks.
He had pierced the wall as high as a man's stature with
numerous loop-holes, which, on the outside, were about as
big as the palm of the hand. Inside the wall he stationed
archers and cross-bows, or scorpions,
4 and by the volleys
discharged through these he made the marines useless. By
these means he not only baffled the enemy, whether at a
distance or close at hand, but also killed the greater number
of them. As often, too, as they tried to work their Sambucae,
he had engines ready all along the walls, not visible at other
times, but which suddenly reared themselves above the wall
from inside, when the moment for their use had come, and
stretched their beams far over the battlements, some of them
carrying stones weighing as much as ten talents,
and others great masses of lead. So whenever
the Sambucae were approaching, these beams swung round on
their pivot the required distance, and by means of a rope
running through a pulley dropped the stone upon the Sambucae, with the result that it not only smashed the machine
itself to pieces, but put the ship also and all on board into the
most serious danger.
Other Inventions of Archimedes
Other machines which he invented were directed against
storming parties, who, advancing under the protection of penthouses, were secured by them from being hurt by missiles
shot through the walls. Against these he either shot stones
big enough to drive the marines from the prow; or let down
an iron hand swung on a chain, by which the man who
guided the crane, having fastened on some part of the prow
where he could get a hold, pressed down the lever of the
machine inside the wall; and when he had thus lifted the prow
and made the vessel rest upright on its stern, he fastened
the lever of his machine so that it could not be moved; and then
suddenly slackened the hand and chain by means of a rope
and pulley. The result was that many of the vessels heeled over
and fell on their sides: some completely capsized; while the
greater number, by their prows coming down suddenly from a
height, dipped low in the sea, shipped a great quantity of
water, and became a scene of the utmost confusion. Though
reduced almost to despair by these baffling inventions of
Archimedes, and though he saw that all his attempts were
repulsed by the garrison with mockery on their part and loss
to himself, Marcellus could not yet refrain from making a joke
at his own expense, saying that "Archimedes was using his
ships to ladle out the sea-water, but that his 'harps' not having
been invited to the party were buffeted and turned out with
disgrace." Such was the end of the attempt at storming
Syracuse by sea.
The Assault By Land Repulsed
Nor was Appius Claudius more successful. He, too,
was compelled by similar difficulties to desist
from the attempt; for while his men were
still at a considerable distance from the
wall, they began falling by the stones and shots from the
engines and catapults. The volleys of missiles, indeed, were
extraordinarily rapid and sharp, for their construction had been
provided for by all the liberality of a Hiero, and had been
planned and engineered by the skill of an Archimedes. Moreover, when they did at length get near the walls, they were
prevented from making an assault by the unceasing fire
through the loop-holes, which I mentioned before; or if they
tried to carry the place under cover of pent-houses, they were
killed by the stones and beams let down upon their heads.
The garrison also did them no little damage with those hands
at the end of their engines; for they used to lift the men,
armour, and all, into the air, and then throw them down. At
last Appius retired into the camp, and summoning the Tribunes
to a council of war, decided to try every possible means of
taking
Syracuse except a storm.
The siege turned into a blockade, B.C. 214. Coss. Q. Fabius Maximus IV. M. Claudius Marcellus III. |
And this
decision they carried out; for during the eight
months of siege which followed, though there
was no stratagem or measure of daring which they
did not attempt, they never again ventured to
attempt a storm. So true it is that one man
and one intellect, properly qualified for the particular undertaking, is a host in itself and of extraordinary efficacy. In
this instance, at any rate, we find the Romans confident that
their forces by land and sea would enable them to become
masters of the town, if only one old man could be got rid of;
while as long as he remained there, they did not venture even
to think of making the attempt, at least by any method which
made it possible for Archimedes to oppose them. They
believed, however, that their best chance of reducing the
garrison was by a failure of provisions sufficient for so large a
number as were within the town; they therefore relied upon
this hope, and with their ships tried to cut off their supplies by
sea, and with their army by land. But desiring that the time
during which they were blockading
Syracuse should not be
entirely wasted, but that some addition should be made to their
power in other parts of the country, the two commanders
separated and divided the troops between them: Appius
Claudius keeping two-thirds and continuing the blockade, while
Marcus Marcellus with the remaining third went to attack the
cities that sided with the Carthaginians. . . .
Philip Devastates Messene
Upon arriving in Messenia Philip began devasting the
Philip's second devastation of Messene, B.C. 214. |
country, like an open enemy, with more passion
than reason; for while pursuing this continuous
course of injurious actions, he expected, it
appears to me, that the sufferers would feel no
anger or hatred towards him.
I was induced
to speak of these proceedings in somewhat full
detail in the present as well as in the last book, not alone by
the same motives as those which I have assigned for other
parts of my work, but also by the fact that of our historians,
some have entirely omitted this Messenian episode; while
others from love or fear of kings have maintained that, so far
from the outrages committed by Philip in defiance of religion
and law upon the Messenians being a subject of blame, his
actions were on the contrary matters for praise and gratulation.
But it is not only in regard to the Messenians that we
may notice the historians of Philip acting thus; they have
done much the same in other cases also. And the result is
that their compositions have the appearance of a panegyric
rather than of a history. I however hold that an historian ought
neither to blame or praise kings untruly, as has often been
done; but to make what we say consistent with what has been
written before, and tally with the characters of the several
persons in question. But it may be urged perhaps that this is
easy to say, but very difficult to carry out; because situations
and circumstances are so many and various, to which men
have to give way in the course of their life, and which prevent
them from speaking out their real opinions. This may excuse
some, but not others.
Criticism Of Theopompus
I do not know any one who deserves more blame in
The extravagance of Theopompus's account of Philip II. |
this particular than Theopompus. In the beginning of his history of Philip he said that what
chiefly induced him to undertake it was the fact
that
Europe had never produced such a man as
Philip son of Amyntas; and then immediately afterwards, both
in his preface and in the whole course of his history, he
represents this king as so madly addicted to women, that he
did all that in him lay to ruin his own family by this inordinate
passion; as having behaved with the grossest unfairness and
perfidy to his friends and allies; as having enslaved and
treacherously seized a vast number of towns by force or fraud;
and as having been besides so violently addicted to strong
drink, that he was often seen by his friends drunk in open day.
But if any one will take the trouble to read the opening
passage of his forty-ninth book, he would be indeed astonished
at this writer's extravagance. Besides his other strange statements he has ventured to write as follows—for I here subjoin
his actual words:—"If there was any one in all
Greece, or among
the Barbarians, whose character was lascivious and shameless, he
was invariably attracted to Philip's court in
Macedonia and got
the title of 'the king's companion.' For it was Philip's constant
habit to reject those who lived respectably and were careful of
their property; but to honour and promote those who were
extravagant, and passed their lives in drinking and dicing. His
influence accordingly tended not only to confirm them in these
vices, but to make them proficients in every kind of rascality
and lewdness. What vice or infamy did they not possess?
What was there virtuous or of good report that they did not
lack? Some of them, men as they were, were ever clean
shaven and smooth-skinned; and even bearded men did not
shrink from mutual defilement. They took about with them
two or three slaves of their lust, while submitting to the same
shameful service themselves. The men whom they called
companions deserved a grosser name, and the title of soldier
was but a cover to mercenary vice; for, though bloodthirsty
by nature, they were lascivious by habit. In a word, to make
a long story short, especially as I have such a mass of matter
to deal with, I believe that the so-called 'friends' and
'companions' of Philip were more bestial in nature and
character than the Centaurs who lived on
Pelion, or the
Laestrygones who inhabited the Leontine plain, or in fact any
other monsters whatever."
5
Philip, Alexander, And the Diadochi
Who would not disapprove of such bitterness and intemperance of language in an historian? It is not only because
his words contradict his opening statement that he deserves
stricture; but also because he has libelled the king and his
friends; and still more because his falsehood is expressed in
disgusting and unbecoming words. If he had been speaking
of Sardanapalus, or one of his associates, he could hardly have
ventured to use such foul language; and what that monarch's
principles and debauchery were in his lifetime we gather from
the inscription on his tomb, which runs thus:
“"The joys I had from love or wine
Or dainty meats—those now are mine."
”
But when speaking of Philip and his friends, a man ought to be
on his guard, not so much of accusing them of effeminacy and
want of courage, or still more of shameless immorality, but on
the contrary lest he should prove unequal to express their praises
in a manner worthy of their manliness, indefatigable energy,
and the general virtue of their character.
The vigorous characters of the Diadochi. |
It is notorious that
by their energy and boldness they raised the
Macedonian Empire from a most insignificant
monarchy to the first rank in reputation and
extent. And, putting aside the achievements of Philip, what
was accomplished by them after his death, under the rule
of Alexander, has secured for them a reputation for valour
with posterity universally acknowledged. For although a large
share of the credit must perhaps be given to Alexander, as
the presiding genius of the whole, though so young a man;
yet no less is due to his coadjutors and friends, who won many
wonderful victories over the enemy; endured numerous desperate labours, dangers and sufferings; and, though put into
possession of the most ample wealth, and the most abundant
means of gratifying all their desires, never lost their bodily
vigour by these means, or contracted tastes for violence or
debauchery. On the contrary, all those who were associated
with Philip, and afterwards with Alexander, became truly royal in
greatness of soul, temperance of life, and courage. Nor is it
necessary to mention any names: but after Alexander's death,
in their mutual rivalries for the possession of various parts of
nearly all the world, they filled a very large number of histories
with the record of their glorious deeds. We may admit then
that the bitter invective of the historian Timaeus against
Agathocles, despot of
Sicily, though it seems unmeasured, has
yet some reason in it,—for it is directed against a personal
enemy, a bad man, and a tyrant; but that of Theopompus is
too scurrilous to be taken seriously.
Flawed Structure of Theopompus's History
For, after premising that he is going to write about a
king most richly endowed by nature with virtue, he has raked up
against him every shameful and atrocious charge that he could
find. There are therefore but two alternatives: either this
writer in the preface to his work has shown himself a liar and
a flatterer; or in the body of that history a fool and utter
simpleton, if he imagined that by senseless and improper
invective he would either increase his own credit, or gain
great acceptance for his laudatory expressions about Philip.
But the fact is that the general plan of this writer is one
Thucydides breaks off in B. C. 411. Battle of Leuctra, B. C. 371. |
also which can meet with no one's approval. For
having undertaken to write a Greek History from
the point at which Thucydides left off, when he
got near the period of the battle of Leuctra, and
the most splendid exploits of the Greeks, he threw aside
Greece
and its achievements in the middle of his story, and, changing
his purpose, undertook to write the history of Philip. And yet
it would have been far more telling and fair to have included
the actions of Philip in the general history of
Greece, than the
history of
Greece in that of Philip. For one cannot conceive
any one, who had been preoccupied by the study of a royal
government, hesitating, if he got the power and opportunity, to
transfer his attention to the great name and splendid personality
of a nation like
Greece; but no one in his senses, after beginning
with the latter, would have exchanged it for the showy biography
of a tyrant. Now what could it have been that compelled
Theopompus to overlook such inconsistencies? Nothing
surely but this, that whereas the aim of his original history was
honour, that of his history of Philip was expediency. As to
this deviation from the right path however, which made him
change the theme of his history, he might perhaps have had
something to say, if any one had questioned him about it; but
as to his abominable language about the king's friends, I do not
think that he could have said a word of defence, but must have
owned to a serious breach of propriety. . . .
Aratus Poisoned
Though regarding the Messenians as open enemies,
Philip was unable to inflict serious damage upon them, in spite
of his setting to work to devastate their territory; but he was
guilty of abominable conduct of the worst description to men
who had been his most intimate friends. For on the elder
Aratus showing disapproval of his proceedings at
Messene, he
caused him not long afterwards to be made
away with by poison, through the agency of
Taurion who had charge of his interests in the
Peloponnese.
Death of Aratus, B. C. 213. |
The crime was not known at the time by other
people; for the drug was not one of those which kill on the
spot, but was a slow poison producing a morbid state of the body.
Aratus himself however was fully aware of the cause of his illness;
and showed that he was so by the following circumstance.
Though he kept the secret from the rest of the world, he did not
conceal it from one of his servants named Cepholon, with whom
he was on terms of great affection. This man waited on him
during his illness with great assiduity, and having one day
pointed out some spittle on the wall which was stained with
blood, Aratus remarked, 'That is the reward I have got for
my friendship to Philip." Such a grand and noble thing is
disinterested virtue, that the sufferer was more ashamed, than
the inflicter of the injury, of having it known, that, after so
many splendid services performed in the interests of Philip, he
had got such a return as that for his loyalty.
6
In consequence of having been so often elected Strategus
of the Achaean league, and of having performed
so many splendid services for that people, Aratus
after his death met with the honours he deserved,
both in his own native city and from the league
as a body. They voted him sacrifices and the honours of
heroship, and in a word every thing calculated to perpetuate his
memory; so that, if the departed have any consciousness, it is
but reasonable to think that he feels pleasure at the gratitude
of the Achaeans, and at the thought of the hardships and
dangers he endured in his life. . . .
Philip Takes Lissus in Illyria, B.C. 213
Philip had long had his thoughts fixed upon
Lissus and
Lissus founded by Dionysius of Syracuse, B. C. 385. See Diod. Sic. 15. 13. |
its citadel; and, being anxious to become master
of those places, he started with his army, and
after two days' march got through the pass and
pitched his camp on the bank of the river
Ardaxanus, not far from the town. He found
on surveying the place that the fortifications of
Lissus, both on the side of the sea and of the land, were
exceedingly strong both by nature and art; and that the citadel,
which was near it, from its extraordinary height and its other
sources of strength, looked more than any one could hope to
carry by storm. He therefore gave up all hope of the latter,
but did not entirely despair of taking the town. He observed
that there was a space between
Lissus and the foot of the Acrolissus which was fairly well suited for making an attempt upon
the town. He conceived the idea therefore of bringing on a
skirmish in this space, and then employing a strategem suited
to the circumstances of the case. Having given his men a day
for rest; and having in the course of it addressed them in
suitable words of exhortation; he hid the greater and most
effective part of his light-armed troops during the night in
some woody gulleys, close to this space on the land side; and
next morning marched to the other side of the town next the
sea, with his peltasts and the rest of his light-armed. Having
thus marched round the town, and arrived at this spot, he
made a show of intending to assault it at that point. Now as
Philip's advent had been no secret, a large body of men from
the surrounding country of
Illyria had flocked into
Lissus;
but feeling confidence in the strength of the citadel, they had
assigned a very moderate number of men to garrison it.
Philip V. In Illyria
As soon therefore as the Macedonians approached,
The Acrolissus taken by a feint, and Lissus afterwards. |
they began pouring out of the town, confident
in their numbers and in the strength of the places.
The king stationed his peltasts on the level
ground, and ordered the light-armed troops to
advance towards the hills and energetically engage the enemy.
These orders being obeyed, the fight remained doubtful for a
time; but presently Philip's men yielded to the inequality of
the ground, and the superior number of the enemy, and gave
way. Upon their retreating within the ranks of the peltasts,
the sallying party advanced with feelings of contempt, and
having descended to the same level as the peltasts joined battle
with them. But the garrison of the citadel seeing Philip
moving his divisions one after the other slowly to the rear, and
believing that he was abandoning the field, allowed themselves
to be insensibly decoyed out, in their confidence in the strength
of their fortifications; and thus, leaving the citadel by degrees,
kept pouring down by bye-ways into the lower plain, under the
belief that they would have an opportunity of getting booty and
completing the enemy's discomfiture. Meanwhile the division,
which had been lying concealed on the side of the mainland,
rose without being observed, and advanced at a rapid pace.
At their approach the peltasts also wheeled round and charged
the enemy. On this the troops from
Lissus were thrown into
confusion, and, after a straggling retreat, got safely back into
the town; while the garrison which had abandoned the citadel
got cut off from it by the rising of the troops which had been
lying in ambush. The result accordingly was that what
seemed hopeless, namely the capture of the citadel, was
effected at once and without any fighting; while
Lissus did
not fall until next day, and then only after desperate struggles,
the Macedonians assaulting with vigour and even terrific fury.
Thus Philip having, beyond all expectation, made himself
master of these places, reduced by this exploit all the
neighbouring populations to obedience; so much so that the
greater number of the Illyrians voluntarily surrendered their
cities to his protection; for it had come to be believed that,
after the storming of such strongholds as these, no fortification
and no provision for security could be of any avail against the
might of Philip.
Bolis the Cretan Agrees to Rescue Achaeus
(See
7, 15-18)
Bolis was by birth a Cretan, who had long enjoyed
the honours of high military rank at King Ptolemy's court,
and the reputation of being second to none
in natural ability, adventurous daring, and experience in war.
B.C. 214. Sosibius secures the help of Bolis to rescue Achaeus. |
By repeated arguments Sosibius secured this man's fidelity; and when he felt
sure of his zeal and affection he communicated
the business in hand to him. He told him that he could not
do the king a more acceptable service at the present crisis
than by contriving some way of saving Achaeus. At the
moment Bolis listened, and retired without saying more than
that he would consider the suggestion. But after two or
three days' reflection, he came to Sosibius and said that he would
undertake the business; remarking that, having spent some
considerable time at
Sardis, he knew its topography, and that
Cambylus, the commander of the Cretan contingent of the
army of Antiochus, was not only a fellow citizen of his but a
kinsmen and friend. It chanced moreover that Cambylus and
his men had in charge one of the outposts on the rear of the
acropolis, where the nature of the ground did not admit of
siege-works, but was guarded by the permanent cantonment of
troops under Cambylus. Sosibius caught at the suggestion,
convinced that, if Achaeus could be saved at all from his
dangerous situation, it could be better accomplished by the
agency of Bolis than of any one else; and, this conviction being
backed by great zeal on the part of Bolis, the undertaking was
pushed on with despatch. Sosibius at once supplied the
money necessary for the attempt, and promised a large sum
besides in case of its success; at the same time raising the
hopes of Bolis to the utmost by dilating upon the favours he
might look for from the king, as well as from the rescued
prince himself.
Full of eagerness therefore for success, Bolis set sail without delay, taking with him a letter in cipher and other
credentials addressed to Nicomachus at
Rhodes, who was
believed to entertain a fatherly affection and devotion for
Achaeus, and also to Melancomas at
Ephesus; for these were
the men formerly employed by Achaeus in his negotiations
with Ptolemy, and in all other foreign affairs.
Bolis Turns Traitor
Bolis went to
Rhodes, and thence to
Ephesus; communicated
his purpose to Nicomachus and Melancomas; and
found them ready to do what they were asked. He then
despatched one of his staff, named Arianus, to Cambylus, with
a message to the effect that he had been sent from
Alexandria
on a recruiting tour, and that he wished for an interview with
Cambylus on some matters of importance; he thought it
therefore necessary to have a time and place arranged for them
to meet without the privity of a third person. Arianus quickly
obtained an interview with Cambylus and delivered his
message; nor was the latter at all unwilling to listen to the
proposal. Having appointed a day, and a place known to
both himself and Bolis, at which he would be after nightfall,
he dismissed Arianus. Now Bolis had all the subtlety of a
Cretan, and he accordingly weighed carefully in his own mind
every possible line of action, and patiently examined every
idea which presented itself to him.
Finally he
met Cambylus according to the arrangement
made with Arianus, and delivered his letter. This
was now made the subject of discussion between them in a
truly Cretan spirit. They never took into consideration the
means of saving the person in danger, or their obligations of
honour to those who had entrusted them with the undertaking,
but confined their discussions entirely to the question of their
own safety and their own advantage. As they were both
Cretans they were not long in coming to an unanimous
agreement: which was, first of all, to divide the ten talents
supplied by Sosibius between themselves in equal shares; and,
secondly, to discover the whole affair to Antiochus, and to
offer with his support to put Achaeus into his hands, on
condition of receiving a sum of money and promises for the
future, on a scale commensurate with the greatness of the
undertaking. Having settled upon this plan of action:
Cambylus undertook the negotiation with Antiochus, while to
Bolis was assigned the duty of sending Arianus within the
next few days to Achaeus, bearing letters in cipher from
Nicomachus and Melancomas: he bade Cambylus however
take upon himself to consider how Arianus was to make his
way into the acropolis and return with safety. "If," said
Bolis, "Achaeus consents to make the attempt, and sends an
answer to Nicomachus and Melancomas, I will be ready to
act and will communicate with you." Having thus arranged
the parts which each was to take in the plot, they separated
and set about their several tasks.
Antiochus Approves the Plan
At the first opportunity Cambylus laid the proposal
The intended treason against Achaeus communicated to Antiochus. |
before the king. It was as acceptable to
Antiochus as it was unexpected: in the first
flush of his exultation he promised everything
they asked; but presently feeling some distrust,
he questioned Cambylus on every detail of their
plan, and their means of carrying it out. Being eventually
satisfied on these points, and believing that the undertaking
was under the special favour of Providence, he repeatedly
begged and prayed Cambylus to bring it to a conclusion.
Bolis was equally successful with Nicomachus and Melancomas.
They entertained no doubt of his sincerity, and joined him in
the composition of letters to Achaeus,—composed in a
cipher which they had been accustomed to use,—to prevent
any one who got hold of the letter from making out its contents,
exhorting him to trust Bolis and Cambylus. So Arianus,
having by the aid of Cambylus made his way into the acropolis,
delivered the letters to Achaeus; and having had personal
acquaintance with the whole business from its commencement,
he was able to give an account of every detail when questioned
and cross-questioned again and again by Achaeus about
Sosibius and Bolis, about Nicomachus and Melancomas, and
most particularly about the part which Cambylus was taking
in the affair. He could of course stand this cross-examination
with some air of sincerity and candour, because, in point of
fact, he was not acquainted with the most important part of
the plan which Cambylus and Bolis had
adopted.
Achaeus was convinced by the
answers returned by Arianus, and still more
by the cipher of Nicomachus and Melancomas; gave his
answer; and sent Arianus back with it without delay. This
kind of communication was repeated more than once: and at
last Achaeus entrusted himself without reserve to Nicomachus,
there being absolutely no other hope of saving himself left
remaining, and bade him send Bolis with Arianus on a certain
moonless night, promising to place himself in their hands.
The idea of Achaeus was, first of all, to escape his immediate
danger; and then by a circuitous route to make his way into
Syria. For he entertained very great hopes that, if he appeared
suddenly and unexpectedly to the Syrians, while Antiochus
was still lingering about
Sardis, he would be able to stir up a
great movement, and meet with a cordial reception from the
people of
Antioch,
Coele-Syria, and
Phoenicia.
With such expectations and calculations Achaeus was
waiting for the appearance of Bolis.
The Final Arrangements are Made
Meanwhile Arianus had reached Melancomas, who, on
reading the letter which he brought, immediately despatched
Bolis with many words of exhortation and great promises of
profit if he succeeded in his enterprise. Bolis sent Arianus
in advance to signify his arrival to Cambylus, and went after
nightfall to their usual place of meeting. There they spent a
whole day together settling every detail of their plan of
operations; and having done this they went into the camp
under cover of night. The arrangement made between them
was this. If it turned out that Achaeus came from the
acropolis alone with Bolis and Arianus, or with only one
attendant, he would give them no cause for anxiety at all,
but would be easily captured by the ambuscade set for him.
If, on the other hand, he should be accompanied by a
considerable number, the business would be one of some
difficulty to those on whose good faith he relied; especially
as they were anxious to capture him alive, that being what
would most gratify Antiochus. In that case, therefore, Arianus,
while conducting Achaeus, was to go in front, because he knew
the path by which he had on several occasions effected his
entrance and return; Bolis was to bring up the rear, in order
that, when they arrived at the spot where Cambylus was to
have his ambuscade ready, he might lay hold on Achaeus, and
prevent his getting away through wooded ground, in the confusion and darkness of the night, or throwing himself in his
terror from some precipice; thus they would secure that he
fell, as they intended, into his enemies' hands alive.
These arrangements having been agreed upon, Bolis was
taken by Cambylus on the very night of his arrival, without
any one else, and introduced to Antiochus. The king was
alone and received them graciously; he pledged himself to
the performance of his promises, and urged them both again
and again not to postpone any longer the performance of their
purpose. Thereupon they returned for the present to their
own camp; but towards morning Bolis, accompanied by
Arianus, ascended to the acropolis, and entered it before
daybreak.
Achaeus Takes Precautions
Achaeus received them with warmth and cordiality,
Achaeus takes vain precautions. |
and questioned Bolis at great length on every
detail. From the expression of his face, and
his conversation, he judged Bolis to be a man of
a character weighty enough for so serious an undertaking; but
while at one time he exulted in the prospect of his release, at
another, he grew painfully excited, and was torn with an agony of
anxiety at the gravity of the issues at stake. But no one had a
clearer head or greater experience in affairs than he; and in spite
of the good opinion he had formed of him, he still determined
that his safety should not depend entirely on the good faith of
Bolis. He accordingly told him that it was impossible for
him to leave the acropolis at the moment: but that he would
send some two or three of his friends with him, and by the
time that they had joined Melancomas he would be prepared
to depart. So Achaeus did all he could for his security; but
he did not know that he was trying to do what the proverb
declares to be impossible—out-cretan a Cretan. For there was
no trick likely to be tried that Bolis had not anticipated. However when the night came, in which Achaeus said that he would
send his friends with them, he sent on Arianus and Bolis to the
entrance of the acropolis, with instructions to wait there until
those who were to go with them arrived. They did as he bade
them. Achaeus then, at the very moment of his departure,
communicated his plan to his wife Laodice; and she was so
terrified at his sudden resolve, that he had to spend some time
in entreating her to be calm, in soothing her feelings, and
encouraging her by pointing out the hopes which he entertained. This done he started with four companions, whom he
dressed in ordinary clothes, while he himself put on a mean
and common dress and disguised his rank as much as possible.
He selected one of his four companions to be always prepared
to answer anything said by Arianus, and to ask any necessary
question of him, and bade him say that the other four did not
speak Greek.
Capture of Achaeus
The five then joined Arianus, and they all started
together on their journey. Arianus went in
front, as being acquainted with the way; while
Bolis took up his position behind in accordance
with the original plan, puzzled and annoyed at the way things
were turning out. For, Cretan as he was, and ready to suspect
every one he came near, he yet could not make out which of
the five was Achaeus, or whether he was there at all. But the
path was for the most part precipitous and difficult, and in
some places there were abrupt descents which were slippery
and dangerous; and whenever they came to one of these,
some of the four gave Achaeus a hand down, and the others
caught him at the bottom, for they could not entirely conceal
their habitual respect for him; and Bolis was quick to detect,
by observing this, which of them was Achaeus. When therefore
they arrived at the spot at which it had been arranged that
Cambylus was to be, Bolis gave the signal by a whistle, and
the men sprang from their places of concealment and seized
the other four, while Bolis himself caught hold of Achaeus,
at the same time grasping his mantle, as his hands were inside
it; for he was afraid that having a sword concealed about his
person he would attempt to kill himself when he understood
what was happening. Being thus quickly surrounded on every
side, Achaeus fell into the hands of his enemies, and along
with his four friends was taken straight off to Antiochus.
The king was in his tent in a state of extreme anxiety
Achaeus brought to Antiochus, sentenced and executed. |
awaiting the result. He had dismissed his
usual court, and, with the exception of two
or three of the bodyguard, was alone and
sleepless. But when Cambylus and his men
entered, and placed Achaeus in chains on the ground, he fell
into a state of speechless astonishment: and for a considerable
time could not utter a word, and finally overcome by a feeling
of pity burst into tears; caused, I have no doubt, by this
exhibition of the capriciousness of Fortune, which defies
precaution and calculation alike. For here was Achaeus, a
son of Andromachus, the brother of Seleucus's queen Laodice,
and married to Laodice, a daughter of King Mithridates, and
who had made himself master of all
Asia this side of Taurus,
and who at that very moment was believed by his own army,
as well as by that of his enemy, to be safely ensconced in
the strongest position in the world,—sitting chained upon the
ground, in the hands of his enemies, before a single person
knew of it except those who had effected the capture.
Antiochus In Armenia
And, indeed, when at daybreak the king's friends
assembled as usual at his tent, and saw this strange spectacle,
they too felt emotions very like those of the king; while extreme
astonishment made them almost disbelieve the evidence of their
senses. However the council met, and a long debate ensued
as to what punishment they were to inflict upon Achaeus.
Finally, it was resolved that his extremities should be cut off,
his head severed from his body and sewn up in the skin of an
ass, and his body impaled. When this sentence had been
carried out, and the army learnt what had happened, there
was such excitement in the ranks and such a rush of the soldiers
to the spectacle, that Laodice on the acropolis, who alone
knew that her husband had left it, guessed what had happened
from the commotion and stir in the camp. And before long
a herald arrived, told Laodice what had happened to Achaeus,
and ordered her to resign the command and quit the
acropolis.
The citadel of Sardis surrendered. |
At first any answer was prevented
by an outburst of sorrow and overpowering
lamentation on the part of the occupants of
the acropolis; not so much from affection towards Achaeus,
as from the suddenness and utter unexpectedness of the
catastrophe. But this was succeeded by a feeling of
hesitation and dismay; and Antiochus, having got rid of
Achaeus, never ceased putting pressure on the garrison of
the acropolis, feeling confident that a means of taking it
would be put into his hands by those who occupied it, and
most probably by the rank and file of the garrison. And this
is just what did finally happen: for the soldiers split up into
factions, one joining Ariobazus, the other Laodice. This
produced mutual distrust, and before long both parties surrendered
themselves and the acropolis. Thus Achaeus, in spite
of having taken every reasonable precaution, lost his life by
the perfidy of those in whom he trusted. His fate may teach
posterity two useful lessons,—not to put faith in any one
lightly; and not to be over-confident in the hour of prosperity,
knowing that, in human affairs, there is no accident which we
may not expect. . . .
The Gallic King, Cauarus
Cauarus, king of the Gauls in
Thrace, was of a truly
royal and high-minded disposition, and gave
the merchants sailing into the
Pontus great
protection, and rendered the Byzantines important services in their wars with the
Thracians and Bithynians. . . .
This king, so excellent in other respects, was corrupted
by a flatterer named Sostratus, who was a Chalchedonian by
birth. . . .
Antiochus the Great at Armosata
In the reign of Xerxes, prince of the city of Armosata, situated on the "Fair Plain," between
In the course of his campaigns for the recovering of the eastern provinces (B. C. 212-205).
Antiochus makes a demonstration before the city of Armosata, in Armenia, to recover the arrears of tribute owed by the late king, B. C. 212. |
the
Tigris and
Euphrates, King Antiochus
encamped under its walls and prepared to
attack it. When he saw the king's forces,
Xerxes at first conveyed himself away; but
feeling afterwards that, if his palace were seized
by his enemies, his whole kingdom would be
overthrown, he changed his mind, and sent a
message to Antiochus declaring his wish for
a conference. The most loyal of the friends
of Antiochus were against letting the young
prince go when they once got him into their
hands, and advised Antiochus to take possession of the town,
and hand over the principality to Mithridates, his own sister's
son. The king, however, would not listen to any of these
suggestions; but sent for the young prince and accommodated their differences, forgiving him the larger part of the
money which he allowed to be owing from his father under
the head of tribute, and accepting a present payment from him
of three hundred talents, a thousand horses, and a thousand
mules with their trappings. He then settled the government
of the city, and gave the prince his sister Antiochis as a wife.
By these proceedings, in which he was thought to have acted
with true royal magnanimity, he won the affection and
support of all the inhabitants of that part of the country.
The Hannibalian War — Tarentum
It was in the wantonness of excessive prosperity that
the Tarentines invited Pyrrhus of
Epirus; for democratic
liberty that has enjoyed a long and unchecked career comes
naturally to experience a satiety of its blessings, and then it
looks out for a master; and when it has got one, it is not
long before it hates him, because it is seen that the change is
for the worse. This is just what happened to the Tarentines
on that occasion. . . .
On this news being brought to
Tarentum and
Thurii there
was great popular indignation. . . .
The conspirators left the town at first under the pretext
of
Hannibal marched south early in B.C. 212 to renew his attempt upon Tarentum,
on which he had wasted much of the previous summer (Livy, 25, 1) The severity
of the punishment of the Tarentine hostages who tried to escape from Rome caused a conspiracy of Tarentines
to betray the town to Hannibal. Livy, 25, 7-8. |
a foray, and got near Hannibal's camp before
daybreak. Then, while the rest crouched down
on a certain wooded spot by the side of the
road, Philemenus and Nicon went up to the
camp. They were seized by the sentries and
taken off to Hannibal, without saying a word as
to where they came from or who they were, but
simply stating that they wished for an interview
with the general. Being taken without delay
to Hannibal they said that they wished to
speak with him privately. He assented with
the utmost readiness; whereupon they explained
to him their own position and that of their
native city, charging the Romans with many
various acts of oppression, that they might not
seem to be entering on their present undertaking without good reason. For the present
Hannibal dismissed them with thanks and a cordial acceptance
of their proposed movement, and charging them to come back
very soon and have another interview with him. "This time,"
he added, "when you get at a sufficient distance from the camp,
take possession of the first cattle you find being driven out to
pasture in the early morning, and go off boldly with them and
their herdsmen; for I will take care that you are unmolested."
His object in doing this was to give himself time to inquire
into the tale of the young men; and also to confirm their credit
with their fellow-citizens, by making it appear that their
expedition had really been for the purpose of foraging.
Nicon and his companions did as they were bidden, and left
Hannibal in great exultation at having at last got an opportunity of completing his enterprise: while they themselves
were made all the more eager to carry out their plot by having
been able to accomplish their interview with Hannibal without
danger, and by having found him warmly disposed to their
undertaking, and by having besides gained the confidence of
their own people by the considerable amount of booty which
they had brought home. This they partly sold and partly
used in splendid entertainments, and thus not only were
believed in by the Tarentines, but excited a considerable
number to emulate their exploit.
A Bargain Made with Hannibal
On their next expedition, which they conducted in the
same way as the first, they interchanged pledges
of fidelity with Hannibal on the following conditions: "He was to set the Tarentines free;
and the Carthaginians were neither to exact tribute of any sort
from them, nor impose any burden upon them; but the houses
and lodgings occupied by Romans should, on their taking
possession of the town, be given up to the Carthaginians to
plunder." They also arranged on a watch-word at which the
sentries were to admit them without delay into the camp
whenever they came. After making these arrangements, they
got the opportunity of often having interviews with Hannibal:
sometimes pretending to be going out of the town on a foray,
and sometimes on a hunting expedition. Everything having
thus been put in train, the greater part of the conspirators
waited for the proper occasions for acting, while they assigned
to Philemenus the part of leader of their hunting excursions; for,
owing to his excessive taste for that amusement, he had the reputation of thinking hunting the most important thing in life.
Accordingly they left it to him, first to win the favour of Gaius
Livius the commander of the town by presents of game, and
then that of the guards of the gate-tower which protected what
were called the Temenid gates. Philemenus undertook the
task: and partly by what he caught himself, and partly with what
Hannibal supplied, always managed to bring in some game;
which he divided between Livius and the guards of the gate,
to induce them to be always ready to open the wicket to him.
For he generally went and returned from his expeditions after
nightfall, under the pretext of being afraid of the enemy, but
really with a view of preparing for the plot. When Philemenus
then had managed to make it a regular arranged thing with
the picket at the gate, that the guards should have no hesitation;
but that, whenever he came under the wall and whistled, they
should open the wicket to him; he waited for a day on which
the Roman commander of the town was engaged to be present
at a large party, meeting early in the Musaeum, which is near
the agora, and agreed with Hannibal to carry out their plot
on that day.
Tarentum Betrayed To Hannibal
For some time before this, Hannibal had given out that
Hannibal prepares to act. |
he was ill, to prevent the Romans wondering
when they were told of his staying so long on
the same ground; and he now made a greater
pretence than ever of ill-health, and remained encamped three
days' march from
Tarentum. But when the time was come, he
got ready the most conspicuous for their speed and daring in
his cavalry and infantry, to the number of about ten thousand,
and gave orders that they should take provisions for four days.
He started just before daybreak, and marched at full speed;
having told off eighty Numidian horsemen to keep thirty stades
ahead, and to scour the country on both sides of the road; so
that no one might get a sight of the main body, but might
either be taken prisoners by this advanced guard, or, if he
escaped, might carry a report of it into the city as if it were
merely a raid of Numidian horsemen. When the Numidians
were about a hundred and twenty stades from the town,
Hannibal halted his men for supper by the side of a river
flowing through a deep gully, and offering excellent cover; and
having summoned his officers, did not indeed tell them outright what the service was on which they were going, but
simply exhorted them, first to show themselves brave men,
as the prize awaiting them was the greatest they had ever had;
and, secondly, that each should keep the men of his own
company well together, and rebuke sharply all who left their
own division on any pretext whatever; and, thirdly, to attend
strictly to orders, and not attempt anything on their own account
outside them. Dismissing the officers with these words, he got
his troops on the march just after dark, being very anxious to
reach the wall about midnight; having Philemenus to act as
guide, and having got ready for him a wild-boar to enable
him to sustain the part which he was to perform.
Gaius Livius Has a Party
About sunset news was brought to Gaius Livius, who
Gaius Livius thrown off the scent. |
had been with his friends in the Musaeum since
early in the day, just when the drinking was at
its height, that the Numidians were scouring
the country. He therefore took measures for that and
nothing more, calling some of his officers and bidding
them take half the cavalry, and sally out to stop the progress
of the enemy, who were devasting the country: but this
only made him still more unsuspicious of the whole extent
of the movement. Nicon, Tragiscus, and their confederates
collected together at nightfall in the town and waited for the
return of Livius and his friends. As these last rose from table
somewhat early, because the banquet had begun before the usual
time, the greater number of the conspirators retired to a certain
spot and there remained; but some of the younger men went to
meet Gaius, imitating by their disorderly procession and mutual
jests a company returning from a carouse. As Livius and his
company were even more flustered with drink, as soon as
they met laughter and joking were readily excited on both
sides. Finally, they turned and conducted Gaius to his house;
where he went to bed full of wine, as might be expected after
a party beginning so early in the day, without any anxiety or
trouble in his thoughts, but full of cheerfulness and idle
content. Then Nicon and Tragiscus rejoined their companions,
and, dividing themselves into three companies, took
up their positions at the most favourable points in the marketplace, to keep themselves fully acquainted with everything
reported from outside the walls, or that happened within the
city itself. They posted some also close to the house of
Livius: being well aware that, if any suspicion of what was
coming arose, it would be to him that the news would be first
brought, and that from him every measure taken would
originate. So when the noise of the returning guests, and every
disturbance of the sort, had subsided, and the great bulk of the
citizens was asleep; and now the night was advancing, and
nothing had happened to dash their hopes, they collected
together and proceeded to perform their part of the undertaking.
Hannibal Enters Tarentum
The arrangements between these young men and
Hannibal were these. Hannibal was to arrive at the town by the
inland road and on the eastern side near the Temenid gates;
and when there, was to light a fire on the tomb, which some
called the tomb of Hyacinthus, and others of Apollo: Tragiscus
and his confederates, when they saw this, were to light an
answering fire from within the walls. This done, Hannibal
was to put out his fire and advance slowly towards the gate.
In pursuance of these arrangements, the young men marched
through the inhabited part of town and
came to the tombs.
Why the Tarentines bury within the walls. |
For the eastern quarter of
Tarentum is full of monuments, because those who
die there are to this day all buried within the walls, in obedience
to an ancient oracle. For it is said that the god delivered
this answer to the Tarentines, "That it were better and more
profitable for them if they made their dwelling with the majority"; and they thought therefore that they would be living
in accordance with the oracle if they kept the departed within
the walls. That is why to this day they bury inside the gates.
The young men, then, having gone as far as the tomb of
Hannibal arrives and gets into the town. |
Pythionicus, waited to see what would happen.
Presently Hannibal arrived and did as arranged:
whereupon Nicon and Tragiscus with renewed
courage displayed their beacon also; and, as soon as they saw
the fire of the Carthaginians being put out, they ran to the
gates as fast as they could go, wishing to get the picket at the
gate tower killed before the Carthaginians arrived; as it had
been agreed that they should advance leisurely and at a foot's
pace. Everything went smoothly: the guards were overpowered; and while some of the young men were engaged in
killing them, others were cutting the bolts. The gates having
been quickly thrown open, Hannibal arrived at the right
moment, having so timed his march that he never had to stop
on the way to the town at all.
Philemenus and his Retinue Get In Too
Having thus effected their intended entrance, without
danger or any disturbance whatever, and thinking that the most
important part of their undertaking was accomplished, the
Carthaginians now began advancing boldly along the street
leading up from what is called the Batheia or Deep Road.
They left the cavalry however outside the walls, numbering as
many as two thousand, intending them to act as a reserve both
in case of any appearance of the enemy from without, and of
any of those unforeseen casualities which do occur in such
operations. But when they had come to the immediate
neighbourhood of the market-place, they halted, and waited
to see how the attempt of Philemenus would turn out: being
anxious as to the success of this part of their plan as well as
the other. For at the same moment that he lighted his fire,
and was on the point of starting for the gates, Hannibal had
despatched Philemenus also, with his boar on
a litter, and a thousand Libyans, to the next
gate; wishing, in accordance with his original
design, not to depend solely on one chance, but to have several.
When Philemenus, then, arrived at the wall and gave his
customary signal by whistling, the sentry immediately appeared
coming down to open the wicket; and when Philemenus told
him from outside to open quickly because they had a great
weight to carry, as they were bringing a wild boar, he made
haste to open the wicket, expecting that some of the game
which Philemenus was conveying would come his way, as
he had always had a share of what was brought in.
Thereupon Philemenus himself, being at the head of the
litter, entered first; and with him another dressed like a
shepherd, as though he were one of the country folk
of those parts; and after him two others besides who were
carrying the dead beast behind. But when the four had
got inside the wicket, they struck and killed the man who
opened it, as he was unsuspiciously examining and feeling the
boar, and then let the men who were just behind them, and
were in advance of the main body of Libyan horsemen, to
the number of thirty, leisurely and quietly through. This
having been accomplished without a hitch, some set about
cutting the bolts, others were engaged in killing the picket
on duty at the gate, and others in giving the signal to
the Libyans still outside to come in. These having also
effected their entrance in safety, they began making their way
towards the market-place according to the arrangement. As
soon as he was joined by this division also, in great delight at
the successful progress of the operation, Hannibal proceeded
to carry out the next step.
Massacre of Romans In Tarentum
He told off two thousand of his Celts: and, having
divided them into three companies, he assigned two of the
young men who had managed the plot to each company; and
sent with them also certain of his own officers, with orders to
close up the several most convenient streets that led to the
market-place. And when he had done this, he bade the
young men of the town pick out and save those of their
fellow-citizens whom they might chance to meet, by shouting
out before they came up with them, "That Tarentines should
remain where they were, as they were in no danger"; but he
ordered both Carthaginian and Celtic officers to kill all the
Romans they met.
So these companies separated and proceeded to carry out
Escape of Livius into the citadel. |
their orders. But when the entrance of the
enemy became known to the Tarentines, the
city began to be full of shouting and extraordinary confusion. As for Gaius, when the enemy's entrance was
announced to him, being fully aware that his drunkenness had
incapacitated him, he rushed straight out of the house with his
servants, and having come to the gate leading to the harbour,
and the sentinel having opened the wicket for him, he got
through that way; and having seized one of the boats lying at
anchor there, went on board it with his servants and arrived
safely at the citadel.
Massacre of Roman soldiers. |
Meanwhile Philemenus had provided
himself with some Roman bugles, and some
men who were able to blow them, from being
used to do so; and they stood in the theatre and
sounded a call to arms. The Romans promptly rallying in
arms, as was their custom at this sound, and directing their
steps towards the citadel, everything happened exactly as the
Carthaginians intended; for as the Roman soldiers came into
the streets, without any order and in scattered groups, some of
them came upon the Carthaginians and others upon the Celts;
and by their being in this way put to the sword in detail, a
very considerable number of them perished.
But when day began to break, the Tarentines kept quietly
in their houses, not yet being able to comprehend what was
happening. For thanks to the bugle, and the absence of all
outrage or plundering in the town, they thought that the
movement arose from the Romans themselves. But the sight
of many of the latter lying killed in the streets, and the
spectacle of some Gauls openly stripping the Roman corpses,
suggested a suspicion of the presence of the Carthaginians.
The Tarentines Themselves Spared
Presently when Hannibal had marched his forces into
Roman houses sacked, Tarentines spared. |
the market-place, and the Romans had retired
into the citadel, as having been previously
secured by them with a garrison, and it had
become broad daylight, the Carthaginian general caused a
proclamation to be made to the Tarentines to assemble in full
number in the market-place; while the young conspirators
went meanwhile round the town talking loudly about liberty,
and bidding everybody not to be afraid, for the Carthaginians had
come to save them. Such of the Tarentines as held to their
loyalty to
Rome, upon learning the state of the case, went off
to the citadel; but the rest came to the meeting, in obedience
to the proclamation, without their arms: and to them Hannibal
addressed a cordial speech. The Tarentines heartily cheered
everything he said from joy at their unexpected safety; and he
dismissed the crowd with an injunction to each man, to go with
all speed to his own house, and write over the door, "A
Tarentine's"; but if any one wrote the same word on a house
where a Roman was living, he declared the penalty to be
death. He then personally told off the best men he had for
the service, and sent them to plunder the houses of the
Romans; giving them as their instructions to consider all
houses which had no inscription as belonging to the enemy:
the rest of his men he kept drawn up as a reserve.
Hannibal Secures Tarentum
A vast quantity of miscellaneous property having been
Fortifications raised to preserve the town from attack from the citadel. |
got together by this plundering, and a booty
fully answering the expectations of the Carthaginians, they bivouacked for that night under
arms. But the next day, after consulting with the
Tarentines, Hannibal decided to cut off the city
from the citadel by a wall, that the Tarentines might not any
longer be under continual alarm from the Romans in possession of the citadel. His first measure was to throw up a
palisade, parallel to the wall of the citadel and to the trench in
front of it. But as he very well knew that the enemy would
not allow this tamely, but would make a demonstration of their
power in that direction, he got ready for the work a number
of his best hands, thinking that the first thing necessary was to
overawe the Romans and give confidence to the Tarentines.
But as soon as the first palisade was begun, the Romans began
a bold and determined attack; whereupon Hannibal, offering
just enough resistance to induce the rest to come out, as soon
as the greater part of them had crossed the trench, gave the
word of command to his men and charged the enemy. A
desperate struggle ensued; for the fight took place in a narrow
space surrounded by walls; but at last the Romans were forced
to turn and fly. Many of them fell in the actual fighting, but
the larger number were forced over the edge of the trench and
were killed by the fall over its steep bank.
Additional Fortifications
For the present Hannibal, after completing the palisade
Further works of security. |
unmolested, was content to remain quiet, as his
plan had succeeded to his wish; for he had
shut in the enemy and compelled them to
remain inside their wall, in terror for the safety of the citadel
as well as for their own; while he had raised the courage of
the citizens of Tarentum to such an extent, that they now
imagined themselves to be a match for the Romans, even
without the Carthaginians. A little later he made at a short
distance from the palisade, in the direction of the town, a trench
parallel to the palisade and the wall of the citadel; and the
earth dug out from it having been piled up on the other side
along the edge nearest the town, he erected another palisade
on the top, thus making a fortification no less secure than the
wall itself. Once more, at a moderate distance, nearer the city,
he commenced building a wall, starting from the street called
Soteira up to that called Batheia; so that, even without a garrison,
the Tarentines were adequately protected by the mere constructions themselves. Then leaving a sufficient garrison, and
enough cavalry to serve on outpost duty for the protection of the
wall, he encamped along the bank of the river which is called by
some the Galaesus, but by most people the Eurotas, after the
river which flows past
Sparta. The Tarentines have many
such derived names, both in town and country, from the
acknowledged fact of their being a colony from
Sparta and
connected by blood with the Lacedaemonians. As the wall
quickly approached completion, owing to the activity and zeal
of the Tarentines, and the vigorous co-operation of the Carthaginians, Hannibal next conceived the idea of taking the
citadel also.
The Tarantines Blockade the Romans
But when he had already completed the preparation
Hannibal's arrangements for storming the citadel frustrated. |
of the necessary engines for the assault, the
Romans received some slight encouragement
on a reinforcement throwing itself into the
citadel by sea from Metapontium; and consequently they sallied out by night and attacked the works, and
destroyed all Hannibal's apparatus and engines.
After this Hannibal abandoned the idea of a
storm: but as the new wall was now completed,
he summoned a meeting of the Tarentines and pointed out to
them that the most imperative necessity, in view of the present
state of things, was to get command of the sea. For as the citadel
commanded the entrance to the harbour, the Tarentines could
not use their ships nor sail out of it; while the Romans could
get supplies conveyed to them by sea without danger: and as
long as that was the case, it was impossible that the city should
have any security for its freedom.
New plans for cutting off the |
Hannibal
saw this clearly, and explained to the Tarentines
that, if the enemy on the citadel were
deprived of hope of succour by sea, they
would at once give way, and abandon it of their own accord,
without attempting to defend the place.
The Tarentines were
fully convinced by his words: but how it was to be brought
about in the present state of affairs they could form no idea,
unless a fleet should appear from
Carthage; which at that
time of the year was impossible. They therefore said that they
could not understand what Hannibal was aiming at in these
remarks to them. When he replied that it was plain that,
even without the Carthaginians, they were all but in command
of the sea, they were still more puzzled, and could not guess
his meaning. The truth was that Hannibal had noticed that the
broad street, which was at once within the wall separating the
town from the citadel, and led from the harbour into the open
sea, was well suited for the purpose; and he had conceived the
idea of dragging the ships out of the harbour to the sea on
the southern side of the town. Upon his disclosing his idea to
the Tarentines, they not only expressed their agreement with
the proposal, but the greatest admiration for himself; and made
up their minds that there was nothing which his acuteness and
daring could not accomplish. Trucks on wheels were quickly
constructed: and it was scarcely sooner said than done, owing
to the zeal of the people and the numbers who helped to work
at it. In this way the Tarentines dragged their ships across
into the open sea, and were enabled without danger to themselves to blockade the Romans on the citadel, having deprived
them of their supplies from without.
But Hannibal himself,
leaving a garrison for the city, started with his
army, and returned in a three day's march to his
original camp; and there remained without further movements
for the rest of the winter. . . .
Fall of Syracuse, B. C. 212
He counted the layers; for as the
tower had been built of regular layers of
stone, it was very easy to reckon the height
of the battlements from the ground. . . .
Some days afterwards on information being given by a
deserter that the Syracusans had been engaged in a public
sacrifice to Artemis for the last three days; and
that they were using very scanty food in the
festival though plenty of wine, both Epicydes and
certain Syracusans having given a large supply;
Marcus Marcellus selected a part of the wall somewhat lower
than the rest, and thinking it probable that the men were
drunk, owing to the license of the hour, and the short supply of
food with their wine, he determined to attempt an escalade.
Two ladders of the proper height for the wall having been
quickly made, he pressed on the undertaking. He spoke
openly to those who were fit to make the ascent and to face
the first and most conspicuous risk, holding out to them
brilliant prospects of reward. He also picked out some men
to give them necessary help and bring ladders, without telling them anything except to bid them be ready to obey
orders. His directions having been accurately obeyed, at
the proper time in the night he put the first men in motion,
sending with them the men with the ladders together with a
maniple and a tribune, and having first reminded them of the
rewards awaiting them if they behaved with gallantry. After
this he got his whole force ready to start; and despatching the
vanguard by maniples at intervals, when a thousand had been
massed in this way, after a short pause, he marched himself
with the main body. The men carrying the ladders having
succeeded in safely placing them against the wall, those who
had been told off to make the ascent mounted at once without hesitation. Having accomplished this
without being observed, and having got a firm footing on the top of the wall,
the rest began to mount by the ladders also, not in any fixed
order, but as best they could. At first as they made their way
upon the wall they found no one to oppose them, for the
guards of the several towers, owing to it being a time of public
sacrifice, were either still drinking or were gone to sleep again
in a state of drunkenness. Consequently of the first and second
companies of guards, which they came upon, they killed the
greater number before they knew that they were being attacked.
And when they came near Hexapyli, they descended from the
wall, and forced open the first postern they came to which was
let into the wall, through which they admitted the general and
the rest of the army. This is the way in which the Romans
took
Syracuse. . . .
None of the citizens knew what was happening because of the distance; for the town is
a very large one. . . .
But the Romans were rendered very confident
by their conquest of Epipolae. . . .
Beasts of Burden Used as a Defensive Wall
He gave orders that the infantry should take the beasts
of burden along with the baggage tied upon them from the
rear and range them in front of themselves. This produced a
defence of greater security than any palisade.
7 . . .
So entirely unable are the majority of mankind to submit
to that lightest of all burdens—-silence. . . .
Anything in the future seems preferable to what exists in
the present. . . .