Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 2.
Frank Moore, Ed.

[39] passed over the run, and I supposed (and I believed the commanding general supposed) that the entire division was over. If so, the stone bridge was unguarded, and if we were defeated our retreating columns might be cut off from Centreville by the detachments of the enemy crossing this bridge. I became so anxious on this point that I sought you again, and found you at some distance in the rear. After some consultation, you, on my assuming the responsibility, sent an order to Col. Miles to move up two of his brigades to the stone bridge, and to telegraph the Secretary of War to send up all the troops that could be spared from Washington.

While I was returning towards the front, intending to rejoin the commanding general, I saw our front give way, and it soon became evident that we were defeated.

I have stated that it was a part of the plan of the battle, that Tyler's division should pass at or near the stone bridge. Two of his brigades actually did pass, not at the bridge, (they finding fords a half mile higher up,) and connected themselves with our left. In anticipation that the stone bridge would be blown up, Capt. Alexander had been instructed to obtain a trestle bridge to replace it. This he had on the spot, but there appears to have been no mine prepared under the bridge. Capt. Alexander passed over his pioneers one by one, and set them to cutting away the abatis--two hundred yards in extent — obstructing the road. This task was accomplished, and the way was opened for Schenck's brigade to fall on the enemy's right at the moment when our lines finally gave way in front.

It will be seen from the above that the combination, though thwarted by adverse circumstances, was actually successful in uniting three entire divisions, (excepting the brigade of Schenck, which had just opened its way to fall on the enemy's right at the moment when our lines finally gave way in front,) upon the decisive point.

A fault, perhaps it was, that it did not provide earlier for bringing the two brigades of Miles's (in reserve at Centreville) into action. One of his brigades (Richardson's) actually did participate, (though not on the battle-field.) and in its affair at Blackburn's Ford probably neutralized at least an equal number of the enemy.

On retiring to Centreville my opinion was asked as to maintaining our position, and I gave it in favor of a prompt retreat; for I believed the enemy was far superior in numbers, and that, elated by his victory, he would pursue, and I believed that a defeated army, actually driven back on Washington before a pursuing enemy, would endanger the safety of the Capital.

The engineer officers under my command and attached to the different divisions were as follows:

Capt. D. P. Woodbury and Second Lieut. Charles E. Cross, to the Second Division, under Col. Hunter.

Capt. H. G. Wright and First Lieut. G. W. Snyder, to the Third Division, under Col. Heintzelman.

Capt. B. S. Alexander and First Lieut. D. C. Houston, to the First Division, under Gen. Tyler.

First Lieut. F. E. Prime, to the First Division, under Col. Miles.

They have all been most active and zealous in the discharge of the duties devolving upon them.

A report from Capt. D. P. Woodbury is herewith annexed. Reports from Capts. Wright and Alexander and Lieut. Prime will be furnished when received.

I am, very respectfully, your most obedient,

Captain: Having been appointed, by special orders No. 21, Headquarters Department Northeastern Virginia, Centreville, July 19, 1861, Chief of Artillery of the Corps d'armee, commanded by Brig. Gen. McDowell, and having served in that capacity during the battle of the 21st inst., I have the honor to submit the following report:

The Artillery of the Corps d'armee consisted of the following named batteries: Rickett's (Light Company 1, 1st Artillery) six 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns; Hunt's (Light Company M, 2d Artillery) four light 12-pounders; Carlisle's (Company E, 2d Artillery) two James's 13-pounder rifle guns, two 6-pounder guns; Tidball's (Light Company A, 2d Artillery) two 6-pounder guns, two 12-pounder howitzers; Green's (Company G, 2d Artillery) four 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns; Arnold's (Company D, 2d Artillery) two 13-pounder James's rifle guns, two 6-pounder guns; Ayres's (Light Company E, 3d Artillery) two 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns, two 12-pounder howitzers, two 6-pounder guns; Griffin's (Battery D, 5th Artillery) four 10-pounder Parrott rifle guns, two 12-pounder howitzers; Edwards's (Company G, 5th Artillery) two 20-pounders and one 30-pounder Parrott rifle guns. The 2d Regiment Rhode Island Volunteers had with it a battery of six 13-pounder James's rifle guns; the 71st Regiment New York Militia, two of Dahlgren's boat howitzers, and the 8th Regiment New York Militia a battery of six 6-pounder guns. The men of this last-named battery having claimed their discharge on the day before the battle, because their term of service had expired, the battery was thrown out of service.

The whole force of artillery, of all calibres, was therefore 49 pieces, of which 28 were rifled guns. All of these batteries were fully horsed and equipped, with the exception of the two howitzers of the 71st regiment New York Militia, which were without horses, and were drawn by drag-ropes manned by detachments from