Rebellion Record: a Diary of American Events: Documents and Narratives, Volume 2.
Frank Moore, Ed.

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[384] we saw the account alluded to, but we do remember that in his first essay with the army of Egypt he was invited by the Turks to walk up to a deliberately constructed range of batteries and be slaughtered; but that — in a cowardly sort of manner, perhaps — he chose to go around the spot where they were planted with so much care, and the result was, that he slew some thousands of the Turks, and broke their power completely for all time. Valor is a very good thing, doubtless, but we greatly prefer the “Rich Mountain” sort — the McClellan and Rosecranz school of tacticians — to that which is in vogue lower down on the Potomac, especially where the purpose of those on the line of the advance is to disorganize and conquer — not slay — with the remembrance that those who are opposed to them are people of the same country.

That a more overwhelming disaster has not been the consequence of all this management — this helter-skelter rush to “Richmond” --is rather remarkable than otherwise. Nearly two hundred miles to advance through hostile territory is an exceedingly long distance, comparatively, as those have found, doubtless, who have penetrated about one-eighth as far, to retrace their footsteps under these untoward results. And suppose — here comes a lesson from history again — suppose, we say, that Beauregard and his advisers had adopted the tactics of the Parthians toward the Roman consul, Crassus — suppose they had coaxed along toward Richmond the brave but inadequate force lately defeated, and then turned upon and suddenly and completely destroyed them, what then would have been the condition of the questions at issue to-day? They might have done it. “Onward to Richmond!” has been the senseless battle-cry which has stunned the ears of the nation for weeks past, and the authorities at Washington may consider themselves fortunate that the case for them is no worse.

It is not our special business either to censure or defend those attempting, with varied success, to preserve those free institutions, that unequalled fabric of free government so nearly suffered to go to ruin mainly by default of the head of the late Administration. We cannot defend the palpable blunders of our present rulers, but when we behold them reeling under the heavy burdens cast upon them by the faults of others, we would be as charitable as possible toward their shortcomings. Not their partisans, we yet hope they may, with as little suffering to the nation as possible, restore the country to its wonted condition of prosperity; but to do this, that terrible evil — political brawling — must not be recognized as a qualification for military position, or for the places of military counsellors. If there is one rock which more than any other endangers the safety of the Government in this frightful crisis it is this. And if the Government does not remorselessly, and at once, throw overboard the whole phalanx of these insane brawlers — some of them members of Congress, sitting in grand council, and yet commanders of regiments in the field — if it does not likewise silence in some way the newspaper school, who cause impatience, and consequent insubordination in the camp, as well as untimely precipitancy at Headquarters, it will prolong a struggle awful to contemplate in the far future. Some steps, it is true, have been taken toward reforms in high places, in view of the lesson of the other day; but there must be a clean sweep of the blundering and incompetent civilians, in the new levies especially, if the country at large is to expect success in the reconstruction of the Government.--Baltimore American, July 26.

Washington, July 26, 1861.--The public mind, painfully but reasonably excited, is entitled to be informed of what so deeply and vitally concerns the general welfare. When the rebellion broke out into open war upon Fort Sumter, the people rose with a unanimity unexampled in the world's history, offering themselves and their possessions to the Government, asking only in return that a war thus wantonly and wickedly provoked, should be vigorously prosecuted.

Passing over an interval of three months, we come to the disastrous battle of Manassas. Who is responsible for this great national disaster? Officials cannot answer — individuals may speak — their answers passing for what they are worth, according to the estimate which the public put upon the judgment and means of information.

Lieutenant-General Scott, in the discharge of his duty as commander-in-chief of the army, conceived and perfected a plan or programme, by means of which he confidently, as the results of a summer and fall campaign, anticipated the overthrow of the Confederate army, and thus virtually to end the rebellion.

This plan, primarily, contemplated camps of instruction, where raw levies might, during the months of June, July, and August, be subject to discipline and inured to service, sending the regiments as they became fit for duty, into the field, making room, as they departed, for green organizations.

With this disposable force (after the safety of the Capital was assured) Gen. Scott commenced operations at Fortress Monroe, near Harper's Ferry, and in Western Virginia, the latter point being most favorable, profiting, as no other section did, by the cooperation and sympathies of loyal inhabitants. With Washington for his base of operations, the western wings of his army were to feel and fight their way southward; until at the appointed time, having reached their designated positions, all his columns were to move simultaneously, Richmond falling as Mexico fell, before an irresistible army.

But this plan did not accord with the popular idea. Prominent individuals, whose counsels and clamors precipitated the outbreak, demanded precipitate action. These demands were