Recapitulation of Book 1
IN the previous book I have described how the Romans,
Recapitulation of the subjects treated in Book I. |
having subdued all
Italy, began to aim at foreign
dominion; how they crossed to
Sicily, and the
reasons of the war which they entered into
against the Carthaginians for the possession of
that island. Next I stated at what period they began the
formation of a navy; and what befell both the one side and
the other up to the end of the war; the consequence of which
was that the Carthaginians entirely evacuated
Sicily, and the
Romans took possession of the whole island, except such parts
as were still under the rule of Hiero. Following these events
I endeavoured to describe how the mutiny of the mercenaries
against
Carthage, in what is called the Libyan War, burst out;
the lengths to which the shocking outrages in it went; its surprises and extraordinary incidents, until its conclusion, and the
final triumph of
Carthage. I must now relate the events which
immediately succeeded these, touching summarily upon each
in accordance with my original plan.
As soon as they had brought the Libyan war to a conclusion
B. C. 238. Hamilcar and his son Hannibal sent to Spain. |
the Carthaginian government collected an army
and despatched it under the command of Hamilcar to
Iberia. This general took over the command of the troops, and with his son Hannibal,
then nine years old, crossing by the Pillars of Hercules, set
about recovering the Carthaginian possessions in
Iberia.
He
spent nine years in
Iberia, and after reducing
many Iberian tribes by war or diplomacy to
obedience to
Carthage he died in a manner worthy of his
great achievements; for he lost his life in a battle against the
most warlike and powerful tribes, in which he showed a conspicuous
and even reckless personal gallantry. The Carthaginians appointed his son-in-law Hasdrubal to succeed him, who
was at the time in command of the fleet.
It was at this same period that the Romans for the first
time crossed to
Illyricum and that part of
Europe with an army. The history of this expedition must not be treated as immaterial; but must be carefully studied by those who wish to understand clearly the
story I have undertaken to tell, and to trace the progress and
consolidation of the Roman Empire.
Agron, king of the Illyrians, was the son of Pleuratus, and
possessed the most powerful force, both by
land and sea, of any of the kings who had
reigned in
Illyria before him. By a bribe received from
Demetrius he was induced to promise help to the Medionians,
who were at that time being besieged by the
Aetolians, who, being unable to persuade the
Medionians to join their league, had determined
to reduce the city by force.
They accordingly levied their
full army, pitched their camp under the walls of the city, and
kept up a continuous blockade, using every means to force
their way in, and every kind of siege-machine. But when
the time of the annual election of their Strategus drew near,
the besieged being now in great distress, and seeming likely
every day to surrender, the existing Strategus made an appeal
to the Aetolians. He argued that as he had had during
his term of office all the suffering and the danger, it was but
fair that when they got possession of the town he should have
the apportioning of the spoil, and the privilege of inscribing his
name on such arms as should be preserved for dedication.
This was resisted by some, and especially by those who were
candidates for the office, who urged upon the Assembly not to
prejudge this matter, but to leave it open for fortune to determine who was to be invested with this honour; and, finally, the
Aetolians decided that whoever was general when the city was
taken should share the apportioning of the spoils, and the
honour of inscribing the arms, with his predecessor.
The Illyrians Relieve Medion
The decision was come to on the day before the election
of a new Strategus, and the transference of the command had,
according to the Aetolian custom, to take place.
The Illyrians relieve Medion. |
But on
that very night a hundred galleys with five
thousand Illyrians on board, sailed up to land
near Medion. Having dropped anchor at
daybreak, they effected a disembarkation with secrecy and
despatch; they then formed in the order customary in their
country, and advanced in their several companies against the
Aetolian lines. These last were overwhelmed with astonishment at the unexpected nature and boldness of the move; but
they had long been inspired with overweening self-confidence,
and having full reliance in their own forces were far from being
dismayed. They drew up the greater part of their hoplites
and cavalry in front of their lines on the level ground, and
with a portion of their cavalry and their light infantry they
hastened to occupy some rising ground in front of their camp,
which nature had made easily defensible. A single charge,
however, of the Illyrians, whose numbers and close order gave
them irresistible weight, served to dislodge the light-armed
troops, and forced the cavalry who were on the ground with
them to retire to the hoplites. But the Illyrians, being on the
higher ground, and charging down from it upon the Aetolian
troops formed up on the plain, routed them without difficulty; the
Medionians at the same time making a diversion in their favour
by sallying out of the town and charging the Aetolians. Thus,
after killing a great number, and taking a still greater number prisoners, and becoming masters also of their arms and
baggage, the Illyrians, having carried out the orders of their
king, conveyed their baggage and the rest of the booty to their
boats, and immediately set sail for their own country.
Death of Agron of Illyria
This was a most unexpected relief to the Medionians.
They met in public assembly and deliberated on the whole
business, and especially as to the inscribing the arms reserved
for dedication. They decided, in mockery of the Aetolian
decree, that the inscription should contain the name of the
Aetolian commander on the day of battle, and of the candidates
for succession to his office. And indeed Fortune seems, in what
happened to them, to have designed a display of her power to
the rest of mankind. The very thing which these men were
in momentary expectation of undergoing at the hands of their
enemies, she put it in their power to inflict upon those
enemies, and all within a very brief interval. The unexpected
disaster of the Aetolians, too, may teach all the world not to
calculate on the future as though it were the actually existent,
and not to reckon securely on what may still turn out quite
otherwise, but to allow a certain margin to the unexpected.
And as this is true everywhere and to every man, so is it
especially true in war.
When his galleys returned, and he heard from his officers
Death of Agron, who is succeeded by his wife Teuta, B. C. 231. |
the events of the expedition, King Agron was
so beside himself with joy at the idea of having
conquered the Aetolians, whose confidence in
their own prowess had been extreme, that, giving
himself over to excessive drinking and other similar indulgences,
he was attacked by a pleurisy of which in a few days he died.
His wife Teuta succeeded him on the throne; and managed
the various details of administration by means of friends whom
she could trust. But her woman's head had been turned by
the success just related, and she fixed her gaze upon that, and
had no eyes for anything going on outside the country. Her
first measure was to grant letters of marque to privateers,
authorising them to plunder all whom they fell in with; and
she next collected a fleet and military force as large as the
former one, and despatched them with general instructions to
the leaders to regard every land as belonging to an enemy.
Queen Teuta's Pirates
Their first attack was to be upon the coast of
Elis and
Teuta's piratical fleet, B. C. 230. |
Messenia, which had been from time immemorial the scene of the raids of the Illyrians.
For owing to the length of their seaboard, and
to the fact that their most powerful cities were inland, troops
raised to resist them had a great way to go, and were long in
coming to the spot where the Illyrian pirates landed; who accordingly overran those districts, and swept them clean without
having anything to fear. However, when this fleet was off
Phoenice in
Epirus they landed to get supplies.
There they
fell in with some Gauls, who to the number of
eight hundred were stationed at Phoenice, being
in the pay of the Epirotes; and contracted with
them to betray the town into their hands. Having made this
bargain, they disembarked and took the town and everything
in it at the first blow, the Gauls within the walls acting in
collusion with them. When this news was known, the
Epirotes raised a general levy and came in haste to the
rescue. Arriving in the neighbourhood of Phoenice, they
pitched their camp so as to have the river which flows
past Phoenice between them and the enemy, tearing up
the planks of the bridge over it for security. But news
being brought them that Scerdilaidas with five thousand
Illyrians was marching overland by way of the pass near
Antigoneia, they detached some of their forces to guard that
town; while the main body gave themselves over to an
unrestrained indulgence in all the luxuries which the country
could supply; and among other signs of demoralisation they
neglected the necessary precaution of posting sentries and
night pickets. The division of their forces, as well as the
careless conduct of the remainder, did not escape the observation
of the Illyrians; who, sallying out at night, and replacing the
planks on the bridge, crossed the river safely, and having
secured a strong position, remained there quietly for the rest
of the night. At daybreak both armies drew up their forces
in front of the town and engaged. In this battle the Epirotes
were decidedly worsted: a large number of them fell, still
more were taken prisoners, and the rest fled in the direction
of the country of the Atintanes.
The Aetolians and Achaeans Support the Epirotes
Having met with this reverse, and having lost all the
The Aetolian and Achaean leagues send a force to the relief of the Epirotes. A truce is made. The Illyrians depart. |
hopes which they had cherished, the Epirotes
turned to the despatch of ambassadors to the
Aetolians and Achaeans, earnestly begging for
their assistance. Moved by pity for their misfortunes, these nations consented; and an army
of relief sent out by them arrived at Helicranum.
Meanwhile the Illyrians who had occupied Phoenice, having
effected a junction with Scerdilaidas, advanced with him to this
place, and, taking up a position opposite to this army of relief,
wished at first to give it battle. But they were embarrassed
by the unfavourable nature of the ground; and just then a
despatch was received from Teuta, ordering their instant
return, because certain Illyrians had revolted to the Dardani
Accordingly, after merely stopping to plunder
Epirus, they made
a truce with the inhabitants, by which they undertook to deliver
up all freemen, and the city of Phoenice, for a fixed ransom.
They then took the slaves they had captured and the rest of
their booty to their galleys, and some of them sailed away;
while those who were with Scerdilaidas retired by land through
the pass at
Antigoneia, after inspiring no small or ordinary terror
in the minds of the Greeks who lived along the coast. For
seeing the most securely placed and powerful city of
Epirus
thus unexpectedly reduced to slavery, they one and all began
henceforth to feel anxious, not merely as in former times for
their property in the open country, but for the safety of their
own persons and cities.
The Epirotes were thus unexpectedly preserved: but so far
from trying to retaliate on those who had wronged them, or expressing gratitude to those who had come to their relief, they
sent ambassadors in conjunction with the Acarnanians to
Queen Teuta, and made a treaty with the Illyrians, in virtue
of which they engaged henceforth to co-operate with them and
against the Achaean and Aetolian leagues. All which proceedings showed conclusively the levity of their conduct towards
men who had stood their friends, as well as an originally shortsighted policy in regard to their own interests.
A Band of Gallic Mercenaries
That men, in the infirmity of human nature, should fall
into misfortunes which defy calculation, is the fault not of the
sufferers but of Fortune, and of those who do the wrong; but
that they should from mere levity, and with their eyes open,
thrust themselves upon the most serious disasters is without
dispute the fault of the victims themselves. Therefore it is
that pity and sympathy and assistance await those whose
failure is due to Fortune: reproach and rebuke from all men
of sense those who have only their own folly to thank for it.
It is the latter that the Epirotes now richly deserved at the
The career of a body of Gallic mercenaries, |
hands of the Greeks. For in the first place, who in his senses,
knowing the common report as to the character of the Gauls,
would not have hesitated to trust to them a
city so rich, and offering so many opportunities
for treason? And again, who would not
have been on his guard against the bad character of this
particular body of them? For they had originally been
driven from their native country by an outburst of popular
indignation at an act of treachery done by them to their
own kinsfolk and relations.
Then having been received
by the Carthaginians, because of the exigencies of the war
in which the latter were engaged, and being
drafted into
Agrigentum to garrison it (being at
the time more than three thousand strong), they seized the
opportunity of a dispute as to pay, arising between the soldiers
and their generals, to plunder the city; and again being brought
by the Carthaginians into
Eryx to perform the
same duty, they first endeavoured to betray the
city and those who were shut up in it with them to the
Romans who were besieging it; and when they failed in that
treason, they deserted in a body to the enemy: whose trust
they also betrayed by plundering the temple of Aphrodite in
Eryx.
Thoroughly convinced, therefore, of their abominable
character, as soon as they had made peace with
Carthage the
Romans made it their first business to disarm them, put them
on board ship, and forbid them ever to enter
any part of
Italy. These were the men whom the
Epirotes made the protectors of their democracy
and the guardians of their laws! To such men as these they
entrusted their most wealthy city! How then can it be denied
that they were the cause of their own misfortunes?
My object, in commenting on the blind folly of the
Epirotes, is to point out that it is never wise to introduce a
foreign garrison, especially of barbarians, which is too strong
to be controlled.
Queen Teuta and Rome
To return to the Illyrians. From time immemorial
they had oppressed and pillaged vessels sailing
from
Italy; and now while their fleet was engaged at Phoenice a considerable number of them, separating from the main body, committed acts of piracy on a
number of Italian merchants: some they merely plundered,
others they murdered, and a great many they
carried off alive into captivity.
The Romans interfere, B. C. 230. |
Now, though
complaints against the Illyrians had reached the
Roman government in times past, they had always been
neglected; but now when more and more persons approached
the Senate on this subject, they appointed two ambassadors,
Gaius and Lucius Coruncanius, to go to
Illyricum and investigate the matter. But on the arrival of her galleys from
Epirus, the enormous quantity and beauty of the spoils which
they brought home (for Phoenice was by far the wealthiest
city in
Epirus at that time), so fired the imagination of Queen
Teuta, that she was doubly eager to carry on the predatory
warfare on the coasts of
Greece. At the moment, however,
she was stopped by the rebellion at home; but it had not
taken her long to put down the revolt in
Illyria, and she was
engaged in besieging
Issa, the last town which held out, when
just at that very time the Roman ambassadors arrived. A
time was fixed for their audience, and they proceeded to discuss the injuries which their citizens had sustained.
Queen Teuta's reception of the Roman legates. |
Throughout the interview, however,
Teuta listened with an insolent and disdainful
air; and when they had finished their speech, she replied that
she would endeavour to take care that no injury should be
inflicted on Roman citizens by Illyrian officials; but that it was
not the custom for the sovereigns of
Illyria to binder private
persons from taking booty at sea. Angered by these words,
the younger of the two ambassadors used a plainness of speech
which, though thoroughly to the point, was rather ill-timed.
"The Romans," he said, "O Teuta, have a most excellent
custom of using the State for the punishment of private
wrongs and the redress of private grievances: and we will
endeavour, God willing, before long to compel you to improve the relations between the sovereign and the subject in
Illyria." The queen received this plain speaking with womanish
passion and unreasoning anger.
A Roman legate assassinated. |
So enraged was she at the
speech that, in despite of the conventions universally observed
among mankind, she despatched some men after
the ambassadors, as they were sailing home, to
kill the one who had used this plainness. Upon
this being reported at
Rome the people were highly incensed
at the queen's violation of the law of nations, and at once set
about preparations for war, enrolling legions and collecting a
fleet.
Teuta Sends Out Another Fleet
When the season for sailing was come Teuta sent out a
B. C. 229. Another piratical fleet sent out by Teuta. |
larger fleet of galleys than ever against the
Greek shores, some of which sailed straight to
Corcyra; while a portion of them put into the
harbour of
Epidamnus on the pretext of taking
in victual and water, but really to attack the town. The
Epidamnians received them without suspicion
and without taking any precautions.
Their treacherous attack on Epidamnus, which is repulsed. |
Entering
the town therefore clothed merely in their
tunics, as though they were only come to fetch
water, but with swords concealed in the water vessels, they
slew the guards stationed at the gates, and in a brief space were
masters of the gate-tower. Being energetically supported by
a reinforcement from the ships, which came quickly up in
accordance with a pre-arrangement, they got possession of the
greater part of the walls without difficulty. But though the
citizens were taken off their guard they made a determined
and desperate resistance, and the Illyrians after maintaining
their ground for some time were eventually driven out of
the town. So the Epidamnians on this occasion went near to
lose their city by their carelessness; but by the courage which
they displayed they saved themselves from actual damage
while receiving a useful lesson for the future. The Illyrians
who had engaged in this enterprise made haste to put to sea,
and, rejoining the advanced squadron, put in at
Corcyra: there, to the terror of the inhabitants,
they disembarked and set about besieging the
town.
Dismayed and despairing of their safety, the Corcyreans,
acting in conjunction with the people of
Apollonia and
Epidamnus, sent off envoys to the
Achaean and Aetolian leagues, begging for instant help, and entreating them not to allow of
their being deprived of their homes by the Illyrians.
The Corcyreans appeal to the Aetolian and Achaean leagues. |
The
petition was accepted, and the Achaean and Aetolian leagues
combined to send aid. The ten decked ships of war belonging
to the Achaeans were manned, and having been fitted out in a
few days, set sail for
Corcyra in hopes of raising the siege.
Illyrian Victories
But the Illyrians obtained a reinforcement of seven
decked ships from the Acarnanians, in virtue of their treaty with
that people, and, putting to sea, engaged the Achaean fleet off
the islands called Paxi.
Defeat of the Achaean ships. |
The Acarnanian and Achaean ships
fought without victory declaring for either, and
without receiving any further damage than
having some of their crew wounded. But the
Illyrians lashed their galleys four together, and, caring nothing
for any damage that might happen to them, grappled with the
enemy by throwing their galleys athwart their prows and encouraging them to charge; when the enemies' prows struck
them, and got entangled by the lashed-together galleys
getting hitched on to their forward gear, the Illyrians leaped
upon the decks of the Achaean ships and captured them
by the superior number of their armed men. In this way
they took four triremes, and sunk one quinquereme with
all hands, on board of which Margos of Caryneia was sailing,
who had all his life served the Achaean league with complete
integrity. The vessels engaged with the Acarnanians, seeing
the triumphant success of the Illyrians, and trusting to their
own speed, hoisted their sails to the wind and effected their
voyage home without further disaster.
The Illyrians, on the
other hand, filled with self-confidence by their success, continued their siege of the town in high spirits, and without
putting themselves to any unnecessary trouble; while the
Corcyreans, reduced to despair of safety by
what had happened, after sustaining the siege
for a short time longer, made terms with the Illyrians, consenting to receive a garrison, and with it Demetrius of Pharos.
After this had been settled, the Illyrian admirals put to sea
again; and, having arrived at
Epidamnus, once more set about
besieging that town.
Corcyra Submits To the Romans
In this same season one of the Consuls, Gnaeus
B. C. 229, The Roman Consuls, with fleet and army, start to punish the Illyrians. |
Fulvius, started from
Rome with two hundred
ships, and the other Consul, Aulus Postumius,
with the land forces. The plan of Gnaeus was
to sail direct to
Corcyra, because he supposed
that he should find the result of the siege still
undecided. But when he found that he was too
late for that, he determined nevertheless to sail to the island
because he wished to know the exact facts as to what had
happened there, and to test the sincerity of the overtures that
had been made by Demetrius.
For Demetrius,
being in disgrace with Teuta, and afraid of what
she might do to him, had been sending messages
to
Rome, offering to put the city and everything else of which
he was in charge into their hands.
Delighted at the appearance
of the Romans, the Corcyreans not only surrendered the garrison to them, with the consent of Demetrius, but committed
themselves also unconditionally to the Roman
protection; believing that this was their only
security in the future against the piratical incursions of the Illyrians. So the Romans, having admitted
the Corcyreans into the number of the friends of
Rome,
sailed for
Apollonia, with Demetrius to act as their guide for
the rest of the campaign.
At the same time
the other Consul, Aulus Postumius, conveyed
his army across from
Brundisium, consisting of twenty
thousand infantry and about two thousand horse. This
army, as well as the fleet under Gnaeus Fulvius, being
directed upon
Apollonia, which at once put itself under
Roman protection, both forces were again put in motion
on news being brought that
Epidamnus was being besieged
by the enemy. No sooner did the Illyrians learn the
approach of the Romans than they hurriedly broke up the
siege and fled.
The Romans, taking the Epidamnians under
their protection, advanced into the interior of
Illyricum, subduing the Ardiaei as they went.
They were met on their march by envoys from
man tribes: those of the Partheni offered an unconditional
surrender, as also did those of the Atintanes. Both were
accepted: and the Roman army proceeded towards
Issa, which
was being besieged by Illyrian troops. On their arrival, they
forced the enemy to raise the siege, and received the Issaeans
also under their protection. Besides, as the fleet coasted along,
they took certain Illyrian cities by storm; among which was
Nutria, where they lost not only a large number of soldiers,
but some of the Military Tribunes also and the Quaestor.
But they captured twenty of the galleys which were conveying
the plunder from the country.
Of the Illyrian troops engaged in blockading
Issa, those
that belonged to Pharos were left unharmed, as a favour to
Demetrius; while all the rest scattered and fled to Arbo.
Teuta herself, with a very few attendants, escaped to Rhizon,
a small town very strongly fortified, and situated on the river
of the same name. Having accomplished all this, and having
placed the greater part of
Illyria under Demetrius, and invested
him with a wide dominion, the Consuls retired to
Epidamnus
with their fleet and army.
Teuta Agrees to Pay Tribute to Rome
Then Gnaeus Fulvius sailed back to
Rome with the
B. C. 228. Teuta submits. |
larger part of the naval and military forces, while Postumius,
staying behind and collecting forty vessels and a legion from
the cities in that district, wintered there to guard the Ardiaei
and other tribes that had committed themselves to the protection of
Rome. Just before spring in the
next year, Teuta sent envoys to
Rome and concluded a treaty; in virtue of which she consented
to pay a fixed tribute, and to abandon all
Illyricum, with the
exception of some few districts: and what affected
Greece more
than anything, she agreed not to sail beyond
Lissus with more
than two galleys, and those unarmed. When this arrangement
had been concluded, Postumius sent legates to the Aetolian
and Achaean leagues, who on their arrival first explained the
reasons for the war and the Roman invasion; and then stated
what had been accomplished in it, and read the treaty which
had been made with the Illyrians. The envoys then returned
to
Corcyra after receiving the thanks of both leagues: for they
had freed
Greece by this treaty from a very serious cause for
alarm, the fact being that the Illyrians were not the enemies
of this or that people, but the common enemies of all alike.
Such were the circumstances of the first armed interference
of the Romans in
Illyricum and that part of
Europe, and their
first diplomatic relations with
Greece; and such too were the
motives which suggested them. But having thus begun, the
Romans immediately afterwards sent envoys to
Corinth and
Athens. And it was then that the Corinthians first admitted
Romans to take part in the Isthmian games.
Jealousy At Rome of Hasdrubal In Spain
We must now return to Hasdrubal in
Iberia. He had
during this period been conducting his command with ability
and success, and had not only given in general a great impulse
to the Carthaginian interests there, but in particular had greatly strengthened them by the
fortification of the town, variously called Carthage, and
New Town, the situation of which was
exceedingly convenient for operations in
Libya as
well as in
Iberia.
Hasdrubal in Spain. The founding of New Carthage, B. C. 228. |
I shall take a more suitable opportunity of
speaking of the site of this town, and pointing out the advantages offered by it to both countries: I must at present speak
of the impression made by Hasdrubal's policy at
Rome.
Seeing him strengthening the Carthaginian influence in
Spain,
and rendering it continually more formidable, the Romans
were anxious to interfere in the politics of that country. They
discovered, as they thought, that they had allowed their suspicions to be lulled to sleep, and had meanwhile given the
Carthaginians the opportunity of consolidating their power.
They did not venture, however, at the moment to impose
conditions or make war on them, because they
were in almost daily dread of an attack from
the Celts.
They determined therefore to
mollify Hasdrubal by gentle measures, and to leave themselves free to attack the Celts first and try conclusions with
them: for they were convinced that, with such enemies on
their flank, they would not only be unable to keep their
hold over the rest of
Italy, but even to reckon on safety in
their own city.
Accordingly, while sending envoys to Hasdrubal, and making a treaty with him
by which the Carthaginians, without saying anything of the rest of
Iberia, engaged not to cross the Iber
in arms, they pushed on the war with the Celts in
Italy.
Cisalpine Gaul
This war itself I shall treat only summarily, to avoid
breaking the thread of my history; but I must go back somewhat in point of time, and refer to the period at which these
tribes originally occupied their districts in
Italy. For the story
I think is worth knowing for its own sake, and must absolutely
be kept in mind, if we wish to understand what tribes and
districts they were on which Hannibal relied to assist him in
his bold design of destroying the Roman dominion. I will
first describe the country in which they live, its nature, and its
relation to the rest of
Italy; for if we clearly understand its
peculiarities, geographical and natural, we shall be better able
to grasp the salient points in the history of the war.
Italy, taken as a whole, is a triangle, of which the eastern
side is bounded by the
Ionian Sea and the
Adriatic Gulf, its southern and western sides by
the Sicilian and Tyrrhenian seas; these two sides
converge to form the apex of the triangle, which is represented
by the southern promontory of
Italy called Cocinthus, and
which separates the Ionian from the Sicilian Sea.
1 The
third side, or base of this triangle, is on the north, and is
formed by the chain of the
Alps stretching right across the
country, beginning at
Marseilles and the coast of the Sardinian
Sea, and with no break in its continuity until within a short
distance of the head of the Adriatic. To the south of this
range, which I said we must regard as the base of the triangle,
are the most northerly plains of
Italy, the largest and most
fertile of any with which I am acquainted in all
Europe. This
is the district with which we are at present concerned.
Taken
as a whole, it too forms a triangle, the apex of which is the point
where the
Apennines and
Alps converge, above
Marseilles, and not far from the coast of the
Sardinian Sea. The northern side of this triangle is formed
by the
Alps, extending for 2200 stades; the southern by the
Apennines, extending 3600; and the base is the seaboard of
the Adriatic, from the town of
Sena to the head of the gulf, a
distance of more than 2500 Stades. The total length of the
three sides will thus be nearly 10,000 stades.
Grain Production in Cisalpine Gaul
The yield of corn in this district is so abundant that
wheat is often sold at four obols a Sicilian
medimnus, barley at two, or a metretes of wine
for an equal measure of barley. The quantity
of panic and millet produced is extraordinary; and the amount
of acorns grown in the oak forests scattered about the country
may be gathered from the fact that, though nowhere are more
pigs slaughtered than in
Italy, for sacrifices as well as for family
use, and for feeding the army, by far the most important
supply is form these plains. The cheapness and abundance
of all articles of food may also be clearly shown from the fact
that travellers in these parts, when stopping at inns, do not
bargain for particular articles, but simply ask what the charge is
per head for board. And for the most part the innkeepers are
content to supply their guests with every necessary at a charge
rarely exceeding half an as (that is, the fourth part of an obol)
2
a day each. Of the numbers, stature, and personal beauty of
the inhabitants, and still more of their bravery in war, we shall
be able to satisfy ourselves from the facts of their history.
Rivers and Mountains in Northern Italy
Such parts of both slopes of the
Alps as are not too
rocky or too precipitous are inhabited by different tribes; those on the north towards the
Rhone by the Gauls, called Transalpine; those towards the
Italian plains by the Taurisci and Agones and a number of
other barbarous tribes. The name Transalpine is not tribal,
but local, from the Latin proposition
trans, "across." The
summits of the
Alps, from their rugged character, and the
great depth of eternal snow, are entirely uninhabited.
Both
slopes of the
Apennines, towards the Tuscan
Sea and towards the plains, are inhabited by
the Ligurians, from above
Marseilles and the Junction with the
Alps to
Pisae on the cast, the first city on the west of Etruria,
and inland to
Arretium. Next to them come the Etruscans; and
next on both slopes the Umbrians. The distance between the
Apennines and the Adriatic averages about five hundred stades;
and when it leaves the northern plains the chain verges to the
right, and goes entirely through the middle of the rest of
Italy, as
far as the Sicilian Sea.
The remaining portion of this triangle,
namely the plain along the sea coast, extends as far as the town
of
Sena. The
Padus, celebrated by the poets under the name
of
Eridanus, rises in the
Alps near the apex
of the triangle, and flows down to the plains
with a southerly course; but after reaching the plains, it
turns to the east, and flowing through them discharges
itself by two mouths into the Adriatic. The larger part
of the plain is thus cut off by it, and lies between this river
and the
Alps to the head of the Adriatic.
In body of water
it is second to no river in
Italy, because the mountain
streams, descending from the
Alps and
Apennines to the plain,
one and all flow into it on both sides; and its stream is at its
height and beauty about the time
of the rising of the Dog
Star, because it is then swollen by the melting
snows on those mountains. It is navigable for
nearly two thousand stades up stream, the ships entering by
the mouth called Olana; for though it is a single main stream
to begin with, it branches off into two at the place called
Trigoboli, of which streams the northern is called the Padoa,
the southern the Olana. At the mouth of the latter there is
a harbour affording as safe anchorage as any in the Adriatic.
The whole river is called by the country folk the Bodencus.
As to the other stories current in
Greece about this river,—I
mean Phaethon and his fall, and the tears of the poplars and
the black clothes of the inhabitants along this stream, which
they are said to wear at this day as mourning for Phaethon,—all
such tragic incidents I omit for the present, as not being suitable
to the kind of work I have in hand; but I shall return to them
at some other more fitting opportunity, particularly because
Timaeus has shown a strange ignorance of this district.
Gauls expel Etruscans from the valley of the Po. |
Gallic Settlements In the Valley of the Po
To continue my description. These plains were
anciently inhabited by Etruscans,
3 at the same
period as what are called the Phlegraean plains
round
Capua and
Nola; which latter, however,
have enjoyed the highest reputation, because
they lay in a great many people's way and so got known.
In speaking then of the history of the Etruscan Empire,
we should not refer to the district occupied by them at the
present time, but to these northern plains, and to what they
did when they inhabited them. Their chief intercourse was
with the Celts, because they occupied the adjoining districts;
who, envying the beauty of their lands, seized some slight
pretext to gather a great host and expel the Etruscans from
the valley of the
Padus, which they at once took possession
of themselves. First, the country near the source of the
Padus was occupied by the Laevi and Lebecii; after them the
Insubres settled in the country, the largest tribe of all; and
next them, along the bank of the river, the
Cenomani. But
the district along the shore of the Adriatic was held by another
very ancient tribe called Venĕti, in customs and dress nearly
allied to Celts, but using quite a different language, about
whom the tragic poets have written a great many wonderful
tales. South of the
Padus, in the Apennine district, first
beginning from the west, the Ananes, and next them the Boii
settled. Next them, on the coast of the Adriatic, the
Lingones;
and south of these, still on the sea-coast, the
Senones. These
are the most important tribes that took possession of this part of the country.
They lived
in open villages, and without any permanent buildings. As
they made their beds of straw or leaves, and fed on meat,
and followed no pursuits but those of war and agriculture,
they lived simple lives without being acquainted with any
science or art whatever. Each man's property, moreover,
consisted in cattle and gold; as they were the only things
that could be easily carried with them, when they wandered
from place to place, and changed their dwelling as their
fancy directed. They made a great point, however, of friendship: for the man who had the largest number of clients or
companions in his wanderings, was looked upon as the most
formidable and powerful member of the tribe.
4
Early Conflicts between Gauls and Romans
In the early times of their settlement they did not
merely subdue the territory which they occupied, but rendered
also many of the neighbouring peoples subject to them, whom
they overawed by their audacity. Some time afterwards they
conquered the Romans in battle, and pursuing the flying
legions, in three days after the battle occupied
Rome itself
with the exception of the Capitol.
Battle of the Allia, 18th July, B. C. 390. |
But a circumstance intervened which recalled them home,
an invasion, that is to say, of their territory by
the Venĕti. Accordingly they made terms with the Romans,
handed back the city, and returned to their own land; and
subsequently were occupied with domestic wars. Some of the
tribes, also, who dwelt on the
Alps, comparing their own barren
districts with the rich territory occupied by the others, were continually making raids upon them, and collecting their force
to attack them.
Latin war, B. C. 349-340. |
This gave the Romans time
to recover their strength, and to come to terms
with the people of
Latium. When, thirty
years after the capture of the city, the Celts came again as far
as Alba, the Romans were taken by surprise; and
having had no intelligence of the intended invasion, nor time to collect the forces of the Socii, did not
venture to give them battle.
But when another invasion in
great force took place twelve years later, they
did get previous intelligence of it; and, having
mustered their allies, sallied forth to meet them with great
spirit, being eager to engage them and fight a decisive battle.
But the Gauls were dismayed at their approach; and, being
besides weakened by internal feuds, retreated homewards as
soon as night fell, with all the appearance of a regular flight.
After this alarm they kept quiet for thirteen
years; at the end of which period, seeing
that the power of the Romans was growing formidable, they
made a peace and a definite treaty with them.
Gallic Wars
They abided by this treaty for thirty years: but at that
time, alarmed by a threatening movement on the part of the
Transalpine tribes, and fearing that a dangerous war was
imminent, they diverted the attack of the invading horde from themselves by presents and
appeals to their ties of kindred, but incited them to attack the
Romans, joining in the expedition themselves. They directed
their march through Etruria, and were joined by the Etruscans;
and the combined armies, after taking a great quantity of booty,
got safely back from the Roman territory. But when they got
home, they quarrelled about the division of the spoil, and in
the end destroyed most of it, as well as the flower of their own
force. This is the way of the Gauls when they have appropriated their neighbours' property; and it mostly arises from
brutal drunkenness, and intemperate feeding.
In the fourth year after this, the Samnites
and Gauls made a league, gave the Romans battle in the
neighbourhood of Camerium, and slew a large number.
Incensed at this defeat, the Romans marched out a few days
afterwards, and with two Consular armies engaged the enemy in
the territory of
Sentinum; and, having killed the greater number of them, forced the survivors to retreat in hot haste each
to his own land.
Again, after another interval
of ten years, the Gauls besieged
Arretium with
a great army, and the Romans went to the assistance of the
town, and were beaten in an engagement under its walls.
The Praetor Lucius
5 having fallen in this battle, Manius
Curius was appointed in his place. The ambassadors, sent
by him to the Gauls to treat for the prisoners, were treacherously murdered by them. At this the Romans, in high wrath, sent
an expedition against them, which was met by the tribe called
the
Senones. In a pitched battle the army of the
Senones were
cut to pieces, and the rest of the tribe expelled from the county;
into which the Romans sent the first colony which they ever
planted in Gaul—namely, the town of
Sena, so
called from the tribe of Gauls which formerly
occupied it.
This is the town which I mentioned before as
lying on the coast at the extremity of the plains of the
Padus.
The Boii Attack the Romans and Lose
Seeing the expulsion of the
Senones, and fearing the
same fate for themselves, the Boii made a general levy, summoned the Etruscans to join them, and set out to war. They
mustered their forces near the lacus Vadimonis, and there gave
the Romans battle; in which the Etruscans indeed suffered a loss
of more than half their men, while scarcely any of
the Boii escaped. But yet in the very next year
the same two nations joined forces once more; and arming even
those of them who had only just reached manhood, gave the
Romans battle again; and it was not until they had been utterly
defeated in this engagement that they humbled themselves so
far as to send ambassadors to
Rome and make a treaty.
6
These events took place in the third year before Pyrrhus
crossed into
Italy, and in the fifth before the destruction of the
Gauls at
Delphi. For at this period fortune seems to have
plagued the Gauls with a kind of epidemic of war. But the
Romans gained two most important advantages from these
events. First, their constant defeats at the hands of the Gauls
had inured them to the worst that could befall them; and so,
when they had to fight with Pyrrhus, they came to the contest
like trained and experienced gladiators. And in the second
place, they had crushed the insolence of the Gauls just in time
to allow them to give an undivided attention, first to the war
with Pyrrhus for the possession of
Italy, and then to the war
with
Carthage for the supremacy in
Sicily.
War with Insubres and Boii and Gaesatae
After these defeats the Gauls maintained an unbroken
peace with
Rome for forty-five years. But when the generation which had witnessed the actual struggle had passed away,
and a younger generation of men had taken their places, filled
with unreflecting hardihood, and who had neither experienced
nor seen any suffering or reverse, they began, as was natural, to
disturb the settlement; and on the one hand
to let trifling causes exasperate them against
Rome, and on the other to invite the Alpine Gauls to join the
fray. At first these intrigues were carried on by their chiefs
without the knowledge of the tribesmen; and accordingly,
when an armed host of Transalpine Gauls arrived at
Ariminum,
the Boii were suspicious; and forming a conspiracy against their
own leaders, as well as against the new-comers, they put their
own two kings Atis and Galatus to death, and cut each other
to pieces in a pitched battle. Just then the Romans, alarmed
at the threatened invasion, had despatched an army; but learning that the Gauls had committed this act of self-destruction, it
returned home again. In the fifth year after this alarm, in
the Consulship of Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, the Romans
divided among their citizens the territory of Picenum, from
which they had ejected the
Senones when they
conquered them: a democratic measure introduced by Gaius Flaminius, and a policy which we must
pronounce to have been the first step in the demoralisation of
the people, as well as the cause of the next Gallic war.
For
many of the Gauls, and especially the Boii whose lands were
coterminous with the Roman territory, entered upon that war
from the conviction that the object of
Rome in her wars with
them was no longer supremacy and empire over them, but
their total expulsion and destruction.
Several Gallic Tribes Join Forces
Accordingly the two most extensive tribes, the Insubres
and Boii, joined in the despatch of messengers
to the tribes living about the
Alps and on the
Rhone, who from a word which means "serving for hire," are
called Gaesatae. To their kings Concolitanus and Aneroetes
they offered a large sum of gold on the spot; and, for the future,
pointed out to them the greatness of the wealth of
Rome, and
all the riches of which they would become possessed, if they
took it. In these attempts to inflame their cupidity and induce
them to join the expedition against
Rome they easily succeeded.
For they added to the above arguments pledges of their own
alliance; and reminded them of the campaign of their own
ancestors in which they had seized
Rome itself, and had been
masters of all it contained, as well as the city itself, for seven
months; and had at last evacuated it of their own free will,
and restored it by an act of free grace, returning unconquered
and scatheless with the booty to their own land. These arguments made the leaders so eager for the expedition, that there
never at any other time came from that part of
Gaul a larger
host, or one consisting of more notable warriors. Meanwhile,
the Romans, informed of what was coming, partly by report
and partly by conjecture, were in such a state of constant alarm
and excitement, that they hurriedly enrolled legions, collected
supplies, and sent out their forces to the frontier, as though
the enemy were already in their territory, before the Gauls
had stirred from their own lands.
It was this movement of the Gauls that, more than anything
else, helped the Carthaginians to consolidate their power in
Iberia. For the Romans, as I have said, looked upon the
Celtic question as the more pressing one of the two, as being so
near home; and were forced to wink at what was going on in
Iberia, in their anxiety to settle it satisfactorily first. Having,
therefore, put their relations with the Carthaginians on a safe
footing by the treaty with Hasdrubal, which I spoke of a short
time back,
7 they gave an undivided attention to the Celtic war,
convinced that their interest demanded that a decisive battle
should be fought with them.
The Roman Forces
The Gaesatae, then, having collected their forces, crossed
B. C. 225. Coss. L. Aemilius Papus. C. Atilius Regulus. |
the
Alps and descended into the valley of the
Padus with a
formidable army, furnished with a variety of
armour, in the eighth year after the distribution
of the lands of Picenum. The Insubres and
Boii remained loyal to the agreement they had
made with them: but the Venĕti and
Cenomani being induced
by embassies from
Rome to take the Roman side, the Celtic
kings were obliged to leave a portion of their forces behind, to
guard against an invasion of their territory by those tribes.
They themselves, with their main army, consisting of one hundred and fifty thousand foot, and twenty thousand horse and
chariots, struck camp and started on their march, which was
to be through Etruria, in high spirits. As soon as it was
known at
Rome that the Celts had crossed the
Alps, one of
the Consuls, Lucius Aemilius Papus, was sent with an army to
Ariminum to guard against the passage of the enemy, and one
of the Praetors into Etruria: for the other Consul, Gaius
Atilius Regulus, happened to be in
Sardinia with his legions.
There was universal terror in
Rome, for the danger threatening
them was believed to be great and formidable. And naturally
so: for the old fear of the Gauls had never been eradicated from
their minds. No one thought of anything else: they were
incessantly occupied in mustering the legions, or enrolling new
ones, and in ordering up such of the allies as were ready
for service. The proper magistrates were ordered to give in
lists of all citizens of military age; that it might at once be
known to what the total of the available forces amounted.
And such stores of corn, and darts, and other military equipments
were collected as no one could remember on any
former occasion. From every side assistance was eagerly
rendered; for the inhabitants of
Italy, in their terror at the
Gallic invasion, no longer thought of the matter as a question
of alliance with
Rome, or of the war as undertaken to support
Roman supremacy, but each people regarded it as a danger
menacing themselves and their own city and territory. The
response to the Roman appeal therefore was prompt.
Forces Available to the Romans
But in order that we may learn from actual facts how
great the power was which Hannibal subsequently ventured to attack, and what a mighty
empire he faced when he succeeded in inflicting upon the Roman people the most severe disasters, I
must now state the amount of the forces they could at that
time bring into the field. The two Consuls had marched out
with four legions, each consisting of five thousand two hundred
infantry and three hundred cavalry. Besides this there were
with each Consul allies to the number of thirty thousand
infantry and two thousand cavalry. Of Sabines and Etruscans
too, there had come to
Rome, for that special occasion, four
thousand horse and more than fifty thousand foot. These
were formed into an army and sent in advance into Etruria,
under the command of one of the Praetors. Moreover, the
Umbrians and Sarsinatae, hill tribes of the Apennine district,
were collected to the number of twenty thousand; and with
them were twenty thousand Venĕti and
Cenomani. These
were stationed on the frontier of the Gallic territory, that they
might divert the attention of the invaders, by making an
incursion into the territory of the Boii. These were the forces
guarding the frontier. In
Rome itself, ready as a reserve
in case of the accidents of war, there remained twenty thousand
foot and three thousand horse of citizens, and thirty thousand
foot and two thousand horse of the allies. Lists of men for
service had also been returned, of Latins eighty thousand foot
and five thousand horse; of Samnites seventy thousand foot and
seven thousand horse; of Iapygians and Messapians together
fifty thousand foot and sixteen thousand horse; and of Lucanians
thirty thousand foot and three thousand horse; of Marsi, and
Marrucini, and Ferentani, and Vestini, twenty thousand foot
and four thousand horse. And besides these, there were in
reserve in
Sicily and
Tarentum two legions, each of which consisted of about four thousand two hundred foot, and two hundred
horse. Of the Romans and Campanians the total of those put
on the roll was two hundred and fifty thousand foot and twentythree thousand horse; so that the grand total of the forces actually
defending
Rome was over 150,000 foot, 6000 cavalry:
8 and of
the men able to bear arms, Romans and allies, over 700,000 foot
and 70,000 horse; while Hannibal, when he invaded
Italy, had
less than twenty thousand to put against this immense force.
Defeat of the Romans Near Faesulae
There will be another opportunity of treating the
subject in greater detail; for the present I
must return to the Celts. Having entered
Etruria, they began their march through the
country, devastating it as they chose, and without any
opposition; and finally directed their course against
Rome
itself. But when they were encamped under the walls of
Clusium, which is three days' march from
Rome, news was
brought them that the Roman forces, which were on duty in
Etruria, were following on their rear and were close upon them;
upon which they turned back to meet them, eager to offer
them battle.
The Praetor's army defeated at Clusium. |
The two armies came in sight
of each other about sunset, and encamped for
the night a short distance apart. But when
night fell, the Celts lit their watch fires; and leaving their
cavalry on the ground, with instructions that, as soon as
daylight made them visible to the enemy, they should follow
by the same route, they made a secret retreat along the road
to
Faesulae, and took up their position there; that they
might be joined by their own cavalry, and might disconcert
the attack of the enemy. Accordingly, when at daybreak the
Romans saw that the cavalry were alone, they believed that
the Celts had fled, and hastened in pursuit of the retreating
horse; but when they approached the spot where the enemy
were stationed, the Celts suddenly left their position and fell
upon them. The struggle was at first maintained with fury on
both sides: but the courage and superior numbers of the
Celts eventually gave them the victory. No less than six
thousand Romans fell: while the rest fled, most of whom
made their way to a certain strongly fortified height, and there
remained. The first impulse of the Celts was to besiege
them: but they were worn out by their previous night march,
and all the suffering and fatigue of the day; leaving therefore
a detachment of cavalry to keep guard round the hill, they
hastened to procure rest and refreshment, resolving to besiege
the fugitives next day unless they voluntarily surrendered.
Aemilius Deters the Gauls
But meanwhile Lucius Aemilius, who had been stationed
On the arrival of Aemilius the Gauls retire. |
on the coast of the Adriatic at
Ariminum,
having been informed that the Gauls had
entered Etruria and were approaching
Rome,
set off to the rescue; and after a rapid march appeared on
the ground just at the critical moment. He pitched his
camp close to the enemy; and the fugitives on the hill, seeing
his watch fires, and understanding what had happened, quickly
recovered their courage and sent some of their men unarmed
to make their way through the forest and tell the Consul what
had happened. This news left the Consul as he thought no
alternative but to fight. He therefore ordered the Tribunes to
lead out the infantry at daybreak, while he, taking command
of the cavalry, led the way towards the hill. The Gallic
chieftains too had seen his watch fires, and understood that the
enemy was come; and at once held council of war. The
advice of King Aneroestes was, "that seeing the amount of
booty they had taken,—an incalculable quantity indeed of
captives, cattle, and other spoil,—they had better not run
the risk of another general engagement, but return home in
safety; and having disposed of this booty, and freed themselves
from its incumbrance, return, if they thought good, to make
another determined attack upon
Rome." Having resolved to
follow the advice of Aneroestes in the present juncture, the
chiefs broke up their night council, and before daybreak struck
camp, and marched through Etruria by the road which follows
the coast of the Ligurian bay. While Lucius, having taken off
the remnant of the army from the hill, and combined it with
his own forces, determined that it would not be by any means
advantageous to offer the enemy regular battle; but that it was
better to dog their footsteps, watching for favourable times and
places at which to inflict damage upon them, or wrest some of
their booty from their hands.
Atilius Meets the Gauls
Just at that time the Consul Gaius Atilius had crossed
Atilius landing at Pisa intercepts the march of the Gauls. |
from
Sardinia, and having landed at
Pisae was
on his way to
Rome; and therefore he and
the enemy were advancing to meet each
other. When the Celts were at
Telamon in
Etruria, their advanced guard fell in with that of Gaius, and
the men being made prisoners informed the Consul in answer
to questions of what had taken place; and told him that both the
armies were in the neighbourhood: that of the Celts, namely,
and that of Lucius close upon their rear. Though somewhat
disturbed at the events which he thus learnt, Gaius regarded
the situation as a hopeful one, when he considered that the
Celts were on the road between two hostile armies. He therefore ordered the Tribunes to martial the legions and to advance
at the ordinary pace, and in line as far as the breadth of the
ground permitted; while he himself having surveyed a piece
of rising ground which commanded the road, and under which
the Celts must march, took his cavalry with him and hurried
on to seize the eminence, and so begin the battle in person;
convinced that by these means he would get the principal
credit of the action for himself. At first the Celts not knowing
anything about the presence of Gaius Atilius, but supposing
from what was taking place, that the cavalry of Aemilius had outmarched them in the night, and were seizing the points or vantage
in the van of their route, immediately detached some cavalry and
light armed infantry to dispute the possession of this eminence.
But having shortly afterwards learnt the truth about the presence
of Gaius from a prisoner who was brought in, they hurriedly
got their infantry into position, and drew them up so as to
face two opposite ways, some, that is, to the front and others to
the rear. For they knew that one army was following on their
rear; and they expected from the intelligence which had reached
them, and from what they saw actually occurring, that they
would have to meet another on their front.
The Gauls Defeated On Their Way Home
Aemilius had heard of the landing of the legions at
Pisae, but had not expected them to be already so far on
their road; but the contest at the eminence proved to him
that the two armies were quite close.
The battle of the horse. Atilius falls. |
He
accordingly despatched his horse at once to
support the struggle for the possession of the
hill, while he marshalled his foot in their usual order, and
advanced to attack the enemy who barred his way. The
Celts had stationed the Alpine tribe of the Gaesatae to face
their enemies on the rear, and behind them the Insubres; on
their front they had placed the Taurisci, and the Cispadane
tribe of the Boii, facing the legions of Gaius. Their waggons
and chariots they placed on the extremity of either wing, while
the booty they massed upon one of the hills that skirted the
road, under the protection of a guard. The army of the Celts
was thus double-faced, and their mode of marshalling their
forces was effective as well as calculated to inspire terror. The
Insubres and Boii were clothed in their breeches and light
cloaks; but the Gaesatae from vanity and bravado threw these
garments away, and fell in in front of the army naked, with
nothing but their arms; believing that, as the ground was in
parts encumbered with brambles, which might possibly catch
in their clothes and impede the use of their weapons, they
would be more effective in this state. At first the only actual
fighting was that for the possession of the hill: and the numbers
of the cavalry, from all three armies, that had joined in
the struggle made it a conspicious sight to all. In the
midst of it the Consul Gaius fell, fighting with reckless bravery
in the thick of the battle, and his head was brought to the
king of the Celts. The Roman cavalry, however, continued the
struggle with spirit, and finally won the position and overpowered
their opponents. Then the foot also came to close quarters.
A Peculiar and Surprising Battle
It was surely a peculiar and surprising battle to witness,
and scarcely less so to hear described. A battle, to begin
with, in which three distinct armies were engaged, must have
presented a strange and unusual appearance, and must have
been fought under strange and unusual conditions. Again, it
must have seemed to a spectator open to question, whether the
position of the Gauls were the most dangerous conceivable, from
being between two attacking forces; or the most favourable, as
enabling them to meet both armies at once, while their own two
divisions afforded each other a mutual support: and, above all,
as putting retreat out of the question, or any hope of safety except in victory. For this is the peculiar advantage of having an
army facing in two opposite directions. The Romans, on the
other hand, while encouraged by having got their enemy between two of their own armies, were at the same time dismayed
by the ornaments and clamour of the Celtic host. For there
were among them such innumerable horns and trumpets, which
were being blown simultaneously in all parts of their army, and
their cries were so loud and piercing, that the noise seemed not
to come merely from trumpets and human voices, but from
the whole country-side at once. Not less terrifying was the
appearance and rapid movement of the naked warriors in the
van, which indicated men in the prime of their strength and
beauty: while all the warriors in the front ranks were richly
adorned with gold necklaces and bracelets. These sights
certainly dismayed the Romans; still the hope they gave of a
profitable victory redoubled their eagerness for the battle.
Great Slaughter of the Gauls
When the men who were armed with the
pilum advanced in front of the legions, in accordance
with the regular method of Roman warfare,
and hurled their
pila in rapid and effective
volleys, the inner ranks of the Celts found their jerkins
and leather breeches of great service; but to the naked
men in the front ranks this unexpected mode of attack caused
great distress and discomfiture. For the Gallic shields not
being big enough to cover the man, the larger the naked body
the more certainty was there of the
pilum hitting. And at last,
not being able to retaliate, because the pilum-throwers were
out of reach, and their weapons kept pouring in, some of them,
in the extremity of their distress and helplessness, threw themselves with desperate courage and reckless violence upon the
enemy, and thus met a voluntary death; while others gave
ground step by step towards their own friends, whom they
threw into confusion by this manifest acknowledgment of their
panic. Thus the courage of the Gaesatae had broken down
before the preliminary attack of the
pilum. But when the
throwers of it had rejoined their ranks, and the whole Roman
line charged, the Insubres, Boii, and Taurisci received the
attack, and maintained a desperate hand-to-hand fight. Though
almost cut to pieces, they held their ground with unabated
courage, in spite of the fact that man for man, as well as collectively, they were inferior to the Romans in point of arms.
The shields and swords of the latter were proved to be manifestly
superior for defence and attack, for the Gallic sword can only
deliver a cut, but cannot trust. And when, besides the Roman
horse charged down from the high ground on their flank, and
attacked them vigorously, the infantry of the Celts were cut
to pieces on the field, while their horse turned and fled.
Aemilius Returns Victorious
Forty thousand of them were slain, and quite ten
thousand taken prisoners, among whom was one
of their kings, Concolitanus: the other king,
Aneroestes, fled with a few followers; joined
a few of his people in escaping to a place of security; and
there put an end to his own life and that of his friends.
Lucius Aemilius, the surviving Consul, collected the spoils of
the slain and sent them to
Rome, and restored the property
taken by the Gauls to its owners. Then taking command
of the legions, he marched along the frontier of
Liguria,
and made a raid upon the territory of the Boii; and having
satisfied the desires of the legions with plunder, returned with
his forces to
Rome in a few days' march. There he adorned
the Capitol with the captured standards and necklaces, which
are gold chains worn by the Gauls round their necks; but
the rest of the spoils, and the captives, he converted to the
benefit of his own estate and to the adornment of his triumph.
Thus was the most formidable Celtic invasion repelled,
which had been regarded by all Italians, and especially by the
Romans, as a danger of the utmost gravity. The victory
inspired the Romans with a hope that they might be able to
entirely expel the Celts from the valley of the
Padus: and
accordingly the Consuls of the next year, Quintus
Fulvius Flaccus and Titus Manlius Torquatus,
were both sent out with their legions, and military preparations on a large scale, against them. By a rapid attack they
terrified the Boii into making submission to
Rome; but the
campaign had no other practical effect, because, during the
rest of it, there was a season of excessive rains, and an
outbreak of pestilence in the army.
Victory Over the Insubres
The Consuls of the next year, however, Publius Furius
Philus and Caius Flaminius, once more invaded
the Celtic lands, marching through the territory
of the Anamares, who live not far from
Placentia.
9 Having secured the friendship of this tribe, they crossed into the country
of the Insubres, near the confluence of the
Adua and
Padus.
They suffered some annoyance from the enemy, as they were
crossing the river, and as they were pitching their camp; and
after remaining for a short time, they made terms with the
Insubres and left their country. After a circuitous march of
several days, they crossed the River Clusius, and came into the
territory of the
Cenomani. As these people were allies of
Rome, they reinforced the army with some of their men,
which then descended once more from the Alpine regions
into the plains belonging to the Insubres, and began laying
waste their land and plundering their houses. The Insubrian
chiefs, seeing that nothing could change the determination of
the Romans to destroy them, determined that they had
better try their fortune by a great and decisive battle.
They therefore mustered all their forces, took down from the
temple of Minerva the golden standards, which are called "the
immovables," and having made other necessary preparations,
in high spirits and formidable array, encamped opposite to
their enemies to the number of fifty thousand. Seeing themselves thus outnumbered, the Romans at first determined to
avail themselves of the forces of the allied Celtic tribes; but
when they reflected on the fickle character of the Gauls, and
that they were about to fight with an enemy of the same race
as these auxiliary troops, they hesitated to associate such men
with themselves, at a crisis of such danger, and in an action of
such importance. However, they finally decided to do this.
They themselves stayed on the side of the river next the
enemy: and sending the Celtic contingent to the other side,
they pulled up the bridges; which at once precluded any
fear of danger from them, and left themselves no hope of safety
except in victory; the impassable river being thus in their rear.
These dispositions made, they were ready to engage.
Tactics Against the Gauls
The Romans are thought to have shown uncommon
Battle with the Insubres. |
skill in this battle; the Tribunes instructing
the troops how they were to conduct themselves both collectively and individually. They
had learned from former engagements that Gallic tribes
were always most formidable at the first onslaught, before their
courage was at all damped by a check; and that the swords
with which they were furnished, as I have mentioned before, could only give one downward cut with any effect,
but that after this the edges got so turned and the blade
so bent, that unless they had time to straighten them with
their foot against the ground, they could not deliver a second
blow. The Tribunes accordingly gave out the spears of the
Triarii, who are the last of the three ranks, to the first ranks,
or Hastati: and ordering the men to use their swords only,
after their spears were done with, they charged the Celts
full in front. When the Celts had rendered their swords useless
by the first blows delivered on the spears, the Romans close
with them, and rendered them quite helpless, by preventing them
from raising their hands to strike with their swords, which is
their peculiar and only stroke, because their blade has no point.
The Romans, on the contrary, having excellent points to their
swords, used them not to cut but to thrust: and by thus
repeatedly hitting the breasts and faces of the enemy, they
eventually killed the greater number of them. And this was due
to the foresight of the Tribunes: for the Consul Flaminius is
thought to have made a strategic mistake in his arrangements
for this battle. By drawing up his men along the very brink
of the river, he rendered impossible a manœuvre characteristic
of Roman tactics, because he left the lines no room for their
deliberate retrograde movements; for if, in the course of the
battle, the men had been forced ever so little from their ground,
they would have been obliged by this blunder of their leader to
throw themselves into the river. However, the valour of the
soldiers secured them a brilliant victory, as I have said, and
they returned to
Rome with abundance of booty of every kind,
and of trophies stripped from the enemy.
Capture of Mediolanum and End of the War
Next year, upon embassies coming from the Celts,
B. C. 222. Attack on the Insubres. |
desiring peace and making unlimited offers of
submission, the new Consuls, Marcus Claudius
Marcellus and Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Calvus,
were urgent that no peace should be granted them. Thus
frustrated, they determined to try a last chance, and once more
took active measures to hire thirty thousand Gaesatae,—the
Gallic tribe which lives on the
Rhone. Having obtained these,
they held themselves in readiness, and waited for the attack of
their enemies. At the beginning of spring the Consuls assumed
command of their forces, and marched them into the territory
of the Insubres; and there encamped under the walls of the
city of Acerrae, which lies between the
Padus and the
Alps,
and laid siege to it. The Insubres, being unable to render
any assistance, because all the positions of vantage had been
seized by the enemy first, and being yet very anxious to break
up the siege of Acerrae, detached a portion of their forces to
affect a diversion by crossing the
Padus and laying siege to
Clastidium. Intelligence of this movement being brought to
the Consuls, Marcus Claudius, taking with him his cavalry and
some light infantry, made a forced march to relieve the besieged inhabitants. When the Celts heard of his approach,
they raised the siege; and, marching out to meet him, offered
him battle. At first they held their ground against a furious
charge of cavalry which the Roman Consul launched at them;
but when they presently found themselves surrounded by the
enemy on their rear and flank, unable to maintain the
fight any longer, they fled before the cavalry; and many of
them were driven into the river, and were swept away by the
stream, though the larger number were cut down by their
enemies. Acerrae also, richly stored with corn, fell into the
hands of the Romans: the Gauls having evacuated it, and
retired to
Mediolanum, which is the most commanding position in the territory of the Insubres. Gnaeus followed them
closely, and suddenly appeared at
Mediolanum. The Gauls at
first did not stir; but upon his starting on his return march to
Acerrae, they sallied out, and having boldly attacked his rear,
killed a good many men, and even drove a part of it into
flight; until Gnaeus recalled some of his vanguard, and urged
them to stand and engage the enemy. The Roman soldiers
obeyed orders, and offered a vigorous resistance to the attacking party. The Celts, encouraged by their success, held their
ground for a certain time with some gallantry, but before long
turned and fled to the neighbouring mountains. Gnaeus followed
them, wasting the country as he went, and took
Mediolanum
by assault. At this the chiefs of the Insubres, despairing of
safety, made a complete and absolute submission to
Rome.
Character of the Gauls
Such was the end of the Celtic war: which, for the
desperate determination and boldness of the enemy, for the
obstinacy of the battles fought, and for the number of those
who fell and of those who were engaged, is second to none
recorded in history, but which, regarded as a specimen of
scientific strategy, is utterly contemptible. The Gauls showed
no power of planning or carrying out a campaign, and in
everything they did were swayed by impulse rather than by
sober calculation. As I have seen these tribes, after a short
struggle, entirely ejected from the valley of the
Padus, with
the exception of some few localities lying close to the
Alps, I
thought I ought not to let their original attack upon
Italy pass
unrecorded, any more than their subsequent attempts, or their
final ejectment: for it is the function of the historian to record
and transmit to posterity such episodes in the drama of
Fortune; that our posterity may not from ignorance of the past
be unreasonably dismayed at the sudden and unexpected invasions of these barbarians, but may reflect how shortlived and
easily damped the spirit of this race is; and so may stand to
their defence, and try every possible means before yielding an
inch to them. I think, for instance, that those who have
recorded for our information the invasion of
Greece by the Persians, and of
Delphi by the
Gauls, have contributed materially to the
struggles made for the common freedom of
Greece. For a
superiority in supplies, arms, or numbers, would scarcely
deter any one from putting the last possible hope to the test,
in a struggle for the integrity and the safety of his city and its
territory, if he had before his eyes the surprising result of those
expeditions; and remembered how many myriads of men, what
daring confidence, and what immense armaments were baffled
by the skill and ability of opponents, who conducted their
measures under the dictates of reason and sober calculation.
And as an invasion of Gauls has been a source of alarm to
Greece in our day, as well as in ancient times, I thought it
worth while to give a summary sketch of their doings from the
earliest times.
Hasdrubal Dies and Hannibal Succeeds Him
Our narrative now returns to Hasdrubal, whom we left
in command of the Carthaginian forces in
Iberia.
After eight years command in that country, he
was assassinated in his own house at night by a
certain Celt in revenge for some private wrong.
Before his death he had done much to strengthen the Carthaginian power in
Iberia, not so much by military achievements,
as by the friendly relations which he maintained with the
native princes. Now that he was dead, the Carthaginians
invested Hannibal with the command in
Iberia,
in spite of his youth, because of the ability in
the conduct of affairs, and the daring spirit
which he had displayed.
Succession of Hannibal to the command in Spain. His hostility to Rome. |
He had no sooner
assumed the command, than he nourished a fixed
resolve to make war on
Rome; nor was it long before he
carried out this resolution. From that time forth there were
constant suspicious and causes of offence arising between the
Carthaginians and Romans. And no wonder: for the Carthaginians were meditating revenge for their defeats in
Sicily; and
the Romans were made distrustful from a knowledge of their
designs. These things made it clear to every one of correct
judgment that before long a war between these two nations
was inevitable.
Greece At This Time
At the same period the Achaean league and King
Social war, B. C. 220-217. |
Philip, with their allies, were entering upon the
war with the Aetolian league, which is called the
Social war. Now this was the point at which I
proposed to begin my general history; and as I have brought
the account of the affairs of
Sicily and
Libya, and those which
immediately followed, in a continuous narrative, up to the date
of the beginning of the Social and Second Punic, generally
called the Hannibalic, wars, it will be proper to leave this branch
of my subject for a while, and to take up the history of events
in
Greece, that I may start upon my full and detailed narrative,
after bringing the prefatory sketch of the history of the several
countries to the same point of time. For since I have not
undertaken, as previous writers have done, to write the history
of particular peoples, such as the Greeks or Persians, but the
history of all known parts of the world at once, because there
was something in the state of our own times which made such
a plan peculiarly feasible,—of which I shall speak more at
length hereafter,—it will be proper, before entering on my main
subject, to touch briefly on the state of the most important of
the recognised nations of the world.
Of
Asia and
Egypt I need not speak before the time at
which my history commences. The previous history of these
countries has been written by a number of historians
already, and is known to all the world; nor in our days has
any change specially remarkable or unprecedented occurred to
them demanding a reference to their past.
The progress of the Achaean league. |
But in regard to
the Achaean league, and the royal family of
Macedonia, it will be in harmony with my
design to go somewhat farther back: for
the latter has become entirely extinct; while the Achaeans,
as I have stated before, have in our time made extraordinary progress in material prosperity and internal unity.
For though many statesmen had tried in past times to induce
the Peloponnesians to join in a league for the common interests
of all, and had always failed, because every one was working
to secure his own power rather than the freedom of the whole;
yet in our day this policy has made such progress, and been
carried out with such completeness, that not only is there in
the
Peloponnese a community of interests such as exists between allies or friends, but an absolute identity. of laws, weights,
measures, and currency.
10 All the States have the same magistrates, senate, and judges. Nor is there any difference
between the entire
Peloponnese and a single city, except in
the fact that its inhabitants are not included within the
same wall; in other respects, both as a whole and in their
individual cities, there is a nearly absolute assimilation of
institutions.
Origin of the Name "Achaean"
It will be useful to ascertain, to begin with, how it
The origin of the name as embracing all the Peloponnese. |
came to pass that the name of the Achaeans
became the universal one for all the inhabitants of the
Peloponnese. For the original
bearers of this ancestral name have no
superiority over others, either in the size of their territory
and cities, or in wealth, or in the prowess of their men. For
they are a long way off being superior to the Arcadians
and Lacedaemonians in number of inhabitants and extent
of territory; nor can these latter nations be said to yield
the first place in warlike courage to any Greek people
whatever. Whence then comes it that these nations, with
the rest of the inhabitants of the
Peloponnese, have been
content to adopt the constitution and the name of the
Achaeans? To speak of chance in such a matter would not
be to offer any adequate solution of the question, and would
be a mere idle evasion. A cause must be sought; for without
a cause nothing, expected or unexpected, can be accomplished. The cause then, in my opinion, was this. Nowhere
could be found a more unalloyed and deliberately established
system of equality and absolute freedom, and, in a word, of
democracy, than among the Achaeans. This constitution
found many of the Peloponnesians ready enough to adopt
it of their own accord: many were brought to share in it by
persuasion and argument: some, though acting under compulsion at first, were quickly brought to acquiesce in its benefits;
for none of the original members had any special privilege
reserved for them, but equal rights were given to all comers:
the object aimed at was therefore quickly attained by the two
most unfailing expedients of equality and fraternity. This
then must be looked upon as the source and original cause
of Peloponnesian unity and consequent prosperity.
That this was the original principle on which the Achaeans
acted in forming their constitution might be demonstrated by
many proofs; but for the present purpose it will be sufficient
to allege one or two in confirmation of my assertion.
The First Achaean League
And first: When the burning of the Pythagorean
clubs in Magna Grecia was followed by great constitutional
disturbances, as was natural on the sudden disappearance of
the leading men in each state; and the Greek cities in that
part of
Italy became the scene of murder, revolutionary warfare,
and every kind of confusion; deputations were sent from most
parts of
Greece to endeavour to bring about some settlement
of these disorders.
11 But the disturbed states preferred the
intervention of the Achaeans above all others, and showed
the greatest confidence in them, in regard to the measures to
be adopted for removing the evils that oppressed them. Nor
was this the only occasion on which they displayed this preference. For shortly afterwards there was a general movement
among them to adopt the model of the Achaean constitution.
The first states to move in the matter were
Croton,
Sybaris,
and Caulonia, who began by erecting a common temple to Zeus
Homorios,
12 and a place in which to hold their meetings and
common councils.
They then adopted the laws
and customs of the Achaeans, and determined
to conduct their constitution according to their
principles; but finding themselves hampered by the tyranny of
Dionysius of
Syracuse, and also by the encroachment of the neighbouring barbarians, they were
forced much against their will to abandon them.
Again, later on,
when the Lacedaemonians met with their unexpected reverse
at Leuctra, and the Thebans as unexpectedly claimed the hegemony in
Greece, a feeling of uncertainty prevailed
throughout the country, and especially among the
Lacedaemonians and Thebans themselves, because the former
refused to allow that they were beaten, the latter felt hardly certain that they had conquered.
On this occasion, once more, the
Achaeans were the people selected by the two parties, out of all
Greece, to act as arbitrators on the points in dispute. And
this could not have been from any special view of their power,
for at that time they were perhaps the weakest state in
Greece;
it was rather from a conviction of their good faith and high
principles, in regard to which there was but one opinion
universally entertained. At that period of their history, however, they possessed only the elements of success; success
itself, and material increase, were barred by the fact that they
had not yet been able to produce a leader worthy of the
occasion. Whenever any man had given indications of such
ability, he was systematically thrust into the background and
hampered, at one time by the Lacedaemonian government, and
at another, still more effectually, by that of
Macedonia.
When at length, however, the country did obtain
leaders of sufficient ability, it quickly manifested its intrinsic
excellence by the accomplishment of that most glorious achievement,—the union of the
Peloponnese. The originator of
this policy in the first instance was Aratus of
Sicyon; its active
promotion and consummation was due to Philopoemen of
Megalopolis; while Lycortas and his party must be looked
upon as the authors of the permanence which it enjoyed. The
actual achievements of these several statesmen I shall narrate
in their proper places: but while deferring a more detailed
account of the other two, I think it will be right to briefly record
here, as well as in a future portion of my work, the political
measures of Aratus, because he has left a record of them himself in an admirably honest and lucid book of commentaries.
I think the easiest method for myself, and most intelligible
to my readers, will be to start from the period of the restoration of the Achaean league and federation, after its disintegration into separate states by the Macedonian kings: from which
time it has enjoyed an unbroken progress towards the state of
completion which now exists, and of which I have already
spoken at some length.
The Second League
The period I mean is the 124th Olympiad. In this
124th Olympiad, B. C. 284-280. |
occurred the first league of
Patrae and
Dyme,
and the deaths of Ptolemy son of Lagus,
Lysimachus, Seleucus, Ptolemy Ceraunus. In
the period before this the state of
Achaia was as follows. It
was ruled by kings from the time of Tisamenus, son of Orestes,
who, being expelled from
Sparta on the return of the Heraclidae,
formed a kingdom in
Achaia. The last of this royal line to
maintain his power was Ogyges, whose sons so alienated the
people by their unconstitutional and tyrannical government,
that a revolution took place and a democracy was established.
In the period subsequent to this, up to the
time of the establishment of the supreme
authority of Alexander and Philip, their fortunes were subject to various fluctuations, but they always
endeavoured to maintain intact in their league a democratical
form of government, as I have already stated. This league
consisted of twelve cities, all of them still surviving, with the
exception of
Olenus, and Helice which was engulfed by the
sea before the battle of Leuctra.
The other
ten were
Patrae,
Dyme, Pharae, Tritaea, Leontium, Aegium, Aegeira,
Pellene,
Bura, Caryneia.
In the
period immediately succeeding Alexander, and
before the above-named 124th Olympiad, these
cities, chiefly through the instrumentality of the Macedonian
kings, became so estranged and ill-disposed to each other,
and so divided and opposed in their interests, that some of
them had to submit to the presence of foreign garrisons, sent
first by Demetrius and Cassander, and afterwards by Antigonus
Gonatas, while others even fell under the power of Tyrants;
for no one set up more of such absolute rulers in the Greek
states than this last-named king.
But about the 124th Olympiad, as I have said, a change
B. C. 284-280, Second Achaean league. |
of sentiment prevailed among the Achaean
cities, and they began again to form a league.
This was just at the time of Pyrrhus's invasion of
Italy. The first to take this step were the peoples
of
Dyme,
Patrae, Tritaea, and Pharae. And as they thus
formed the nucleus of the league, we find no column extant recording the compact between these cities. But about
five years afterwards the people of Aegium expelled their
foreign garrison and joined the league; next, the people
of
Bura put their tyrant to death and did the same; simultaneously,
the state of Caryneia was restored to the league.
For Iseas, the then tyrant of Caryneia, when he saw the expulsion of the garrison from Aegium, and the death of the
despot in
Bura at the hands of Margos and the Achaeans,
and when he saw that he was himself on the point of being attacked on all sides, voluntarily laid down his office; and having
obtained a guarantee for his personal safety from the Achaeans,
formally gave in the adhesion of his city to the league.
Policy of the Achaean League
My object in thus going back in point of time was,
first, to show clearly at what epoch the Achaeans entered into
the second league, which exists at this day, and which were the
first members of the original league to do so; and, secondly,
that the continuity of the policy pursued by the Achaeans
might rest, not on my word only, but on the evidence of the
actual facts. It was in virtue of this policy,—by holding
out the bait of equality and freedom, and by invariably
making war upon and crushing those who on their own account, or with the support of the kings, enslaved any of the
states within their borders, that they finally accomplished the
design which they had deliberately adopted, in some cases by
their own unaided efforts, and in others by the help of their
allies. For in fact whatever was effected in this direction, by
the help of these allies in after times, must be put down to
the credit of the deliberately adopted policy of the Achaeans
themselves. They acted indeed jointly with others in many
honourable undertakings, and in none more so than with the
Romans: yet in no instance can they be said to have
aimed at obtaining from their success any advantage for a
particular state. In return for the zealous assistance rendered
by them to their allies, they bargained for nothing but the
freedom of each state and the union of the
Peloponnese. But
this will be more clearly seen from the record of their actual
proceedings.
Margos First Sole Strategus
For the first twenty-five years of the league between the
cities I have mentioned, a secretary and two strategi for the whole
union were elected by each city in turn. But after this period
they determined to appoint one strategus only,
13 and put the entire
management of the affairs of the union in his hands.
B. C. 255-254. Margos. B. C. 251-250. Aratus. |
The
first to obtain this honour was Margos of Caryneia. In the fourth year after this man's tenure
of the office, Aratus of
Sicyon caused his city to
join the league, which, by his energy and courage,
he had, when only twenty years of age, delivered from the yoke
of its tyrant.
In the eighth year again after
this, Aratus, being elected strategus for the
second time, laid a plot to seize the Acrocorinthus, then held
by Antigonus; and by his success freed the inhabitants of the
Peloponnese from a source of serious alarm: and having thus
liberated
Corinth he caused it to join the league.
Victory of Lutatius off the insulae Aegates, B. C. 241. |
In his
same term of office he got
Megara into his
hands, and caused it to join also. These events
occurred in the year before the decisive defeat
of the Carthaginians, in consequence of which
they evacuated
Sicily and consented for the first time to pay
tribute to
Rome.
Having made this remarkable progress in his design in so
short a time, Aratus continued thenceforth in the position of
leader-of the Achaean league, and in the consistent direction
of his whole policy to one single end; which was to expel
Macedonians from the
Peloponnese, to depose the despots,
and to establish in each state the common freedom which
their ancestors had enjoyed before them.
Antigonus Gonatas, B. C. 283-239 |
So long, therefore,
as Antigonus Gonatas was alive, he maintained
a continual opposition to his interference, as well
as to the encroaching spirit of the Aetolians, and
in both cases with signal skill and success; although their
presumption and contempt for justice had risen to such a
pitch, that they had actually made a formal compact with each
other for the disruption of the Achaeans.
Death of Demetrius
After the death of Antigonus, however, the Achaeans
made terms with the Aetolians, and joined them energetically
in the war against Demetrius; and, in place of the feelings of
estrangement and hostility, there gradually grew up a sentiment
of brotherhood and affection between the two peoples. Upon
the death of Demetrius, after a reign of only ten years,
just about the time of the first invasion of
Illyricum by the Romans, the Achaeans had
a most excellent opportunity of establishing
the policy which they had all along maintained.
Demetrius. B. C. 239-229. |
For the
despots in the
Peloponnese were in despair at the death
of Demetrius. It was the loss to them of their chief supporter and paymaster. And now Aratus was for ever impressing upon them that they ought to abdicate, holding out
rewards and honours for those of them who consented, and
threatening those who refused with still greater vengeance
from the Achaeans. There was therefore a general movement
among them to voluntarily restore their several states to freedom and to join the league. I ought however to say that
Ludiades of
Megalopolis, in the lifetime of Demetrius, of
his own deliberate choice, and foreseeing with great shrewdness and good sense what was going to happen, had abdicated
his sovereignty and become a citizen of the national league.
His example was followed by Aristomachus, tyrant of
Argos,
Xeno of
Hermione, and Cleonymus of Phlius, who all likewise
abdicated and joined the democratic league.
The Aetolians Envy the Achaeans
But the increased power and national advancement
The Aetolians and Antigonus Doson, B. C. 229-220. |
which these events brought to the Achaeans
excited the envy of the Aetolians; who, besides
their natural inclination to unjust and selfish
aggrandisement, were inspired with the hope of
breaking up the union of Achaean states, as they had before succeeded in partitioning those of
Acarnania with Alexander,
14 and
had planned to do those of
Achaia with Antigonus Gonatas.
Instigated once more by similar expectations, they had now
the assurance to enter into communication and close alliance
at once with Antigonus (at that time ruling
Macedonia as
guardian of the young King Philip), and with Cleomenes,
King of
Sparta. They saw that Antigonus had undisputed
possession of the throne of
Macedonia, while he was an open
and avowed enemy of the Achaeans owing to the surprise of the
Acrocorinthus; and they supposed that if they could get the
Lacedaemonians to join them in their hostility to the league,
they would easily subdue it, by selecting a favourable opportunity for their attack, and securing that it should be assaulted
on all sides at once. And they would in all probability have
succeeded, but that they had left out the most important element in the calculation, namely, that in Aratus they had to
reckon with an opponent to their plans of ability equal to
almost any emergency. Accordingly, when they attempted
this violent and unjust interference in
Achaia, so far from
succeeding in any of their devices, they, on the contrary,
strengthened Aratus, the then president of the league, as well as
the league itself. So consummate was the ability with which
he foiled their plan and reduced them to impotence. The
manner in which this was done will be made clear in what I
am about to relate.
Intrigues of the Aetolians
There could be no doubt of the policy of the Aetolians.
The Aetolians intrigue with Cleomenes. King of Sparta, B. C. 229-227. |
They were ashamed indeed to attack the Achaeans
openly, because they could not ignore their
recent obligations to them in the war with
Demetrius: but they were plotting with the
Lacedaemonians; and showed their jealousy of
the Achaeans by not only conniving at the treacherous attack
of Cleomenes upon
Tegea,
Mantinea, and
Orchomenus (cities
not only in alliance with them, but actually members of their
league), but by confirming his occupation of those places. In old
times they had thought almost any excuse good enough to justify
an appeal to arms against those who, after all, had done them no
wrong: yet they now allowed themselves to be treated with such
treachery, and submitted without remonstrance to the loss of
the most important towns, solely with the view of creating in
Cleomenes a formidable antagonist to the Achaeans. These
facts were not lost upon Aratus and the other officers of the
league: and they resolved that, without taking the initiative in
going to war with any one, they would resist the attempts of
the Lacedaemonians. Such was their determination, and for a
time they persisted in it: but immediately afterwards Cleomenes began to build the hostile fort in the territory of
Megalopolis, called the Athenaeum,
15 and showed an undisguised
and bitter hostility. Aratus and his colleagues accordingly summoned a meeting of the league, and it was decided
to proclaim war openly against
Sparta.
The Cleomenic War
This was the origin of what is called the Cleomenic
Cleomenes, B. C. 227-221. |
war. At first the Achaeans were for depending
on their own resources for facing the Lacedaemonians. They looked upon it as more honourable not to look to others for preservation, but to guard their
own territory and cities themselves; and at the same time the
remembrances of his former services made them desirous of
keeping up their friendship with Ptolemy,
16 and averse from the
appearance of seeking aid elsewhere. But when the war had
lasted some time; and Cleomenes had revolutionised the constitution of his country, and had turned its constitutional
monarchy into a despotism; and, moreover, was conducting the war with extraordinary skill and boldness: seeing
clearly what would happen, and fearing the
reckless audacity of the Aetolians, Aratus
determined that his first duty was to be well
beforehand in frustrating their plans.
Aratus applies to Antigonus Doson. |
He satisfied himself
that Antigonus was a man of activity and practical ability,
with some pretensions to the character of a man of honour;
he however knew perfectly well that kings look on no man
as a friend or foe from personal considerations, but ever
measure friendships and enmities solely by the standard of
expediency. He, therefore, conceived the idea of addressing
himself to this monarch, and entering into friendly relations
with him, taking occasion to point out to him the certain result of
his present policy. But to act openly in this matter he thought
inexpedient for several reasons. By doing so he would not
only incur the opposition of Cleomenes and the Aetolians, but
would cause consternation among the Achaeans themselves,
because his appeal to their enemies would give the impression
that he had abandoned all the hopes he once had in them.
This was the very last idea he desired should go abroad; and
he therefore determined to conduct this intrigue in secrecy.
The result of this was that he was often compelled to speak
and act towards the public in a sense contrary to his true
sentiments, that he might conceal his real design by suggesting one of an exactly opposite nature. For which reason
there are some particulars which he did not even commit to
his own commentaries.
It did not escape the observation of Aratus that the
people of Megalopolis would be more ready than others to seek
the protection of Antigonus, and the hopes of safety offered by
Macedonia; for their neighbourhood to
Sparta exposed them
to attack before the other states; while they were unable to get
the help which they ought to have, because the Achaeans were
themselves hard pressed and in great difficulties. Besides
they had special reasons for entertaining feelings of affection
towards the royal family of
Macedonia, founded
on the favours received in the time of Philip,
son of Amyntas.
He therefore imparted his
general design under pledge of secrecy to Nicophanes and
Cercidas of
Megalopolis, who were family friends of his own
and of a character suited to the undertaking; and by their means
experienced no difficulty in inducing the people of
Megalopolis
to send envoys to the league, to advise that an application for
help should be made to Antigonus. Nicophanes and Cercidas
were themselves selected to go on this mission to the league,
and thence, if their view was accepted, to Antigonus. The
league consented to allow the people of Megalopolis to send
the mission; and accordingly Nicophanes lost no time in obtaining an interview with the king. About the interests of his
own country he spoke briefly and summarily, confining himself
to the most necessary statements; the greater part of his
speech was, in accordance with the directions of Aratus,
concerned with the national question.
Message to Antigonus Doson from Aratus
The points suggested by Aratus for the envoy to dwell
The message to Antigonus Doson. |
on were "the scope and object of the understanding between the Aetolians and Cleomenes,
and the necessity of caution on the part primarily
of the Achaeans, but still more even on that of Antigonus himself: first, because the Achaeans plainly could not resist the
attack of both; and, secondly, because if the Aetolians and
Cleomenes conquered them, any man of sense could easily see
that they would not be satisfied or stop there. For the
encroaching spirit of the Aetolians, far from being content to
be confined by the boundaries of the
Peloponnese, would find
even those of
Greece too narrow for them. Again, the ambition
of Cleomenes was at present directed to the supremacy in the
Peloponnese: but this obtained, he would promptly aim at that
of all
Greece, in which it would be impossible for him to
succeed without first crushing the government of
Macedonia.
They were, therefore, to urge him to consider, with a view to
the future, which of the two courses would be the more to his
own interests,—to fight for supremacy in
Greece in conjunction with the Achaeans and Boeotians against Cleomenes in
the
Peloponnese; or to abandon the most powerful race, and to
stake the Macedonian empire on a battle in
Thessaly, against a
combined force of Aetolians and Boeotians, with the Achaeans
and Lacedaemonians to boot. If the Aetolians, from regard
to the goodwill shown them by the Achaeans in the time of
Demetrius, were to pretend to be anxious to keep the peace
as they were at present doing, they were to assert that the
Achaeans were ready to engage Cleomenes by themselves;
and if fortune declared in their favour they would want no
assistance from any one: but if fortune went against them,
and the Aetolians joined in the attack, they begged him to
watch the course of events, that he might not let things go
too far, but might aid the Peloponnesians while they were
still capable of being saved. He had no need to be anxious
about the good faith or gratitude of the Achaeans: when the
time for action came, Aratus pledged himself to find guarantees
which would be satisfactory to both parties; and similarly
would himself indicate the moment at which the aid should
be given."
Antigonus Doson Will Help the League
These arguments seemed to Antigonus to have been
put by Aratus with equal sincerity and ability: and after
listening to them, he eagerly took the first necessary step by
writing a letter to the people of
Megalopolis with an offer of
assistance, on condition that such a measure should receive the
consent of the Achaeans. When Nicophanes and Cercidas
returned home and delivered this despatch from the king,
reporting at the same time his other expressions of goodwill and
zeal in the cause, the spirits of the people of
Megalopolis were
greatly elated; and they were all eagerness to attend the
meeting of the league, and urge that measures should be taken
to secure the alliance of Antigonus, and to put the management of the war
in his hands with all despatch.
Aratus wishes to do without the king if possible. |
Aratus learnt privately from Nicophanes the
king's feelings towards the league and towards
himself; and was delighted that his plan had not failed, and
that he had not found the king completely alienated from
himself, as the Aetolians hoped he would be. He regarded
it also as eminently favourable to his policy, that the people
of
Megalopolis were so eager to use the Achaean league
as the channel of communication with Antigonus. For his
first object was if possible to do without this assistance; but
if he were compelled to have recourse to it, he wished that
the invitation should not be sent through himself personally,
but that it should rather come from the Achaeans as a nation.
For he feared that, if the king came, and conquered Cleomenes
and the Lacedaemonians in the war, and should then adopt any
policy hostile to the interests of the national constitution, he
would have himself by general consent to bear the blame of
the result: while Antigonus would be justified, by the injury
which had been inflicted on the royal house of
Macedonia
in the matter of the Acrocorinthus. Accordingly when
Megalopolitan envoys appeared in the national council,
and showed the royal despatch, and further declared the
general friendly disposition of the king, and added an appeal
to the congress to secure the king's alliance without delay;
and when also the sense of the meeting was clearly shown
to be in favour of taking this course, Aratus rose, and, after
setting forth the king's zeal, and complimenting the meeting
upon their readiness to act in the matter, he proceeded to
urge upon them in a long speech that "They should try if
possible to preserve their cities and territory by their own
efforts, for that nothing could be more honourable or more
expedient than that: but that, if it turned out that fortune
declared against them in this effort, they might then have
recourse to the assistance of their friends; but not until they
had tried all their own resources to the uttermost." This
speech was received with general applause: and it was decided
to take no fresh departure at present, and to endeavour to
bring the existing war to a conclusion unaided.
The Achaeans Must Appeal to Antigonus
But when Ptolemy, despairing of retaining the league's
Euergetes, jealous of the Macedonian policy of Aratus, helps Cleomenes. |
friendship, began to furnish Cleomenes with
supplies,—which he did with a view of setting
him up as a foil to Antigonus, thinking the
Lacedaemonians offered him better hopes than
the Achaeans of being able to thwart the policy of the Macedonian kings.; and when the Achaeans themselves had suffered
three defeats,—one at Lycaeum in an engagement with Cleomenes whom they had met on a march; and again in a pitched
battle at Ladocaea in the territory of
Megalopolis, in which
Lydiades fell; and a third time decisively at a place called Hecatomboeum in the territory of
Dyme where their whole forces had
been engaged,—after these misfortunes, no further delay was
possible, and they were compelled by the force of circumstances
to appeal unanimously to Antigonus. Thereupon Aratus sent
his son to Antigonus, and ratified the terms of the subvention.
The great difficulty was this: it was believed to be certain that
the king would send no assistance, except on the condition of
the restoration of the Acrocorinthus, and of having the city
of
Corinth put into his hands as a base of operations in this
war; and on the other hand it seemed impossible that the
Achaeans should venture to put the Corinthians in the king's
power against their own consent. The final determination of
the matter was accordingly postponed, that they might
investigate the question of the securities to be given to the
king.
Antigonus Doson at the Isthmus
Meanwhile, on the strength of the dismay caused by
The Achaeans offer to surrender the Acrocorinthus to Antigonus. |
his successes, Cleomenes was making an unopposed progress through the cities, winning
some by persuasion and others by threats. In
this way he got possession of Caphyae,
Pellene,
Pheneus,
Argos, Phlius, Cleonae,
Epidaurus,
Hermione,
Troezen, and last of all
Corinth, while he personally commanded
a siege of
Sicyon. But this in reality relieved the Achaeans
from a very grave difficulty. For the Corinthians by ordering
Aratus, as Strategus of the league, and the Achaeans to
evacuate the town, and by sending messages to Cleomenes
inviting his presence, gave the Achaeans a ground of action
and a reasonable pretext for moving. Aratus was quick to
take advantage of this; and, as the Achaeans were in actual
possession of the Acrocorinthus, he made his peace with the
royal family of
Macedonia by offering it to Antigonus; and
at the same time gave thus a sufficient guarantee for friendship
in the future, and further secured Antigonus a base of
operations for the war with
Sparta.
Upon learning of this compact between the league and
Cleomenes prepares to resist. |
Antigonus, Cleomenes raised the siege of
Sicyon and pitched his camp near the Isthmus;
and, having thrown up a line of fortification
uniting the Acrocorinthus with the mountain called the
"Ass's Back," began from this time to expect with confidence
the empire of the
Peloponnese. But Antigonus had made his
preparations long in advance, in accordance with the suggestion
of Aratus, and was only waiting for the right moment to act.
Antigonus comes to the Isthmus, B. C. 224. |
And now the news which he received convinced him that the entrance of Cleomenes
into
Thessaly, at the head of an army, was only
a question of a very few days: he accordingly despatched
envoys to Aratus and the league to conclude the terms
of the treaty
17 and marched to the Isthmus with his army
by way of
Euboea. He took this route because the Aetolians,
after trying other expedients for preventing Antigonus bringing
this aid, now forbade his marching south of
Thermopylae with
an army, threatening that, if he did, they would offer armed
opposition to his passage.
Cleomenes Returns to Sparta after the Achaeans Take Argos
Thus Antigonus and Cleomenes were encamped face
to face: the former desirous of effecting an entrance into the
Peloponnese, Cleomenes determined to prevent him.
Meanwhile the Achaeans, in spite of their severe disasters,
The Achaeans seize Argos. |
did not abandon their purpose or give up all
hopes of retrieving their fortunes. They gave
Aristotle of
Argos assistance when he headed a
rising against the Cleomenic faction; and, under the command
of Timoxenus the Strategus, surprised and seized
Argos. And
this must be regarded as the chief cause of the improvement
which took place in their fortunes; for this reverse checked the
ardour of Cleomenes and damped the courage of his soldiers
in advance, as was clearly shown by what took place afterwards.
For though Cleomenes had already possession of more advantageous posts, and was in the enjoyment of more abundant
supplies than Antigonus, and was at the same time inspired
with superior courage and ambition: yet, as soon as he was informed that
Argos was in the hands of the Achaeans, he at once
drew back, abandoned all these advantages, and retreated from
the Isthmus with every appearance of precipitation, in terror of
being completely surrounded by his enemies. At first he retired
upon
Argos, and for a time made some attempt to regain the
town. But the Achaeans offered a gallant resistance; and the
Argives themselves were stirred up to do the same by remorse
for having admitted him before: and so, having failed in this
attempt also, he marched back to
Sparta by way of
Mantinea.
Antigonus Doson Appointed Generalissimo
On his part, Antigonus advanced without any casualty
Antigonus receives the Acrocorinthus. |
into the
Peloponnese, and took over the
Acrocorinthus; and, without wasting time there,
pushed on in his enterprise and entered
Argos.
He only stayed there long enough to compliment the Argives
on their conduct, and to provide for the security of the
city; and then immediately starting again directed his
march towards
Arcadia; and after ejecting. the garrisons
from the posts which had been fortified by Cleomenes in the
territories of Aegys and Belmina, and, putting those strongholds in the hands of the people of
Megalopolis, he went
to Aegium to attend the meeting of the Achaean league.
There he made a statement of his own proceedings, and consulted with the meeting as to the measures to be taken in the
future. He was appointed commander-in-chief of the allied
army, and went into winter quarters at
Sicyon and
Corinth.
At the approach of spring he broke up his camp and got
B. C. 223. Recovery of Tegea. |
on the march. On the third day he arrived at
Tegea, and being joined there by the Achaean
forces, he proceeded to regularly invest the city.
But the vigour displayed by the Macedonians in conducting
the siege, and especially in the digging of mines, soon reduced
the Tegeans to despair, and they accordingly surrendered.
After taking the proper measures for securing the town,
Antigonus proceeded to extend his expedition.
He now
marched with all speed into
Laconia; and having
found Cleomenes in position on the frontier, he
was trying to bring him to an engagement, and
was harassing him with skirmishing attacks, when news was
brought to him by his scouts that the garrison
of
Orchomenus had started to join Cleomenes.
He at once broke up his camp, hurried thither,
and carried the town by assault. Having done that, he next
invested
Mantinea and began to besiege it.
This town also being soon terrified into surrender by the Macedonians, he started again along the road to
Heraea and Telphusa. These towns, too, being
secured by the voluntary surrender of their inhabitants, as the winter was by this time approaching, he went again to Aegium to attend the meeting of
the league. His Macedonian soldiers he sent away to winter
at home, while he himself remained to confer with the
Achaeans on the existing state of affairs.
But Cleomenes was on the alert. He saw that the
Macedonians in the army of Antigonus had been sent home;
and that the king and his mercenaries in Aegium were three
days' march from
Megalopolis; and this latter town he well
knew to be difficult to guard, owing to its great extent, and the
sparseness of its inhabitants; and, moreover, that it was just
then being kept with even greater carelessness than usual, owing
to Antigonus being in the country; and what was more important than anything else, he knew that the larger number of
its men of military age had fallen at the battles of Lycaeum
and Ladoceia. There happened to be residing in
Megalopolis
some Messenian exiles; by whose help he managed, under
cover of night, to get within the walls without being detected.
When day broke he had a narrow escape from being ejected, if
not from absolute destruction, through the valour of the citizens.
This had been his fortune three months before, when he had
made his way into the city by the region which is called the
Cōlaeum: but on this occasion, by the superiority of his
force, and the seizure in advance of the strongest positions in
the town, he succeeded in effecting his purpose. He eventually ejected the inhabitants, and took entire possession of
the city; which, once in his power, he dismantled in so savage
and ruthless a manner as to preclude the least hope that it
might ever be restored. The reason of his acting in this
manner was, I believe, that
Megalopolis and Stymphalus
were the only towns in which, during the vicissitudes of
that period, he never succeeded in obtaining a single partisan, or inducing a single citizen to turn traitor. For the
passion for liberty and the loyalty of the Clitorians had been
stained by the baseness of one man, Thearces; whom the
Clitorians, with some reason, denied to be a native of their
city, asserting that he had been foisted in from
Orchomenus,
and was the offspring of one of the foreign garrison there.
The Credibility of Phylarchus
For the history of the same period, with which we are
Digression (to ch. 63) on the misstatements of Phylarchus. |
now engaged, there are two authorities, Aratus
and Phylarchus,
18 whose opinions are opposed in
many points and their statements contradictory.
I think, therefore, it will be advantageous, or
rather necessary, since I follow Aratus in my account of
the Cleomenic war, to go into the question; and not by
any neglect on my part to suffer mis-statements in historical
writings to enjoy an authority equal to that of truth. The fact is
that the latter of these two writers has, throughout the whole of his
history, made statements at random and without discrimination.
It is not, however, necessary for me to criticise him on other
points on the present occasion, or to call him to strict account
concerning them; but such of his statements as relate to the
period which I have now in hand, that is the Cleomenic war, these
I must thoroughly sift. They will be quite sufficient to enable
us to form a judgment on the general spirit and ability with
which he approaches historical writing.
It was his object to
bring into prominence the cruelty of Antigonus and the Macedonians, as well as that of Aratus and the
Achaeans; and he accordingly asserts that, when
Mantinea fell into their hands, it was cruelly treated; and
that the most ancient and important of all the Arcadian
towns was involved in calamities so terrible as to move all
Greece to horror and tears. And being eager to stir the
hearts of his readers to pity, and to enlist their sympathies
by his story, he talks of women embracing, tearing their hair,
and exposing their breasts; and again of the tears and
lamentations of men and women, led off into captivity along
with their children and aged parents. And this he does again
and again throughout his whole history, by way of bringing the
terrible scene vividly before his readers. I say nothing of the
unworthiness and unmanliness of the course he has adopted:
let us only inquire what is essential and to the purpose in
history. Surely an historian's object should not be to amaze
his readers by a series of thrilling anecdotes; nor should he
aim at producing speeches which
might have been delivered,
nor study dramatic propriety in details like a writer of tragedy:
but his function is above all to record with fidelity what was
actually said or done, however commonplace it may be. For
the purposes of history and of the drama are not the same, but
widely opposed to each other. In the former the object is to
strike and delight by words as true to nature as possible; in
the latter to instruct and convince by genuine words and
deeds; in the former the effect is meant to be temporary, in
the latter permanent.
19
In the former, again, the power of
carrying an audience is the chief excellence. because the object
is to create illusion; but in the latter the thing of primary
importance is truth, because the object is to benefit the
learner. And apart from these considerations, Phylarchus, in
most of the catastrophes which he relates, omits to suggest the
causes which gave rise to them, or the course of events which
led up to them: and without knowing these, it is impossible to
feel the due indignation or pity at anything which occurs. For
instance, everybody looks upon it as an outrage that the free
should be struck: still, if a man provokes it by an act of violence,
he is considered to have got no more than he deserved; and,
where it is done for correction and discipline, those who strike
free men are deemed worthy of honour and gratitude. Again,
the killing of a fellow-citizen is regarded as a heinous crime,
deserving the severest penalties: and yet it is notorious that the
man who kills a thief, or his wife's paramour, is held guiltless;
while he who kills a traitor or tyrant in every country receives
honours and pre-eminence. And so in everything our final judgment does not depend upon the mere things done, but upon their
causes and the views of the actors, according as these differ.
The Treatment of Mantinea
Now the people of
Mantinea had in the first instance
abandoned the league, and voluntarily submitted, first to
the Aetolians, and afterwards to Cleomenes.
Being therefore, in accordance with this
policy, members of the Lacedaemonian community, in the
fourth year before the coming of Antigonus, their city was
forcibly taken possession of by the Achaeans owing to the
skilful plotting of Aratus. But on that occasion, so far from
being subjected to any severity for their act of treason, it
became a matter of general remark how promptly the feelings of the conquerors and the conquered underwent a
revolution. As soon as he had got possession of the town,
Aratus issued orders to his own men that no one was to lay a
finger on anything that did not belong to him; and then,
having summoned the Mantineans to a meeting, he bade them
be of good cheer, and stay in their own houses; for that, as
long as they remained members of the league, their safety was
secured. On their part, the Mantineans, surprised at this
unlooked - for prospect of safety, immediately experienced a
universal revulsion of feeling. The very men against whom
they had a little while before been engaged in a war, in which
they had seen many of their kinsfolk killed, and no small
number grievously wounded, they now received into their
houses, and entertained as their guests, interchanging every
imaginable kindness with them. And naturally so. For I
believe that there never were men who met with more kindly
foes, or came out of a struggle with what seemed the most dreadful disasters more scatheless, than did the Mantineans, owing
to the humanity of Aratus and the Achaeans towards them.
The Mantineans Turn Over their City to the Lacedaemonians
But they still saw certain dangers ahead from intestine
disorders, and the hostile designs of the Aetolians and
Lacedaemonians; they subsequently, therefore, sent envoys
to the league asking for a guard for their town. The request
was granted: and three hundred of the league army were
selected by lot to form it. These men on whom the lot fell
started for
Mantinea; and, abandoning their native cities and
their callings in life, remained there to protect the lives and
liberties of the citizens. Besides them, the league despatched
two hundred mercenaries, who joined the Achaean guard in
protecting the established constitution. But this state of
things did not last long: an insurrection broke out in the town,
and the Mantineans called in the aid of the Lacedaemonians;
delivered the city into their hands; and put to death the
garrison sent by the league. It would not be easy to
mention a grosser or blacker act of treachery. Even if they
resolved to utterly set at nought the gratitude they owed to,
and the friendship they had formed with, the league; they
ought at least to have spared these men, and to have let every
one of them depart under some terms or another: for this
much it is the custom by the law of nations to grant even to
foreign enemies. But in order to satisfy Cleomenes and the
Lacedaemonians of their fidelity in the policy of the hour, they
deliberately, and in violation of international law, consummated
a crime of the most impious description. To slaughter and
wreak vengeance on the men who had just before taken
their city, and refrained from doing them the least
harm, and who were at that very moment engaged in protecting
their lives and liberties,—can anything be imagined more
detestable? What punishment can be conceived to correspond
with its enormity? If one suggests that they would be rightly
served by being sold into slavery, with their wives and children,
as soon as they were beaten in war; it may be answered that
this much is only what, by the laws of warfare, awaits even
those who have been guilty of no special act of impiety. They
deserved therefore to meet with a punishment even more
complete and heavy than they did; so that, even if what
Phylarchus mentions did happen to them, there was no reason
for the pity of
Greece being bestowed on them: praise and
approval rather were due to those who exacted vengeance for
their impious crime. But since, as a matter of fact, nothing
worse befell the Mantineans than the plunder of their property
and the selling of their free citizens into slavery, this historian,
for the mere sake of a sensational story, has not only told a pure
lie, but an improbable lie. His wilful ignorance also was so supreme, that he was unable to compare with this alleged cruelty
of the Achaeans the conduct of the same people in the case of
Tegea, which they took by force at the same period, and yet did
no injury to its inhabitants. And yet, if the natural cruelty of
the perpetrators was the sole cause of the severity to
Mantinea,
it is to be presumed that
Tegea would have been treated in the
same way. But if their treatment of
Mantinea was an exception
to that of every other town, the necessary inference is that the
cause for their anger was exceptional also.
Execution of Aristomachus
Again Phylarchus says that Aristomachus the
Argive,
a man of a most distinguished family, who
had been despot of
Argos, as his fathers had
been before him, upon falling into the hands of Antigonus
and the league "was hurried off to Cenchreae and there
racked to death,—an unparalleled instance of injustice and
cruelty." But in this matter also our author preserves his
peculiar method. He makes up a story about certain
cries of this man, when he was on the rack, being heard
through the night by the neighbours: "some of whom," he
says, "rushed to the house in their horror, or incredulity,
or indignation at the outrage." As for the sensational story,
let it pass; I have said enough on that point. But I must
express my opinion that, even if Aristomachus had committed
no crime against the Achaeans besides, yet his whole life and
his treason to his own country deserved the heaviest possible
punishment. And in order, forsooth, to enhance this man's
reputation, and move his reader's sympathies for his sufferings,
our historian remarks that he had not only been a tyrant
himself, but that his fathers had been so before him. It would
not be easy to bring a graver or more bitter charge against a
man than this: for the mere word "tyrant" involves the idea
of everything that is wickedest, and includes every injustice
and crime possible to mankind. And if Aristomachus endured
the most terrible tortures, as Phylarchus says, he yet would
not have been sufficiently punished for the crime of one day,
in which, when Aratus had effected an entrance into
Argos
with the Achaean soldiers,—and after supporting the most
severe struggles and dangers for the freedom of its citizens, had
eventually been driven out, because the party within who were
in league with him had not ventured to stir, for fear of the
tyrant,—Aristomachus availed himself of the pretext of their
complicity with the irruption of the Achaeans to put to the rack
and execute eighty of the leading citizens, who were perfectly
innocent, in the presence of their relations. I pass by the
history of his whole life and the crimes of his ancestors; for
that would be too long a story.
Crimes of Aristomachus
But this shows that we ought not to be indignant if
a man reaps as he has sown; but rather if he is allowed to
end his days in peace, without experiencing such retribution
at all. Nor ought we to accuse Antigonus or Aratus of crime,
for having racked and put to death a tyrant whom they had
captured in war: to have killed and wreaked vengeance on
whom, even in time of peace, would have brought praise and
honour to the doers from all right-minded persons.
But when, in addition to these crimes, he was guilty also of
treachery to the league, what shall we say that he deserved?
The facts of the case are these. He abdicated his sovereignty
of
Argos shortly before, finding himself in difficulties, owing to
the state of affairs brought on by the death of Demetrius. He
was, however, protected by the clemency and generosity of the
league; and, much to his own surprise, was left unmolested.
For the Achaean government not only secured him an
indemnity for all crimes committed by him while despot, but
admitted him as a member of the league, and invested him
with the highest office in it,—that, namely, of Commander-in-Chief and
Strategus.
20 All these favours he immediately forgot,
as soon as his hopes were a little raised by the Cleomenic war;
and at a crisis of the utmost importance he withdrew his
native city, as well as his own personal adhesion, from the
league, and attached them to its enemies. For such an act
of treason what he deserved was not to be racked under cover
of night at Cenchreae, and then put to death, as Phylarchus
says: he ought to have been taken from city to city in the
Peloponnese, and to have ended his life only after exemplary
torture in each of them. And yet the only severity that this
guilty wretch had to endure was to be drowned in the sea by
order of the officers at Cenchreae.
The Loyalty of the Megalopolitans
There is another illustration of this writer's manner
to be found in his treatment of the cases of
Mantinea and
Megalopolis. The misfortunes
of the former he has depicted with his usual exaggeration and
picturesqueness: apparently from the notion, that it is the
peculiar function of an historian to select for special mention only such actions as are conspicuously bad. But about
the noble conduct of the Megalopolitans at that same period
he has not said a word: as though it were the province of history to deal with crimes rather than with instances of just and
noble conduct; or as though his readers would be less improved
by the record of what is great and worthy of imitation, than by
that of such deeds as are base and fit only to be avoided. For
instance, he has told us clearly enough how Cleomenes took
the town, preserved it from damage, and forthwith sent couriers
to the Megalopolitans in
Messene with a despatch, offering
them the safe enjoyment of their country if they would throw
in their lot with him;—and his object in telling all this is
to enhance the magnanimity and moderation of Cleomenes
towards his enemies. Nay, he has gone farther, and told us
how the people of
Megalopolis would not allow the letter to
be read to the end, and were not far from stoning the bearers
of it. Thus much he does tell us. But the sequel to this, so
appropriate to an historian,—the commendation, I mean, and
honourable mention of their noble conduct,—this he has altogether left out. And yet he had an opportunity ready to his
hand. For if we view with approval the conduct of a people
who merely by their declarations and votes support a war in
behalf of friends and allies; while to those who go so far as to
endure the devastation of their territory, and a siege of their
town, we give not only praise but active gratitude: what
must be our estimate of the people of
Megalopolis?
Must it not be of the most exalted character? First of all,
they allowed their territory to be at the mercy of Cleomenes,
and then consented to be entirely deprived of their city, rather
than be false to the league: and, finally, in spite of an unexpected chance of recovering it, they deliberately preferred the
loss of their territory, the tombs of their ancestors, their temples,
their homes and property, of everything in fact which men
value most, to forfeiting their faith to their allies. No nobler
action has ever been, or ever will be performed; none to which
an historian could better draw his reader's attention. For
what could be a higher incentive to good faith, or the maintenance of frank and permanent relations between states?
But of all this Phylarchus says not a word, being, as it
seems to me, entirely blind as to all that is noblest and best
suited to be the theme of an historian.
He does, however, state in the course of his narrative
that, from the spoils of
Megalopolis, six thousand talents fell to the Lacedaemonians, of
which two thousand, according to custom, were given to
Cleomenes. This shows, to begin with, an astounding ignorance of the ordinary facts as to the resources of
Greece:
a knowledge which above all others should be possessed
by historians. I am not of course now speaking of the
period in which the
Peloponnese had been ruined by the
Macedonian kings, and still more completely by a long continuance of intestine struggles; but of our own times, in
which it is believed, by the establishment of its unity, to be
enjoying the highest prosperity of which it is capable. Still
even at this period, if you could collect all the movable property of the whole
Peloponnese (leaving out the value of slaves),
it would be impossible to get so large a sum of money together.
That I speak on good grounds and not at random will appear
from the following fact.
Every one has read that when the
Athenians, in conjunction with the Thebans,
entered upon the war with the Lacedaemonians,
and despatched an army of twenty thousand men, and manned
a hundred triremes, they resolved to supply the expenses of
the war by the assessment of a property tax; and accordingly had a valuation taken, not only of the whole land of
Attica and the houses in it, but of all other property: but yet
the value returned fell short of six thousand talents by two
hundred and fifty; which will show that what I have just said
about the
Peloponnese is not far wide of the mark. But at
this period the most exaggerated estimate could scarcely give
more than three hundred talents, as coming from
Megalopolis
itself; for it is acknowledged that most of the inhabitants, free
and slaves, escaped to
Messene. But the strongest confirmation
of my words is the case of
Mantinea, which, as he himself
observes, was second to no Arcadian city in wealth and numbers. Though it was surrendered after a siege, so that no one
could escape, and no property could without great difficulty be
concealed; yet the value of the whole spoil of the town, including the price of the captives sold, amounted at this same
period to only three hundred talents.
Cleomenes Invades Argolis
But a more astonishing mis-statement remains to be remarked. In the course of his history of this
war, Phylarchus asserts "that about ten days
Ptolemy Euergetes and Cleomenes. |
before the battle an ambassador came from
Ptolemy announcing to Cleomenes, that the king declined to
continue to support him with supplies, and advised him to make
terms with Antigonus. And that when this message had been
delivered to Cleomenes, he made up his mind that he had
better put his fortune to the supreme test as soon as possible, before his forces learnt about this message, because he
could not hope to provide the soldiers' pay from his own resources." But if he had at that very time become the master
of six thousand talents, he would have been better supplied
than Ptolemy himself. And as for war with Antigonus, if he
had become master of only three hundred talents, he would
have been able to continue it without any difficulty. But the
writer states two inconsistent propositions—that Cleomenes
depended wholly on Ptolemy for money: and that he at the
same time had become master of that enormous sum. Is this
not irrational, and grossly careless besides? I might mention
many instances of a similar kind, not only in his account of
this period, but throughout his whole work; but I think for
my present purpose enough has been said.
Cleomenes Invades Argos
Megalopolis having fallen, then, Antigonus spent the
B. C. 222. Cleomenes invades Argos. |
winter at
Argos. But at the approach of spring
Cleomenes collected his army, addressed a
suitable exhortation to them, and led them into
the
Argive territory. Most people thought this a hazardous
and foolhardy step, because the places at which the frontier
was crossed were strongly fortified; but those who were
capable of judging regarded the measure as at once safe and
prudent. For seeing that Antigonus had dismissed his forces,
he reckoned on two things,—there would be no one to resist
him, and therefore he would run no risk; and when the
Argives found that their territory was being laid waste up to
their walls, they would be certain to be roused to anger and to
lay the blame upon Antigonus: therefore, if on the one hand
Antigonus, unable to bear the complaints of the populace, were
to sally forth and give him battle with his present forces, Cleomenes felt sure of an easy victory; but if on the other hand
Antigonus refused to alter his plans, and kept persistently aloof,
he believed that he would be able to effect a safe retreat
home, after succeeding by this expedition in terrifying his
enemies and inspiring his own forces with courage. And this
was the actual result. For as the devastation of the country
went on, crowds began to collect and abuse Antigonus: but
like a wise general and king, he refused to allow any consideration
to outweigh that of sound strategy, and persisted in remaining inactive. Accordingly Cleomenes, in pursuance of his
plan, having terrified his enemies and inspired courage in his
own army for the coming struggle, returned home unmolested.
Summer having now come, and the Macedonian and
Achaean soldiers having assembled from their winter quarters,
Antigonus moved his army, along with his
allies, into
Laconia.
The summer campaign. The army of Antigonus. |
The main force consisted
of ten thousand Macedonians for the phalanx,
three thousand light armed, and three hundred
cavalry. With these were a thousand Agraei; the same number of Gauls; three thousand mercenary infantry, and three
hundred cavalry; picked troops of the Achaeans, three
thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry; and a thousand
Megalopolitans armed in the Macedonian manner, under the
command of Cercidas of
Megalopolis. Of the allies there were
two thousand infantry, and two hundred cavalry, from
Boeotia;
a thousand infantry and fifty cavalry from
Epirus; the same
number from
Acarnania; and sixteen hundred from
Illyria, under
the command of Demetrius of Pharos. The whole amounted
to twenty-eight thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry.
Cleomenes had expected the attack, and had secured the
passes into the country by posting garrisons,
digging trenches, and felling trees; while he
took up position at a place called
Sellasia, with
an army amounting to twenty thousand, having calculated that
the invading forces would take that direction: which turned out
to be the case. This pass lies between two hills, called
respectively Evas and
Olympus, and the road to
Sparta follows
the course of the river Oenus. Cleomenes strengthened both
these hills by lines of fortification, consisting of trench and
palisade. On Evas he posted the perioeci and allies, under
the command of his brother Eucleides; while he himself held
Olympus with the Lacedaemonians and mercenaries. On
the level ground along the river he stationed his cavalry, with
a division of his mercenaries, on both sides of the road.
When Antigonus arrived, he saw at once the strength of the
position, and the skill with which Cleomenes had selected the
different branches of his army to occupy the points of vantage,
so that the whole aspect of the position was like that of
skilled soldiers drawn up ready for a charge. For no preparation for attack or defence had been omitted; but everything
was in order, either for offering battle with effect, or for
holding an almost unassailable position.
The Two Armies Line Up
The sight of these preparations decided Antigonus not
to make an immediate attack upon the position, or rashly hazard
an engagement. He pitched his camp a short distance from it,
covering his front by the stream called Gorgylus, and there remained for some days; informing himself by reconnaisances of
the peculiarities of the ground and the character of the troops,
and at the same time endeavouring by feigned movements to
elicit the intentions of the enemy. But he could never find an
unguarded point, or one where the troops were not entirely on
the alert, for Cleomenes was always ready at a moment's notice
to be at any point that was attacked. He therefore gave up
all thoughts of attacking the position; and finally an understanding was come to between him and Cleomenes to bring
the matter to the decision of battle. And, indeed, Fortune
had there brought into competition two commanders equally
endowed by nature with military skill. To face the division
of the enemy on Evas Antigonus stationed his Macedonian
hoplites with brazen shields, and the Illyrians, drawn up in
alternate lines, under the command of Alexander, son of
Acmetus, and Demetrius of Pharos, respectively. Behind
them he placed the Acarnanians and Cretans, and behind
them again were two thousand Achaeans to act as a reserve.
His cavalry, on the banks of the river Oenous, were posted
opposite the enemy's cavalry, under the command of Alexander, and flanked by a thousand Achaean infantry and the
same number of Megalopolitans. Antigonus himself determined to lead his mercenaries and Macedonian troops in
person against the division on
Olympus commanded by Cleomenes. Owing to the narrowness of the ground,
the Macedonians were arranged in a double phalanx, one close behind the
other, while the mercenaries were placed in front of them. It
was arranged that the Illyrians, who had bivouacked in full
order during the previous night along the river Gorgylus, close
to the foot of Evas, were to begin their assault on the hill when
they saw a flag of linen raised from the direction of
Olympus;
and that the Megalopolitans and cavalry should do the same
when the king raised a scarlet flag.
Battle Begins
The moment for beginning the battle had come: the
signal was given to the Illyrians, and the word passed by the
officers to their men to do their duty, and in a moment they
started into view of the enemy and began assaulting the hill.
But the light-armed troops who were
stationed with Cleomenes's cavalry, observing
that the Achaean lines were not covered by any other troops
behind them, charged them on the rear; and thus reduced the
division while endeavouring to carry the hill of Evas to a state of
great peril,—being met as they were on their front by Eucleidas
from the top of the hill, and being charged
and vigorously attacked by the light-armed
mercenaries on their rear.
Philopoemen's presence of mind. |
It was at this point
that Philopoemen of
Megalopolis, with a clear understanding
of the situation and a foresight of what would happen,
vainly endeavoured to point out the certain result to his
superior officers. They disregarded him for his want of
experience in command and his extreme youth; and, accordingly he acted for himself, and cheering on the men of his
own city, made a vigorous charge on the enemy. This effected
a diversion; for the light-armed mercenaries, who were engaged
in harassing the rear of the party ascending Evas, hearing the
shouting and seeing the cavalry engaged, abandoned their
attack upon this party and hurried back to their original position to render assistance to the cavalry. The result was that
the division of Illyrians, Macedonians, and the rest who were
advancing with them, no longer had their attention diverted by
an attack upon their rear, and so continued their advance
upon the enemy with high spirits and renewed confidence. And
this afterwards caused it to be acknowledged that to Philopoemen was due the honour of the success against Eucleidas.
Skill and Gallantry of Philopoemen
It is clear that Antigonus at any rate entertained that
opinion, for after the battle he asked Alexander, the commander of the cavalry, with the view of convicting him of his
shortcoming, "Why he had engaged before the signal was
given?" And upon Alexander answering that "He had not
done so, but that a young officer from
Megalopolis had presumed
to anticipate the signal, contrary to his wish:" Antigonus
replied, "That young man acted like a good general in grasping the situation; you, general, were the youngster."
What Eucleidas ought to have done, when he saw the enemy's
lines advancing, was to have rushed down at once upon them;
thrown their ranks into disorder; and then retired himself, step
by step, to continually higher ground into a safe position: for
by thus breaking them up and depriving them, to begin with,
of the advantages of their peculiar armour and disposition, he
would have secured the victory by the superiority of his position.
But he did the very opposite of all this, and thereby forfeited
the advantages of the ground. As though victory were
assured, he kept his original position on the summit of the
hill, with the view of catching the enemy at as great an elevation as possible, that their flight might be all the longer over
steep and precipitous ground. The result, as might have been
anticipated, was exactly the reverse.
For he left himself no
place of retreat, and by allowing the enemy to
reach his position, unharmed and in unbroken
order, he was placed at the disadvantage of having
to give them battle on the very summit of the hill; and so,
as soon as he was forced by the weight of their heavy armour
and their close order to give any ground, it was immediately
occupied by the Illyrians; while his own men were obliged to
take lower ground, because they had no space for manœuvring
on the top. The result was not long in arriving: they suffered a
repulse, which the difficult and precipitous nature of the ground
over which they had to retire turned into a disastrous flight.
Defeat of Cleomenes
Simultaneously with these events the cavalry engagement was also being brought to a decision; in which all the
Achaean cavalry, and especially Philopoemen, fought with
conspicuous gallantry, for to them it was a contest for freedom.
Philopoemen himself had his horse killed under him, and while
fighting accordingly on foot received a severe wound through
both his thighs. Meanwhile the two kings
on the other hill
Olympus began by bringing
their light-armed troops and mercenaries into
action, of which each of them had five thousand. Both the
kings and their entire armies had a full view of this action,
which was fought with great gallantry on both sides: the
charges taking place sometimes in detachments, and at other
times along the whole line, and an eager emulation being
displayed between the several ranks, and even between individuals.
But when Cleomenes saw that his brother's division
was retreating, and that the cavalry in the low ground were
on the point of doing the same, alarmed at the prospect of
an attack at all points at once, he was compelled to demolish
the palisade in his front, and to lead out his whole force in
line by one side of his position. A recall was sounded on
the bugle for the light-armed troops of both sides, who were
on the ground between the two armies: and the phalanxes
shouting their war cries, and with spears couched, charged
each other. Then a fierce struggle arose: the Macedonians
sometimes slowly giving ground and yielding to the superior
courage of the soldiers of
Sparta, and at another time the
Lacedaemonians being forced to give way before the overpowering weight of the Macedonian phalanx. At length
Antigonus ordered a charge in close order and in double
phalanx; the enormous weight of this peculiar formation proved
sufficient to finally dislodge the Lacedaemonians from their
strongholds, and they fled in disorder and suffering severely as
they went. Cleomenes himself, with a guard of cavalry,
effected his retreat to
Sparta: but the same night he went
down to
Gythium, where all preparations for crossing the
sea had been made long before in case of mishap, and with
his friends sailed to
Alexandria.
End of the Introductory Period
Having surprised and taken
Sparta, Antigonus treated
the citizens with magnanimity and humanity; and after reestablishing their ancient constitution, he left the town in
a few days, on receiving intelligence that the Illyrians had
invaded
Macedonia and were laying waste the country.
This was a instance of the fantastic way in which Fortune
decides the most important matters. For if Cleomenes had
only put off the battle for a few days, or if when he returned
to
Sparta he had only held out for a brief space of time, he
would have saved his crown.
As it was, Antigonus after going to
Tegea and restoring
Death of Antigonus Doson, B. C. 220. |
its constitution, arrived on the second day at
Argos, at the very time of the Nemean games.
Having at this assembly received every mark of
immortal honour and glory at the hands of the Achaean
community, as well as of the several states, he made all
haste to reach
Macedonia. He found the Illyrians still in
the country, and forced them to give him battle, in which,
though he proved entirely successful, he exerted himself to
such a pitch in shouting encouragement to his men, that he
ruptured a bloodvessel, and fell into an illness which terminated shortly in his death. He was a great loss to the Greeks,
whom he had inspired with good hopes, not only by his support in the field, but still more by his character and good
principles. He left the kingdom of
Macedonia to Philip, son
of Demetrius.
Conclusion of Book 2
My reason for writing about this war at such length,
was the advisability, or rather necessity, in view of the general
purpose of my history, of making clear the relations existing
between
Macedonia and
Greece at a time which coincides
with the period of which I am about to treat.
Just about the same time, by the death of Euergetes,
B. C. 284-280. B. C. 224-220. |
Ptolemy Philopator succeeded to the throne of
Egypt. At the
same period died Seleucus, son of that Seleucus who had the
double surnames of
Callinicus and Pogon: he was succeeded
on the throne of
Syria by his brother Antiochus. The deaths of
these three sovereigns—Antigonus, Ptolemy, and Seleucus—fell
in the same Olympiad, as was the case with the
three immediate successors to Alexander the
Great,—Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus,—
for the latter all died in the 124th Olympiad, and the former
in the 139th.
I may now fitly close this book. I have completed the
introduction and laid the foundation on which my history
must rest. I have shown when, how, and why the Romans,
after becoming supreme in
Italy, began to aim at dominion
outside of it, and to dispute with the Carthaginians the dominion
of the sea. I have at the same time explained the state of
Greece,
Macedonia, and
Carthage at this epoch. I have now
arrived at the period which I originally marked out,—that
namely in which the Greeks were on the point of beginning
the Social, the Romans the Hannibalic war, and the kings in
Asia the war for the possession of
Coele-Syria. The termination therefore of the wars just described, and the death of the
princes engaged in them, forms a natural period to this book.