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then kept on our way to Mount Vernon, where we were ordered to rendezvous, expecting to meet Gen. Sweeny.
The mounted rebels were armed principally with shot-guns, of which we have taken several.
Their firing was bad, and their shots fell short of us, as much as their shells went over us. Major Birkhoff, Col.----, and myself had horses shot under us. I had a ball through the hat. Our wounded are not very dangerous, which is likely to be different with the other side, for the Minie balls make an ugly wound.
The State forces were under the command of Gens. Parson and Rains. Jackson was not present, nor was Price.
Their whereabouts is not known.
We were sorry when night came; we could have worried them out without any sacrifice on our part.
We fired from our guns 95 rounds of shot and shell.
There was very little firing from the musketry, as we could not get near their main body.
Our men acted with the most perfect discipline.
I have seen some of the best regiments in Europe in action; they cannot excel the coolness and intrepidity of our volunteers while surrounded with a superior force.
I left Mount Vernon on the 7th, the second day after the battle.
I carried despatches to Springfield on the 6th and returned, and on the Sunday left for St. Louis.
I made the trip to Rolla, 154 miles from Mount Vernon, in twenty-nine hours. Met Gen. Sweeny three miles this side of Mount Vernon and Col. Brown thirty miles; the former with 500 men and the latter about 800.
New York times' narrative.
St. Louis, Wednesday, July 10, 1861.
Our city was thrown into a state of feverish excitement to-day, by the news of a great battle which was reported to have been fought in the vicinity of Carthage, between the United States forces, under Col. Siegel, and the rebel trooPs, under Gens. Price and Rains.
The most contradictory statements were afloat and published by the several newspapers, the State Journal affirming the total rout and destruction of Col. Siegel's corps d'armee, while, on the other side, it was maintained that our troops had achieved the most glorious victory which had yet shed lustre on the Star-Spangled Banner in the present campaign.
The great numerical superiority of the enemy, whose forces were known to outnumber 7,000, while Col. Siegel's whole command did not reach 4,000, led us, at first, to doubt a real victory, and it was not until late in the evening that all doubts were dispelled, by the arrival of a messenger direct from Col. Siegel, with despatches to the commander of the Arsenal.
This messenger, Lieut. M. Tosk, of the artillery attached to Col. Siegel's regiment, came by the evening train of the Pacific Railroad, and brought a full account of the glorious victory.
After having made further endeavors to meet the enemy on the 4th, early on the morning of the 5th, Col. Siegel was advised that the enemy had been seen a few miles north of Carthage, Jasper County. Col. Siegel immediately ordered all troops under arms, and after a short march, had the good fortune to find the report confirmed, by meeting the enemy on an open prairie, about ten miles north of Carthage.
Col. Siegel's command consisted of eight companies of his own (Third) regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Hassendeubel; seven companies of the Fifth Regiment, Colonel Salomon, and two batteries of artillery, consisting of eight field-pieces, under Major Backof.
The forces of the enemy numbered five thousand five hundred, at least three thousand of which were mounted, and a battery of artillery-four six-pounders and one twelve-pounder.
Generals Price and Rains commanded the State troops in person.
The position of the State troops was well chosen and gave them a great advantage, which was more than balanced, however, by our superior artillery.
Three flags floated over their ranks, two Secession flags, which our splendid artillerists soon made to lick the dust, and in the centre the State flag of Missouri.
At half-past 10 o'clock the attack commenced by our artillery opening a strong fire against the centre of the enemy.
The aim was so effective that in less than one hour the enemy's twelve-pounder was dismounted, and by noon the whole battery of the State troops was silenced.
Repeatedly the columns of the enemy gave way under the heavy fire, but rallied again, until our infantry, which had heretofore remained in security behind the batteries, were ordered to advance, when the centre of the enemy at once was broken.
To remedy this disaster, about seventeen hundred of the enemy's cavalry were ordered to fall back, and by a side movement try to get possession of Col. Siegel's baggage train, which had been left some three miles behind on the road, and thus encircle and cut him off from retreat.
But this manoeuvre did not succeed.
The moment that Col. Siegel saw what was intended, he ordered his men to retreat, which was done in the greatest order, at the same time giving word to the baggage train to advance.
Before the enemy's design could be carried out, Col. Siegel had his baggage train in safety.
The wagons were placed in the centre of his column, protected in the front by Major Backof's artillery and Col. Salomon's battalion, and in the rear by Col. Siegel's eight companies.
By this time it was 4 o'clock P. M. Our troops had suffered a loss of only about twenty killed and forty wounded, while the enemy's loss was stated by some of their officers, who had been taken prisoners, to amount at least to two or three hundred.
This difference in the list of killed is mainly due to the efficient use of our artillery, which mowed down the enemy, while our troops were scarcely hurt by the fire from the miserable battery on the other side.
Having thus placed his baggage train in a sure position, Col. Siegel followed the enemy, 