Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 12.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

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‘ [409] will find what you need.’ Action followed speech, and his aggressive operations on that occasion, conducted with electric rapidity, have remained the wonder of the world. He assumed immense risks, it is true, and was very near losing the battle of Marengo, where victory was secured to him by the unexpected arrival of Desoix. But still the question may be asked: Would there not have been greater risk on the defensive than on the offensive?

General Andrew Jackson, when, on the 23d of December, 1814, he marched with inferior forces, composed of raw militia, to attack the veterans of England, encamped on a level plain, six miles from New Orleans, and fought them notwithstanding the darkness of night was intuitively correct in his bold decision. He struck the first blow; he stunned the surprised enemy; and it gave him time to retreat and fortify himself on the ground which he subsequently chose. Had he remained on the defensive, instead of moving resolutely, and almost rashly, to the plains of Chalmetto, it is not impossible that the result would have been painfully different for New Orleans.

From the first to the last day of our civil strife, General Beauregard never ceased, with an earnest perseverance which showed the strength of his conviction, to recommend to his Government to subordinate every other consideration to the military policy of concentration and aggression, whilst the Confederate Government seemed to have been bent on defending, at one and the same time, the whole area of our Southern territory, and particularly Richmond, at all hazards—a policy which necessitated a scattering of forces, and, above all, the maintenance of a large army about the capital for its protection. The aggressive system was thus made subordinate to the protective and defensive. On the other hand, it was the reverse that was invariably advocated in the plans presented by General Beauregard. Those plans appear to have been looked upon by our Government as seductively brilliant, but dangerously imprudent, for they were more or less unceremoniously rejected. Thus, on this point, as on others that successively arose, there was a divergence, a bifurcation of views between the General and the Executive, or his cabinet, which resulted, as shown in Colonel Roman's book, in a sort of permanent antagonism, or at least uncongeniality. It produced gradually a reciprocal estrangement much to be regretted.

Without entering into a painful examination of personal feelings and their causes, we will proceed to consider to some extent the military merits and achievements of General Beauregard as they evolve out of the pages of Colonel Roman.

‘At manassas,’ says Colonel Roman, ‘General Beauregard's ’