Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 12.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

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[412] gentleman whose testimony would have weight in any court of justice, has assured us that at that time he had read a letter from General Patterson to General Barrow, a wealthy planter and slave-owner, in which Patterson expressed friendly feelings, and informed Barrow that a battle was impending at Manassas, but that he would not be present and would take no share in it. This letter, if it could be procured, would be a valuable historical document. General Barrow is dead, but the person who read the letter still lives. This fact, if satisfactorily ascertained, would explain the immobility of Patterson and make of him a second Grouchy. It results, from all that precedes, that the unpleasant and regrettable friction of discordant views that were entertained by President Davis and General Beauregard during the whole war is to be traced to an early date—the battle of Manassas.

The resume of Colonel Roman's views about the non-execution of General Beauregard's plan to crush successively and by rapid movements McDowell, Patterson and McClellan is, that it was because the concentration of forces for which Beauregard had been clamorous, together with a sufficient supply of means of transportation and subsistence, had not been sent at the right moment of opportune aggression; that it came only when he had been compelled to be on the defensive, and if with the required troops, not, however, with the indispensable means of subsistence and transportation to make a victory complete in all its expected consequences; and that the absence of these means prevented, after McDowell's attack and defeat, his being pursued and the march of the Confederates on Washington. We see clearly why, under such circumstances, this could not be done, but without more light than we have on the subject, we do not see as clearly why Patterson was not attacked and the necessities of our destitute army relieved by the capture of his camp, which might have been followed by a march through Maryland to the rear of Washington.

Colonel Roman observes: ‘In rejecting this plan (the original plan of concentration and of offensive operations against the enemy) Mr. Davis left the Confederate forces to await everywhere, isolated and motionless, until the Federal forces could effect junctions to attack them in detail, and this, we may say, was, unhappily, his military method throughout the war.’ Hence, an incessant antagonism between the two, which continued from the beginning to the end of the war, and, consequently, fretted both President Davis and General Beauregard into a reciprocal dislike and discontent, that