[149]
Griffith, of the Twenty-first regiment Iowa volunteers, and some eleven privates of the same regiment.
Of these, none returned except the Sergeant and, possibly, one man. The work entered by him, from its position, could give us no practical advantage, unless others to the right and left of it were carried and held at the same time.
About twelve M. I received a despatch from McClernand, that he was hard pressed at several points; in reply to which I directed him to reenforce the points hard pressed from such troops as he had that were not engaged.
I then rode round to Sherman, and had just reached there, when I received a second despatch from McClernand, stating positively and unequivocally that he was in possession of and still held two of the enemy's forts; that the American flag then waved over them; and asking me to have Sherman and Mc-Pherson make a diversion in his favor.
This despatch I showed to Sherman, who immediately ordered a renewal of the assault on his front.
I also sent an answer to McClernand, directing him to order up McArthur to his assistance, and started immediately to the position I had just left, on McPherson's line, to convey to him the information from McClernand by this last despatch, that he might make the diversion requested.
Before reaching McPherson I met a messenger with a third despatch from McClernand, of which the following is a copy:
The position occupied by me during most of the time of the assault gave me a better opportunity of seeing what was going on in front of the Thirteenth army corps than I believed it possible for the commander of it to have. I could not see his possession of forts, nor necessity for reenforcements, as represented in his despatches, up to the time I left it, which was between twelve M. and one P. M., and I expressed doubts of their correctness, which doubts the facts subsequently, but too late, confirmed. At the time I could not disregard his reiterated statements, for they might possibly be true; and that no possible opportunity of carrying the enemy's stronghold should be allowed to escape through fault of mine, I ordered Quimby's division, which was all of McPherson's corps then present, but four brigades, to report to McClernand, and notified him of the order. I showed his despatches to McPherson, as I had to Sherman, to satisfy him of the necessity of an active diversion on their part to hold as much force in their fronts as possible, The diversion was promptly and vigorously made, and resulted in the increase of our mortality list full fifty per cent, without advancing our position or giving us other advantages. About half-past 3 P. M. I received McClernand's fourth despatch, as follows:
The assault of this day proved the quality of the soldiers of this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there was no murmuring or complaining, no falling back, nor other evidence of demoralization. After the failure of the twenty-second, I determined upon a regular siege. The troops now being fully awake to the necessity of this, worked diligently and cheerfully. The work progressed rapidly and satisfactorily until the third of July, when all was about ready for a final assault. There was a great scarcity of engineer officers in the beginning, but under the skilful superintendence of Captain F. E. Prime, of the Engineer corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of my staff, and Captain C. B. Comstock, of the Engineer corps, who joined this command during the siege, such practical experience was gained as would enable any division of this army hereafter to conduct a siege with considerable skill in the absence of regular engineer officers. On the afternoon of the third of July a letter was received from Lieutenant-General Pemberton, commanding the confederate forces at Vivksburgh, proposing an armistice, and the appointment of commissioners to arrange terms for the capitulation of the place. The correspondence, copies of which are herewith transmitted, resulted in the surrender of the city and garrison of Vicksburgh at ten o'clock A. M., July fourth, 1863, on the following terms: The entire garrison, officers and men, were to be paroled, not to take up arms against the United States until exchanged by the proper authorities; officers and men each to be furnished with a parole, signed by himself; officers to be allowed their side-arms and private baggage, and the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each; the rank and file to be allowed all their clothing, but no other property; rations from their own stores sufficient to last them beyond our lines; the necessary cooking utensils for preparing their food; and thirty
headquarters Thirteenth army corps, in the field, near Vicksburgh, Miss., May 22, 1863.
General: We have gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, but are brought to a stand.
I have sent word to McArthur to reenforce me if he can. Would it not be best to concentrate the whole or a part of his command on this point?
P. S.--I have received your despatch.
My troops are all engaged, and I cannot withdraw any to reenforce others.
McC.The position occupied by me during most of the time of the assault gave me a better opportunity of seeing what was going on in front of the Thirteenth army corps than I believed it possible for the commander of it to have. I could not see his possession of forts, nor necessity for reenforcements, as represented in his despatches, up to the time I left it, which was between twelve M. and one P. M., and I expressed doubts of their correctness, which doubts the facts subsequently, but too late, confirmed. At the time I could not disregard his reiterated statements, for they might possibly be true; and that no possible opportunity of carrying the enemy's stronghold should be allowed to escape through fault of mine, I ordered Quimby's division, which was all of McPherson's corps then present, but four brigades, to report to McClernand, and notified him of the order. I showed his despatches to McPherson, as I had to Sherman, to satisfy him of the necessity of an active diversion on their part to hold as much force in their fronts as possible, The diversion was promptly and vigorously made, and resulted in the increase of our mortality list full fifty per cent, without advancing our position or giving us other advantages. About half-past 3 P. M. I received McClernand's fourth despatch, as follows:
headquarters Thirteenth army corps, May 22, 1863.
General: I have received your despatch in regard to General Quimby's division and General McArthur's division.
As soon as they arrive I will press the enemy with all possible speed, and doubt not I will force my way through.
I have lost no ground.
My men are in two of the ene-my's forts, but they are commanded by rifle-pits in the rear.
Several prisoners have been taken, who intimate that the rear is strong.
At this moment I am hard pressed. John A. Mcclernand, Major-General Commanding. Major-General U. S. Grant, Department of the Tennessee.
The assault of this day proved the quality of the soldiers of this army. Without entire success, and with a heavy loss, there was no murmuring or complaining, no falling back, nor other evidence of demoralization. After the failure of the twenty-second, I determined upon a regular siege. The troops now being fully awake to the necessity of this, worked diligently and cheerfully. The work progressed rapidly and satisfactorily until the third of July, when all was about ready for a final assault. There was a great scarcity of engineer officers in the beginning, but under the skilful superintendence of Captain F. E. Prime, of the Engineer corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of my staff, and Captain C. B. Comstock, of the Engineer corps, who joined this command during the siege, such practical experience was gained as would enable any division of this army hereafter to conduct a siege with considerable skill in the absence of regular engineer officers. On the afternoon of the third of July a letter was received from Lieutenant-General Pemberton, commanding the confederate forces at Vivksburgh, proposing an armistice, and the appointment of commissioners to arrange terms for the capitulation of the place. The correspondence, copies of which are herewith transmitted, resulted in the surrender of the city and garrison of Vicksburgh at ten o'clock A. M., July fourth, 1863, on the following terms: The entire garrison, officers and men, were to be paroled, not to take up arms against the United States until exchanged by the proper authorities; officers and men each to be furnished with a parole, signed by himself; officers to be allowed their side-arms and private baggage, and the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each; the rank and file to be allowed all their clothing, but no other property; rations from their own stores sufficient to last them beyond our lines; the necessary cooking utensils for preparing their food; and thirty
