foot of the embankment, and some succeeded in mounting it with the few brave men of the Seventy-ninth who were there, with a portion of the Eighth Michigan. It was here that Lieut.-Col. Morrison was wounded, and many of the Seventy-ninth either killed or wounded, as were also some of the One Hundredth Pennsylvania. The principal casualties to the Seventy-ninth New-York occurred at this point from the enemy's musketry; while the principal casualties to the One Hundredth Pennsylvania occurred during the few minutes that the centre of the regiment was under the fire of the guns of the fort, throwing every conceivable kind of missile, and that portion of the left which remained with a portion of the left of the Seventy-ninth New-York, under partial cover of the ravine before spoken of. The One Hundredth Pennsylvania volunteers went into battle a fragmentary command. Three hundred and odd privates, with the necessary officers, were on the advanced picket-posts, not more than fifty of whom could rejoin before we went into battle. The previous morning report, as shown by Major Leckey's report, verified by the official report, shows five hundred and eighty-three privates present for duty. This would leave two hundred and eighty-three privates to go to battle, added to which the fragmentary portions of companies that were able to join from the pickets, amounting to not more than fifty men, would make the whole number of that command in battle not more than four hundred men, with the necessary complement of officers, and of these one hundred and thirty men who joined from pickets, three companies did not arrive in time to join their regiment till it was under the thickest of the fire, when they joined on the left, and suffered severely. It was of these companies that Lieut. Morrow was mortally, and Lieuts. Blair and Gilliland seriously wounded. During the formation of the column of attack one mile from the fort, the Forty-sixth New-York volunteers, by order of Gen. Stevens, had proceeded to the left along the road leading toward Secessionville, to form, if possible, a junction with Gen. Wright's troops on that side; but on my plan of advance being represented by my Assistant Adjutant-General, the General directed that the regiment should be recalled and support the One Hundredth Pennsylvania regiment. This caused some delay, which was no disadvantage, under the circumstances, as it enabled that corps to form a good line of battle, which it did, and marched steadily to the front, until ordered to halt and remain in reserve. This regiment afterward advanced and took its position in the brigade, when it was rallied at the hedge, three hundred yards in front of the fort. As soon as the advance had been checked it was found impracticable for the few troops on the embankment to take the fort. Capt. Stevens, as I am informed, ordered them to fall back and let the artillery play upon the works, which was accordingly done in very good order. Meantime about two companies of the One Hundredth regiment Pennsylvania volunteers had rallied to their colors at the hedge, three hundred yards in front of the fort, and on these, with the assistance of Lieut. Leasure, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieut. Justice, Acting Post and Division Quartermaster, I soon succeeded in rallying the whole of my command, and formed in regular order for attack where we lay, till orders came to fall back to the hedge in the rear, which we did in good order, bringing off our wounded, but leaving our dead. During the battle two of my mounted orderlies were wounded, and one had his horse shot under him. I may be permitted to report further, that at the time I arrived in front of the hedge near the fort, I saw nothing of any part of the supporting regiments of the First Brigade, between the advancing Highlanders and the fort, and only a portion of the Eighth Michigan, who led the attack in front of the fort, that regiment having already been more than decimated by the murderous fire through which we all had to pass. After I had formed my command behind the hedge ready to move again to the attack, I rode down to the troops lying back half a mile in reserve, behind a hedge where I had myself rallied not half an hour before, and begged them for God's sake to come up to the front and support me in a charge, and was very coolly told that those troops did not belong to my division, and could not either obey my orders or Gen. Stevens's. Of course, this was a very distant support; and I did not feel at liberty to take the responsibility of acting without the order of Gen. Stevens. The troops under my command behaved with much intrepidity and coolness, and did not shrink from exposing themselves, as the list of casualties will show, and did not at any time evince any tendency to panic, though to maintain a position for two and a half hours under a constant stream of fire, was an affair calculated to try the disposition of soldiers pretty severely. Accompanying this report please find the reports of the several regimental commanders, together with a list of their casualties. I must return to the officers of the several regiments my thanks for their steadiness and coolness, and for their ready and prompt obedience to my orders. Lieut. S. George Leasure, Assistant Adjutant-General, and Lieut. Jefferson Justice, Quartermaster of the One Hundredth regiment Pennsylvania volunteers, deserve my marked approbation for most effective assistance, and for setting an example of coolness and disregard of personal danger, that aided materially in preserving coolness and intrepidity throughout the command. All of which is respectfully reported.
Colonel Williams's report.
Major Edwin Metcalf's