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A Cursory sketch of General Bragg's campaigns.
Paper no. 3.
On the 4th day of January, 1863, the Confederate army fell back and took up winter quarters at
Shelbyville and
Tullahoma.
While there
General Joe Johnston was sent out by the Department to investigate and report upon the operations and discipline of the army.
He found both satisfactory, and so reported.
Retreat out of town.
In June following, to counteract a flank movement on the part of
Rosecrans,
Bragg commenced a retreat to and across the
Tennessee to
Chattanooga.
The Federal commander,
Rosecrans, and
H. W. Halleck,
General-in-Chief, had been in correspondence for some time prior, the latter urging the former to advance and attack
Bragg, the former holding back and assigning, for reason, the impropriety of risking ‘two great and decisive battles at the same time,’ besides his general officers, including corps and division commanders, discouraged an advance at that juncture.
Halleck, rebutting, stated that, as
Johnston and
Bragg were acting on interior lines, between his own and
Grant's armies, and it was for theirs, and not the
Federal commander's interest, to fight at different times, so as to use the same force in turn against
Rosecrans and
Grant, his cherished military maxim, not to risk ‘two great decisive battles at the same time,’ was not applicable—and at the same time warning him of the other and more truthful military maxim, ‘councils never fight.’
To these persuasive arguments, accompanied with the assurance of the constantly growing complaint and dissatisfaction, not only in
Washington, but throughout the country,
Rosecrans yielded, and on the 24th of June, commenced a series of movements with the view of creating the impression of a main advance on our center and left, in the direction of
Shelbyville, whilst he would strike the decisive blow by a rapid march, in force, upon our right, and after defeating or turning it, to move on
Tullahoma, and thereby seize
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upon our base and line of communication from that point.
In furtherance of that design he moved upon and took possession of Liberty and
Hoover's Gaps, which gave to him a commanding position, and he had only to advance, as he soon afterwards did, to
Manchester and
Winchester, to accomplish the flank movement on our right at
Tullahoma, and cause
Bragg to retreat, which was consequently at once begun.
On reaching
Chattanooga,
Bragg fortified his position and threw up defensive works at points along the
Tennessee river as high as
Blythe's Ferry.
But the enemy, in overwhelming force
1 having a passage of the river at various points
2 and seizing important gaps, and threatening
Chattanooga by the pass over the
point of Lookout Mountain,
Bragg was again forced to retreat,
3 and on the morning of the 9th
Crittenden's corps occupied
Chattanooga, the objective point of the campaign, while
Rosecrans, with the remainder of the army, pressed forward through the passes of the
Lookout Mountain, threatening
Lafayette and
Rome, Georgia.
4
Thus
Rosecrans realized the explosion of his pet theory of not risking two decisive battles at one time, because he had accomplished his aim, and at the same time
Grant had reduced
Vicksburg.
The government at
Washington deemed it all important to their arms that the success of
Rosecrans should be utilized and his position, at all hazards, maintained.
To effect this, and to prevent a flank movement on
Rosecrans's right flank, through
Alabama,
General Halleck at once sent telegrams to
Generals Burnside, in
East Tennessee;
Hurlburt, at
Memphis;
Grant, or
Sherman, at
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Vicksburg; also to
General Schofield, in
Missouri, and
Pope, in command of the
Northwestern Department, to hasten forward to the
Tennessee line every available man in their departments, and the
commanding officers in
Indiana,
Ohio and
Kentucky, were ordered to make every possible exertion to secure
General Rosecrans's line of communication.
And learning that
Longstreet had been ordered to
Bragg,
Meade was ordered to attack
General Lee, at least to threaten him, so as to prevent him from sending off any more troops.
In the meanwhile
Thomas's corps,
5 while in the act of passing one of the gaps leading from McLemore's Cove, enclosed between Lookout and
Pigeon Mountains to
Alpine's, in
Broomtown valley, where lay
McCook's corps, he was suddenly confronted by a portion of our forces under
General Hindman,
6 which compelled his hasty retreat.
This sudden show of strength excited uneasiness and doubt in the mind of
Rosecrans.
He could not decide whether it evinced a purpose to give battle, or a movement to secure a safe retreat.
7 But he gave the benefit of the doubt to the former contingency, and commenced a backward movement, with orders to close on the center, and
Crittenden, at Gordon's mills, to be put in good defensive position.
8
McLemore's Cove.
To return for a moment to McLemore's Cove,
General Bragg had sent
General Hindman to attack
Thomas in flank and rear, whilst he would move up the mountain in force from
Lafayette and attack in front; § the attack in front to commence when the guns of
Hindman
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were heard in the rear.
His guns were not heard by us on the mountain, and consequently the ‘golden opportunity of bagging that portion of the enemy,’ as tritely remarked by
ex-Governor Harris of
Tennessee (then volunteer aid on
General Bragg's staff), was lost to us. For this blunder or failure of
General Hindman's he was soon relieved from command.
9
Battle of Chickamauga:
On the evening of the 18th September
General Pegram, of cavalry, having reported the enemy in force at the river (
Chickamauga),
Walthall's brigade, which was leading the advance, was formed in line of battle and ordered to advance and take possession of the bridge and ford, which was done; the enemy, after a brisk encounter, retiring without wholly destroying the bridge.
Speedily repairing the bridge, the army crossed over, camped for the night, and next morning moved forward a short distance, formed in line of battle as each successive division came up, and gave battle to the enemy upon the ever-memorable field of
Chickamauga.
The army was now divided into two corps or wings,
10 the right commanded by
Lieutenant-General Polk, the left wing by
Lieutenant-General Longstreet.
From its inception to its close the battle was furious, but had the orders of
General Bragg to
General Polk, issued on the night of the 19th, to move on the enemy at daylight, the remainder of the army to await his advance and to move forward when he (
Polk) had become engaged, been carried out, it is believed that the results of that battle, glorious and welcome as they were, would have been made more glorious.
11 But as it resulted, the anxious anticipations of the morning's first gun had to be indulged until the humored delay reached long past the day's sunrise,
12 for
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which falterings
General Polk was a few days thereafter removed from the command of his corps.
13
It may be just and proper to state here that some assign as a reason why
Polk did not move and attack as ordered, was that he ascertained that
Longstreet's right lapped his (
Polk's) left front, and to have advanced would have resulted in the slaughter of our own men.
14 But to a military mind this cannot operate as a sufficient excuse, because the danger apprehended could have without delay been obviated by proper instructions to his skirmish line and due notification to the troops in his front of his approaching columns.
On the morning of the 21st September, the enemy having the night previous commenced his retreat to
Chattanooga,
15 Bragg moved rapidly forward, preceded by
General Forrest and his troopers, who were sorely pressing and harrassing the retreating foe, that night reached
Missionary Ridge and commenced fortifying.
16 All the passes of
Lookout Mountain, which had been in possession of the enemy since our abandonment of
Chattanooga during the month previous, and which covered his line of supplies from
Bridgeport, were now regained by us.
Wheeler's cavalry sent to enemy's rear.
To cut off their supplies and force them, if possible, to evacuate
Chattanooga,
Wheeler with his cavalry was ordered to ford the
Tennessee and destroy a large wagon train known to be in the
Sequahatchie Valley on its way to
Rosecrans, which was done, besides capturing
McMinnville and other points on the railroad, making his retreat out of
Tennessee by fording the river at
Decatur, Ala., and
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thus almost completely cutting off the supplies of
Rosecrans's army.
We occupied the entire south side of the river, from Lookout to
Bridgeport; and as the latter place, with
Stevenson, was supplied from depots at
Nashville and
Louisville by a single railroad, and the river road on the north side rendered unsafe by the unerring fire of our sharp-shooters, it necessitated the hauling of supplies by the enemy a distance of sixty miles over mountains, which placed the
Federal army almost in a starving condition.
But
Grant, with heavy reinforcements, having in the meantime arrived and assumed command, and
Longstreet having been detached to operate against
Burnside in
East Tennessee,
17 began to put a new phase on the issue involved.
Battle of Lookout Mountain.
Throwing a heavy column under
Hooker to the south side of the river by means of floating pontoons, and fortifying at the mouth of South Chickamauga, then bridging that and the
Tennessee rivers, and under cover of the darkness cutting off our entire picket line, consisting of the Twenty-seventh Mississippi, under the command of
Colonel Campbell,
18 they had reached midway the mountains, when the ever-watchful, gallant, and chivalric
Walthall, who with his brigade was stationed at the point, observed them and commenced to give them battle.
Failing to obtain from
General J. K. Jackson, then in command of
Cheatham's division, the needful reinforcements, although staff officer after staff officer had been sent for that purpose,
Walthall, after a most obstinate and bloody resistance, was forced to yield the
Mountain, falling back to the
Ridge;
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and
Hooker, on the night of the 25th of November, occupied it and placed himself in communication with
Thomas's right.
In that engagement the enemy's batteries at Moccasin Bend, just across from the point, not only threw grape and canister midway up the mountain, but easily threw shot and shell over the point, a distance of over 2,000 yards in altitude, whilst our guns at the point of the mountain were rendered useless against the enemy on account of the utter impossibility of giving them the necessary depression.
Battle of Missionary Ridge.
Thus
General Bragg was threatened on both flanks and a heavy line of battle in his front.
To hold his line of railroad was all important.
Hooker's force on the mountain could be distinctly seen.
To oppose him and resist the threatenings of the enemy,
Bragg reinforced his right heavily, leaving, as he reasonably supposed from the natural strength of the position, enough to hold his left and centre.
The first attempts of the enemy on the evening of the 25th under
Sherman were unsuccessful for a time, but finally he was enabled to take two hills (the third he several times tried, but was repulsed), and then he moved around as if to gain
Bragg's rear, when the latter began to mass against him. Both sides, appreciating the importance of the deal, played each for a winning hand with eyes fixed steadily on his opponent, until finally
Hooker moved his columns along the
Rossville road towards
General Bragg's left, and thus forced the latter to reinforce his left still more at the hazard of his centre.
It was then that
Thomas advanced the ‘Army of the Cumberland,’ and succeeded in taking the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge, and rushing headlong to the crest of the ridge amid a storm of shot and shell, drove us in confusion from the field.
19 The victory was as great to the enemy as the blow was severe to our cause.
But a few days before, and we had the enemy at the point of starvation; either that or its alternative, a surrender.
Now that he had been overwhelmingly reinforced, and by armies flush with recent victories, he had given us battle and won the day. It was a
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desperate alternative, and equally desperately accepted.
20 He succeeded, and, tested by the measure of military rules, was justly entitled to wear the plume of victory.
Whether or not he won it by superior forces, or by superior military skill, it was none the less a victory—a victory that made for its hero a name in the military annals of this country second only to the immortal
Lee——a victory that secured for him the high and exalted rank of
General of the Army, and finally
President, for two terms at least, of the
United States.
