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” though that is not the case likewise with a man. Also the child is not completely developed, so that manifestly his virtue also is not personal to himself, but relative to the fully developed being, that is, the person in authority over him. And similarly the slave's virtue also is in relation to the master.And we laid it down that the slave is serviceable for the mere necessaries of life, so that clearly he needs only a small amount of virtue, in fact just enough to prevent him from failing in his tasks owing to intemperance and cowardice. （But the question might be raised, supposing that what has just been said is true, will artisans also need to have virtue? for they frequently fall short in their tasks owing to intemperance. Or is their case entirely different? For the slave is a partner in his master's life, but the artisan is more remote, and only so much of virtue falls to his share as of slavery6—
1 This clause seems to have been interpolated; one ms. has a marginal correction, ‘by nature rulers and ruled.’
2 In the mss. this sentence follows the next one, ‘We must suppose—function,’ and begins ‘Hence the ruler must possess moral virtue.’
4 i.e. in Plato, Meno （see 7 above）, where this sophist figures as a character in the dialogue; see also 3.1.9, note.
6 i.e. his excellences as an artisan are the qualities of a subordinate （his virtues as a human being, apart from his trade, are not considered）.
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