[1288a]
[1]
But merely from what has been
said, it is clear that among people who are alike and equal it is neither
expedient nor just for one to be sovereign over all—neither when there
are no laws, but he himself is in the place of law, nor when there are laws,
neither when both sovereign and subjects are good nor when both are bad, nor yet
when the sovereign is superior in virtue, except in a certain manner. What this
manner is must be stated; and in a way it has been stated already even before.
But first we must define what
constitutes fitness for royal government, what fitness for aristocracy, and what
for a republic. A fit subject for royal government is a populace of such a sort
as to be naturally capable of producing a family of outstanding excellence for
political leadership; a community fit for aristocracy is one that naturally
produces a populace1 capable of being governed under the form of
government fit for free men by those who are fitted by virtue for taking the
part of leaders in constitutional government; a republican community, one in
which there naturally grows up a military populace2 capable of being governed and of governing
under a law that distributes the offices among the well-to-do in accordance with
merit. When therefore it comes
about that there is either a whole family or even some one individual that
differs from the other citizens in virtue so greatly that his virtue exceeds
that of all the others, then it is just for this family to be the royal family
or this individual king, and sovereign over all matters. For, as has been said
before,
[20]
this holds good not only
in accordance with the right that is usually brought forward by those who are
founding aristocratic and oligarchic constitutions, and from the other side by
those who are founding democratic ones (for they all make their claim
on the ground of superiority, though not the same superiority), but it
also holds good in accordance with the right spoken of before.3
For it is not seemly to put to
death or banish, nor yet obviously to ostracize, such a man, nor is it seemly to
call upon him to take his turn as a subject; for it is not in the order of
nature for the part to overtop the whole, but the man that is so exceptionally
outstanding has come to overtop the whole community. Hence it only remains for
the community to obey such a man, and for him to be sovereign not in turn but
absolutely.Let this be our answer to the
questions as regards kingship, what are its varieties, and whether it is
disadvantageous for states or advantageous, and for what states, and under what
conditions.And since we pronounce the right constitutions to be three, and
of these the one governed by the best men must necessarily be the best, and such
is the one in which it has come about either that some one man or a whole family
or a group of men is superior in virtue to all the citizens together, the latter
being able to be governed and the former to govern on the principles of the most
desirable life, and since in the first part of the discourse4 it was proved that the virtue of a man
and that of a citizen in the best state must of necessity be the same, it is
evident that a man becomes good in the same way and by the same means as one
might establish an aristocratically or monarchically governed state,5
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