[1308a]
[1]
for they are refuted by the facts (and
what sort of constitutional sophistries we refer to has been said
before). And again we must
observe that not only some aristocracies but also some oligarchies endure not
because the constitutions are secure but because those who get in the offices
treat both those outside the constitution and those in the government well, on
the one hand by not treating those who are not members of it unjustly and by
bringing their leading men into the constitution and not wronging the ambitious
ones in the matter of dishonor or the multitude in the matter of gain, and on
the other hand, in relation to themselves and those who are members, by treating
one another in a democratic spirit. For that equality which men of democratic
spirit seek for in the case of the multitude is not only just but also expedient
in the case of their compeers. Hence
if there are a greater number in the governing class, many of the legislative
enactments of a democratic nature are advantageous, for example for the offices
to be tenable for six months, to enable all the compeers to participate in them;
for the compeers in this case are as it were the people (owing to which
demagogues often arise even among them, as has been said already), and
also oligarchies and aristocracies fall into dynasties less (for it is
not so easy to do wrongs
[20]
when in
office for a short time as when in for a long time, since it is long tenure of
office that causes tyrannies to spring up in oligarchies and democracies; for
either those who are the greatest men in either sort of state aim at tyranny, in
the one sort the demagogues and in the other the dynasts, or those who hold the
greatest offices, when they are in office for along time). And constitutions are kept secure not only
through being at a distance from destroyers but sometimes also through being
near them,1 for
when they are afraid the citizens keep a closer hold on the government; hence
those who take thought for the constitution must contrive causes of fear, in
order that the citizens may keep guard and not relax their vigilance for the
constitution like a watch in the night, and they must make the distant near.
Again, they must also endeavor to guard against the quarrels and party struggles
of the notables by means of legislation, and to keep out those who are outside
the quarrel before they too have taken it over; since to discern a growing evil
at the commencement is not any ordinary person's work but needs a statesman.
And to deal with the revolution
from oligarchy and constitutional government that arises because of the
property-qualifications, when this occurs while the rates of qualification
remain the same but money is becoming plentiful, it is advantageous to examine
the total amount of the rated value of the community as compared with the past
amount, in states where the assessment is made yearly, over that period,
1 This modifies 1207a 31.
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