[1279a]
[1]
like medicine and athletic training, are pursued in
the interest of the persons upon whom they are practised, although incidentally
they may also be in the interest of the practitioners themselves; for nothing
prevents the trainer from being on occasions himself also one of the persons in
training, just as the pilot is always a member of the crew; so although the
trainer or pilot studies the good of those under his authority, when he himself
also becomes one among them he incidentally shares the benefit, for the pilot is
a sailor in the ship and the trainer can become one of the persons in training
under his own direction. Hence in
regard to the political offices also, when the state is constituted on the
principle of equality and of similarity between the citizens, these claim to
hold office by turn—in earlier times, under the natural system,
claiming to do public services in turn, and for somebody in return to look after
their own welfare just as previously they looked after his interest when in
office themselves; but nowadays owing to the benefits to be got from public
sources and from holding office people wish to be in office continuously, just
as if it were the case that those in office although sickly people always
enjoyed good health—in which case office would no doubt be much run
after by invalids.It is clear then that those constitutions that aim at the
common advantage are in effect rightly framed in accordance with absolute
justice, while those that aim at the rulers' own advantage only are
faulty,
[20]
and are all of them
deviations from the right constitutions; for they have an element of despotism,
whereas a city is a partnership of free men.These
matters having been determined the next step is to consider how many forms of
constitution there are and what they are; and first to study the right forms of
constitution, since the deviations will also become manifest when these are
defined.But inasmuch as ‘constitution’ means the
same as ‘government,’ and the government is the supreme
power in the state, and this must be either a single ruler or a few or the mass
of the citizens, in cases when the one or the few or the many govern with an eye
to the common interest, these constitutions must necessarily be right ones,
while those administered with an eye to the private interest of either the one
or the few or the multitude are deviations. For either we must not say that
those who are part of the state are citizens, or those who are part of the state
must share in the advantage of membership. Our customary designation for a monarchy that aims at the
common advantage is ‘kingship’; for a government of more
than one yet only a few ‘aristocracy’ (either
because the best men rule or because they rule with a view to what is best for
the state and for its members); while when the multitude govern the
state with a view to the common advantage, it is called by the name common to
all the forms of constitution, ‘constitutional government.’
(And this comes about
reasonably, since although it is possible for one man or a few to excel in
virtue, when the number is larger it becomes difficult for them to possess
perfect excellence in respect of every form of virtue,
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