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[1320a]
[1]
as shall best compass the results preservative of
constitutions, and not think that a measure is democratic or oligarchic which
will cause the state to be democratically or oligarchically governed in the
greatest degree, but which will cause it to be so governed for the longest time.
But the demagogues of today to
court the favor of the peoples often use the law-courts to bring about
confiscations of property. Hence those who are caring for the safety of the
constitution must counteract this by enacting that nothing belonging to persons
condemned at law shall be confiscated and liable to be carried to the public
treasury, but that their property shall be consecrated to the service of
religion; for male-factors will be no less on their guard, as they will be
punished just the same, while the mob will less often vote guilty against men on
trial when it is not going to get anything out of it. Also they must always make
the public trials that occur as few as possible, checking those who bring
indictments at random by big penalties; for they do not usually indict men of
the people but notables, whereas even with this form of constitution it is
desirable for all the citizens if possible to be friendly to the state, or
failing that, at all events not to think of their rulers as enemies. And inasmuch as the ultimate forms of
democracy tend to have large populations and it is difficult for their citizens
to sit in the assembly without pay, and this in a state where there do not
happen to be revenues is inimical to the notables
[20]
(for pay has to be obtained from a property-tax and
confiscation, and from corruption of the law-courts, which has caused the
overthrow of many democracies before now),—where therefore
there happen to be no revenues, few meetings of the assembly must be held, and
the law-courts must consist of many members but only sit a few days
(for this not only contributes to the rich not being in fear of the
cost of the system even if the well-off do not take the pay and only the poor
do, but also leads to far greater efficiency in the trial of law-suits, for the
well-to-do, though not wishing to be away from their private affairs for many
days, are willing to leave them for a short time), while where there are revenues men must not do what
the popular leaders do now (for they use the surplus for doles, and
people no sooner get them than they want the same doles again, because this way
of helping the poor is the legendary jar with a hole in it1), but the truly democratic statesman must study how
the multitude may be saved from extreme poverty; for this is what causes
democracy to be corrupt. Measures must therefore be contrived that may bring
about lasting prosperity. And since this is advantageous also for the
well-to-do, the proper course is to collect all the proceeds of the revenues
into a fund and distribute this in lump sums to the needy, best of all, if one
can, in sums large enough for acquiring a small estate, or, failing this, to
serve as capital for trade or husbandry,
1 The fifty daughters of Danaus were married to their cousins, and all but one murdered their husbands on the bridal night, and were punished in Hades by having to pour water into the jar described.
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