[957e]
the increase of what is just, and for the bad a change as great as possible from their ignorance, intemperance and cowardice, and, in short, from their general iniquity,—that is to say, for all the bad whose opinions are curable; but for those whose opinions are really fixed by Fate,1—if they assigned death as a cure
1 i.e. men whose false beliefs are ineradicable, beyond hope of conversion.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 10 & 11 translated by R.G. Bury. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1967 & 1968.
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