[757b]
For there are two kinds of equality1 which, though identical in name, are often almost opposites in their practical results. The one of these any State or lawgiver is competent to apply in the assignment of honors,—namely, the equality determined by measure, weight and number,—by simply employing the lot to give even results in the distributions; but the truest and best form of equality is not an easy thing for everyone to discern. It is the judgment of Zeus, and men it never assists save in small measure, but in so far as it does assist either States or individuals,
1 Cp.Plat. Gorg. 508a ff, Plat. Gorg. 508b ff; Aristot. Pol. 1301b 29 ff.;Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1131b 27, Aristot. Nic. Eth. 1158b 30 ff. The “arithmetical” equality which merely counts heads and treats all alike is here contrasted with that truer “proportional” equality which takes account of human inequality, and on which “distributive justice” (as Aristotle terms it) is based: cp. also 744 C.
Plato. Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vols. 10 & 11 translated by R.G. Bury. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1967 & 1968.
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