43.
"But we do here the contrary;
and besides, if any man be suspected of corruption, though he give the best counsel that can be given, yet through envy for this uncertain opinion of his gain, we lose a certain benefit to the commonwealth.
[2]
And our custom is to hold good counsel given suddenly no less suspect then bad, by which means as he that gives the most dangerous counsel must get the same received by fraud, so also he that gives the most sound advice is forced by lying to get himself believed.
[3]
So that the commonwealth is it alone which, by reason of these suspicious imaginations, no man can possibly benefit by the plain and open way without artifice.
For if any man shall do a manifest good unto the commonwealth, he shall presently be suspected of some secret gain unto himself in particular.
[4]
We, therefore, that in the most important affairs and amidst these jealousies do give our advice have need to foresee further than you that look not far, and the rather because we stand accountable for our counsel, and you are to render no account of your hearing it.
[5]
For if the persuader and the persuaded had equal harm, you would be the more moderate judges.
But now, according to the passion that takes you when at any time your affairs miscarry, you punish the sentence of that one only that gave the counsel, not the many sentences of your own that were in fault as well as his.
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