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force was at once set to work corduroying the “rotten” roads and putting them into some kind of practical condition.
Early this morning the army was ordered back to its old camping ground, and about noon the infantry began to pass by these headquarters.
The lads trudged along tired enough, but jolly withal, and disposed to be quite facetious over the “mud campaign,” whose odd experiences will doubtless long form the theme of conversation around many a camp-fire.
Thus ends an enterprise which had every human promise of success, but which has been baulked and brought to naught by causes which mortal ken could neither have foreseen nor prevented.
The fatal part played by the elements needs no comment.
Whether this drawback might not have been overcome by vigorous effort and hearty cooperation on the part of the military leaders, is a question much mooted here.
There are those who assert, that had it not been for the apathy of some in high places of military command, we might still have carried the day. This question, however, is one more fit to be brought to another bar than that of these columns.
There is, however, another point on which I cannot forbear to say a word.
One of your Washington telegrams, referring to the causes of the late failure, says: “The Quartermaster's department, as usual, when an important movement is being executed, was behind with its supplies.”
I have not scrupled in this correspondence to use the privileges of criticism to its fullest extent, and can say to the reader, therefore, that this is a total misapprehension.
Abundant supplies were on hand, and there are at this moment more than six million rations stored here in convenient depots.
Our chief lack is not in the material, but the moral order.
We do not fail for want of food or clothing, or ammunition or arms.
The army was never so well supplied with all these things.
No! The disease is of a more subtle nature.
It is in the blood and brain.
We want energy, capacity, faith, devotion.
'Tis life of which our veins are scant.The only compensation left us in the failure of a movement, which, if made a week ago, would in all probability have been successful, is that we did not succeed in making it at the present time. If the storm which has stopped us on the north side of the Rappahannock had embargoed us on the south side, what is to-day only a misfortune, might have been a great disaster. There has been no opportunity of testing how the men would behave on again meeting the enemy. This time they have been tried by enduring rather than acting. But I believe that, in spite of all the drawbacks, they would have behaved well. And certainly, if “they conquer who suffer” the behavior of the army of the Potomac, amid circumstances so discouraging, may be counted half a battle and a whole victory.--N. Y. Times.
