15. The first question which confronts us is
“What is rhetoric?” Many definitions have been
given; but the problem is really twofold. For the
dispute turns either on the quality of the thing
itself or on the meaning of the words in which it
is defined. The first and chief disagreement on the
subject is found in the fact that some think that
even bad men may be called orators, while others,
of whom I am one, restrict the name of orator and
the art itself to those who are good.
[
2]
Of those who
divorce eloquence from that yet fairer and more desirable title to renown, a virtuous life, some call
rhetoric merely a power, some a science, but not a
virtue, some a practice, some an art, though they will
not allow the art to have anything in common with
science or virtue, while some again call it a perversion of art or
κακοτεχνία.
[
3]
These persons have as a
rule held that the task of oratory lies in persuasion
or speaking in a persuasive manner: for this is
within the power of a bad man no less than a good.
Hence we get the common definition of rhetoric as
the power of persuading. What I call a power,
many call a capacity, and some a faculty. In order
therefore that there may be no misunderstanding I
will say that by power I mean
δύναμις.
[
4]
This view
is derived from Isocrates, if indeed the treatise on
[p. 303]
rhetoric
1 which circulates under his name is really
from his hand. He, although far from agreeing
with those whose aim is to disparage the duties of
an orator, somewhat rashly defined rhetoric as
πειθοῦς δημιουργός, the “worker of persuasion”: for
I cannot bring myself to use the peculiar derivative
which Ennius
2 applies to Marcus Cethegus in the
phrase
suadae medulla, the “marrow of persuasion.”
[
5]
Again Gorgias,
3in the dialogue of Plato that takes
its title from his name, says practically the same
thing, but Plato intends it to be taken as the opinion
of Gorgias, not as his own. Cicero
4 in more than
one passage defined the duty of an orator as “speaking in a persuasive manner.”
[
6]
In his
Rhelorica5 too,
a work which it is clear gave him no satisfaction, he
makes the end to be persuasion. But many other
things have the power of persuasion, such as money,
influence, the authority and rank of the speaker, or
even some sight unsupported by language, when
for instance the place of words is supplied by the
memory of some individual's great deeds, by his
lamentable appearance or the beauty of his person.
[
7]
Thus when Antonius in the course of his defence of
Manius Aquilius tore open his client's robe and revealed the honourable scars which he had acquired
while facing his country's foes, he relied no longer
on the power of his eloquence, but appealed directly
to the eyes of the Roman people. And it is believed
that they were so profoundly moved by the sight as
to acquit the accused.
[
8]
Again there is a speech of
Cato, to mention no other records, which informs us
that Servius Galba escaped condemnation solely by
[p. 305]
the pity which he aroused not only by producing his
own young children before the assembly, but by
carrying round in his arms the son of Sulpicius
Gallus.
[
9]
So also according to general opinion Phryne
was saved not by the eloquence of Hyperides, admirable as it was, but by the sight of her exquisite
body, which she further revealed by drawing aside
her tunic. And if all these have power to persuade, the end of oratory, which we are discussing,
cannot adequately be defined as persuasion.
[
10]
Consequently those who, although holding the same
general view of rhetoric, have regarded it as the
power of persuasion by speaking, pride themselves on
their greater exactness of language. This definition
is given by Gorgias, in the dialogue
6 mentioned
above, under compulsion from the inexorable logic of
Socrates. Theodectes agrees with him, whether the
treatise on rhetoric which has come down to us
under his name is really by him or, as is generally
believed, by Aristotle. In that work the end of
rhetoric is defined as the
leading of men by the
power of speech to the conclusion desired by the orator.
[
11]
But even this definition is not sufficiently comprehensive, since others besides orators persuade by
speaking or lead others to the conclusion desired, as
for example harlots, flatterers and seducers. On
the other hand the orator is not always engaged on
persuasion, so that sometimes persuasion is not his
special object, while sometimes it is shared by
others who are far removed from being orators.
[
12]
And
yet Apollodorus is not very far off this definition
when he asserts that the first and all-important task
of forensic oratory is
to persuade the judge and lead
his mind to the conclusions desired by the speaker. For
[p. 307]
even Apollodorus makes the orator the sport of fortune by refusing him leave to retain his title if he
fails to persuade.
[
13]
Some on the other hand pay no
attention to results, as for example Aristotle,
7 who
says “
rhetoric is the power of discovering all means of
persuading by speech.” This definition has not merely
the fault already mentioned, but the additional defect of including merely the power of invention,
which without style cannot possibly constitute
oratory.
[
14]
Hermagoras, who asserts that its end is to
speak persuasively, and others who express the same
opinion, though in different words, and inform us
that the end is to
say everything which ought to be
said with a view to persuasion, have been sufficiently
answered above, when I proved that persuasion was
not the privilege of the orator alone.
[
15]
Various additions
have been made to these definitions. For some hold
that rhetoric is concerned with everything, while
some restrict its activity to politics. The question
as to which of these views is the nearer to the truth
shall be discussed later in its appropriate place.
[
16]
Aristotle seems to have implied that the sphere of the
orator was all-inclusive when he defined rhetoric as
the
power to detect every element in any given subject
which might conduce to persuasion; so too does Patrocles who omits the words
in any given subject, but
since he excludes nothing, shows that his view is
identical. For he defines rhetoric as the
power to
discover whatever is persuasive in speech. These definitions like that quoted above include no more than
the power of
invention alone. Theodorus avoids this
fault and holds that it is the
power to discover and to
utter forth in elegant language whatever is credible in
every subject of oratory.
[
17]
But, while others besides
[p. 309]
orators may discover what is credible as well as persuasive, by adding the words
in every subject he, to a
greater extent than the others, concedes the fairest
name in all the world to those who use their gifts as
an incitement to crime
[
18]
. Plato makes Gorgias
8 say
that he is a master of persuasion in the law-courts
and other assemblies, and that his themes are justice
and injustice, while in reply Socrates allows him the
power of persuading, but not of teaching.
[
19]
Those
who refused to make the sphere of oratory allinclusive, have been obliged to make somewhat forced
and long-winded distinctions: among these I may
mention Ariston, the pupil of the Peripatetic Critolaus, who produced the following definition, “
Rhetoric
is the science of seeing and uttering what ought to be
said on political questions in language that is likely to
prove persuasive to the people.”
[
20]
Being a Peripatetic he
regards it as a science, not, like the Stoics, as a
virtue, while in adding the words “
likely to prove
persuasie to the people” he inflicts a positive insult on
oratory, in implying that it is not likely to persuade the
learned. The same criticism will apply to all those who
restrict oratory to political questions, for they exclude thereby a large number of the duties of an
orator, as for example panegyric, the third department of oratory, which is entirely ignored.
[
21]
Turning
to those who regard rhetoric as an art, but not as a
virtue, we find that Theodorus of Gadara is more
cautious. For he says (I quote the words of his
translators), “
rhetoric is the art which discovers and
judges and expresses, mith an elegance duly proportioned
to the importance of all such elements of persuasion as
may exist in any subject in the field of politics.”
[
22]
Similarly Cornelius Celsus defines the end of rhetoric as
[p. 311]
to speak persuasively on any doubtful subject within the
field of politics. Similar definitions are given by
others, such for instance as the following:—“
rhetoric
is the power of judging and holding forth on such political subjects as come before it with a certain persuasiveness, a certain action of the body and delivery of the
words.”
[
23]
There are countless other definitions,
either identical with this or composed of the same
elements, which I shall deal with when I come to
the questions concerned with the subject matter of
rhetoric. Some regard it as neither a power, a
science or an art; Critolaus calls it the
practice of
speaking (for this is the meaning of
τριβή),
Athenaeus styles it the
art of deceiving,
[
24]
while the
majority, content with reading a few passages from
the Gorgias of Plato, unskilfully excerpted by
earlier writers, refrain from studying that dialogue
and the remainder of Plato's writings, and thereby
fall into serious error. For they believe that in
Plato's view rhetoric was not an art, but a certain
adroitness in the production of delight and gratification,9
[
25]
or with reference to another passage the
shadow of a small part of politics10 and the
fourth department of flattery. For Plato assigns
11 two departments of politics to the body, namely medicine and
gymnastic, and two to the soul, namely law and
justice, while he styles the art of cookery
12 a form of
flattery of medicine, the art of the slave-dealer a
flattery of gymnastic, for they produce a false complexion by the use of paint and a false robustness
by puffing them out with fat: sophistry he calls a
dishonest counterfeit of legal science, and rhetoric of
justice.
[
26]
All these statements occur in the
Gorgias and
are uttered by Socrates who appears to be the
[p. 313]
mouthpiece of the views held by Plato. But some of his
dialogues were composed merely to refute his
opponents and are styled
refutative, while others are
for the purpose of teaching and are called
doctrinal.
[
27]
Now it is only rhetoric as practised in their own day
that is condemned by Plato or Socrates, for he
speaks of it as “the manner in which you engage in
public affairs”
13: rhetoric in itself he regards as a
genuine and honourable thing, and consequently the
controversy with Gorgias ends with the words, “The
rhetorician therefore must be just and the just man
desirous to do what is just.”
14
[
28]
To this Gorgias
makes no reply, but the argument is taken up by
Polus, a hot-headed and headstrong young fellow,
and it is to him that Socrates makes his remarks
about “shadows” and “forms of flattery.” Then
Callicles,
15 who is even more hot-headed, intervenes,
but is reduced to the conclusion that “he who would
truly be a rhetorician ought to be just and possess a
knowledge of justice.” It is clear therefore that
Plato does not regard rhetoric as an evil, but holds
that true rhetoric is impossible for any save a just
and good man. In the
Phaedrus16
[
29]
he makes it even
clearer that the complete attainment of this art is
impossible without the knowledge of justice, an
opinion in which I heartily concur. Had this not
been his view, would he have ever written the
Apology of Socrates or the Funeral Oration
17 in
praise of those who had died in battle for their
country, both of them works falling within the
sphere of oratory.
[
30]
It was against the class of men
who employed their glibness of speech for evil purposes that he directed his denunciations. Similarly
Socrates thought it incompatible with his honour to
[p. 315]
make use of the speech which Lysias composed for
his defence, although it was the usual practice in
those days to write speeches for the parties concerned to speak in the courts on their own behalf,
a device designed to circumvent the law which forbade the employment of advocates.
[
31]
Further the
teachers of rhetoric were regarded by Plato as quite
unsuited to their professed task. For they divorced
rhetoric from justice and preferred plausibility to
truth, as he states in the
Phaedrus.18
[
32]
Cornelius Celsus
seems to have agreed with these early rhetoricians,
for he writes “The orator only aims at the semblance
of truth,” and again a little later “The reward of
the party to a suit is not a good conscience, but victory.” If this were true, only the worst of men
would place such dangerous weapons at the disposal
of criminals or employ the precepts of their art for
the assistance of wickedness. However I will leave
those who maintain these views to consider what
ground they have for so doing.
[
33]
For my part, I have undertaken the task of moulding the ideal orator, and as my first desire is that he
should be a good man, I will return to those who
have sounder opinions on the subject. Some however identify rhetoric with politics, Cicero
19 calls it a
department of the science of politics (and science of
politics and philosophy are identical terms), while
others again call it a
branch of philosophy, among
them Isocrates.
[
34]
The definition which best suits its
real character is that which makes rhetoric the
science
of speaking well. For this definition includes all the
virtues of oratory and the character of the orator as
well, since no man can speak well who is not good
himself.
[
35]
The definition given by Chrysippus, who
[p. 317]
derived it from Cleanthes, to the effect that it is the
science of speaking rightly, amounts to the same thing.
The same philosopher also gives other definitions,
but they concern problems of a different character
from that on which we are now engaged. Another
definition defines oratory as the power of
persuading
men to do what ought to be done, and yields practically
the same sense save that it limits the art to the result
which it produces.
[
36]
Areus again defines it well as
speaking according to the excellence of speech. Those who
regard it as the science of political obligations, also
exclude men of bad character from the title of orator,
if by science they mean virtue, but restrict it overmuch by confining it to political problems. Albutius,
a distinguished author and professor of rhetoric,
agrees that rhetoric is the science of speaking well,
but makes a mistake in imposing restrictions by the
addition of the words
on political questions and
with
credibility; with both of these restrictions I have
already dealt.
[
37]
Finally those critics who hold that
the aim of rhetoric is
to think and speak rightly, were
on the correct track.
These are practically all the most celebrated and
most discussed definitions of rhetoric. It would be
both irrelevant and beyond my power to deal with all.
For I strongly disapprove of the custom which has
come to prevail among writers of text-books of refusing
to define anything in the same terms as have been
employed by some previous writer. I will have
nothing to do with such ostentation.
[
38]
What I say
will not necessarily be my own invention, but it will
be what I believe to be the right view, as for instance
that oratory is the science of speaking well. For
when the most satisfactory definition has been
[p. 319]
found, he who seeks another, is merely looking for a
worse one.
Thus much being admitted we are now in
a position to see clearly what is the end, the
highest aim, the ultimate goal of rhetoric, that
τέλος
in fact which every art must possess. For if rhetoric
is the science of speaking well, its end and highest
aim is to speak well.