No. 2.-reports of Brig. Gen. George W. Morgan, U. S. Army, commanding Seventh Division, Army of the Ohio.1
Hdqrs. Seventh Division, Army of the Ohio, Cumberland Ford, April 30, 1862-10 p. m.After a reconnaissance of a day and a half party just returned. On yesterday there was a brisk skirmish, in which we had 4 wounded. The enemy's killed and wounded were carried from the field, with the exception of 1 wounded man, whom they failed to remove. One of the enemy was mortally wounded while attempting to do so. The enemy has greatly strengthened his position, and has fourteen works on this side of the mountain. According to the prisoners, whose statements are confirmed by three deserters from Knoxville? on the 28th instant two additional regiments of infantry and 300 Indians re-enforced Cumberland Gap. Kirby Smith is said to have returned to Knoxville, where he is represented to have 5,000 men. My effective force are under 8,000-1,400 of whom are not yet armed. The reconnaissance was conducted by Acting Brigadier-General Carter and Colonel De Courcy.
headquarters, Cumberland Ford, June 7, 1862.The following telegram has just been received:
Senators W. H. Busteed and J. S. Van Winkle, both reliable men, have fled here from Monticello. They report 400 rebel cavalry m Clinton County, 250 in Burkesville,  and 160 in Jamestown, Tenn. They are killing and robbing as they go. They threatened this place, and say the stores, &c., left here shall be destroyed. The loyal citizens of Clinton are almost in despair, &c.
My command, already reduced by sending the Forty-ninth Indiana Regiment to Barboursville, is too small to afford succor to Somerset. Assistant Quartermaster McKinney belongs to my division, and I have ordered him to supply the Home Guard with arms and ammunition, and destroy the balance of the stores on the approach of the enemy. Duplicate sent to General Buell.
Barboursville, Ky., June 9, 1862.Many thanks for Baird and Medary. Both have arrived. My advance guard is at Lambdin's, within 18 miles of Speedwell where the column will strike the Tennessee line. For miles a road had to be constructed as the column advanced, and the guns could only be drawn up the Pine Mountain by the aid of block and tackle. The rear of the column is 3 miles beyond Cumberland Ford, and on Thursday the entire force will be concentrated on the Cumberland Mountains. The obstacles are great, but will be overcome. With my staff left Cumberland Ford at 3 p. m. on yesterday, and in order to go forward rapidly I have avoided line of march, and will be at the head of the column today. George W. Morgan.
Hdqrs. Seventh Division, Army of the Ohio, Cumberland Gap, June 19, 1862.The enemy evacuated this American Gibraltar this morning at 10 o'clock, and De Courcy's brigade took possession at 3 this afternoon. The enemy destroyed a considerable amount of his stores, and precipitated several cannon over the cliffs, spiking others, and carried a few away. I believe, however, that seven have been found in position. The tents were left standing, but cut into slits. He had not time to destroy or take a portion of his stores and they have been taken possession of by the proper officers. The Stars and Stripes were raised by De Courcy, and a national salute was fired in honor of the capture of this stronghold of treason. Each brigade, in the order of its arrival, will on successive days plant its flag at sunset upon the pinnacle of the mountain, accompanied by a national salute. In my hurried dispatches of this morning I neglected speaking in terms of just praise of the valuable services of Lieutenant Fisher and his brother officers of the Signal Corps, and also of the energy and devotion of Lieutenant-Colonel Munday and hisiendful of cavalry; but every officer and every soldier has nobly discharged his duty.
Hdqrs. Seventh Division, Army of the Ohio, Cumberland Gap, June 22, 1862.Colonel: On the 28th of March last I was assigned by Major. General Buell to the command of this division, and directed to concentrate my force at Cumberland Ford and to take Cumberland Gap. At that time the roads leading from Crab Orchard and Mount Vernon to Cumberland Ford were almost impassable, and from 3 to 4 miles a day was the ordinary distance made by small trains of twelve wagons. On my way up I came from Lexington in an open buggy, in order to move forward as rapidly as possible. At many places the narrow roads, walled in by the mountains, had become torrents, and sometimes the horses were obliged to swim. It was the rainy season, and these facts are only mentioned to convey some idea of the difficulties this command has had to overcome. On arriving in the Cumberland Valley I found the country entirely exhausted by the occupation of Carter's brigade and by the ravages committed by the enemy. It was necessary to haul forage for 30, 40, and 50 miles, and at last from a distance of 80 and 90 miles. It was under such circumstances that I concentrated and organized the Seventh Division. I found six guns, and increased the number to twenty-two, four of which are Parrott siege guns. A floating bridge was built upon the Cumberland River by Lieutenant Edge, of the Sixteenth Ohio, under the supervision of Colonel De Courcy, and means were adopted to supply the troops with fresh meat, which some of them had not tasted for several months, and they were threatened with scurvy. Regiments were armed with guns of various calibers, and there was a scarcity of ammunition even for them. A new distribution of arms was made; worthless ones were replaced by effective weapons, and a supply of ammunition was obtained. I reached Cumberland Ford on the 11th April and made a reconnaissance of the enemy's position at Cumberland Gap. It was evident that the enemy had grouped too many works on their left and depended too much on the natural strength of their right. Six hundred yards to the right of Fort Pitts I observed a knob which commanded that fort and Fort Mallory, and I was satisfied that that hill once in our possession, and occupied by siege guns, the gap was ours. I made a requisition for and obtained two 20 and two 30 pounder Parrott guns, but before their arrival I ordered an armed reconnaissance to be made by the brigades of Carter and De Courcy, with directions to avoid an exchange of shots if possible. However, the enemy attacked the reconnoitering party, and a skirmish ensued, in which we lost 1 man mortally and several slightly wounded. The loss of the enemy was 7 killed and 8 wounded. The rebel papers announced that our loss was 150 killed and 300 wounded and that their loss was 30. This statement was untrue both as to their loss and our own. Before the arrival of our siege guns Engineer Lea, of the rebel forces, constructed a strong work, protected by rifle pits, upon the summit, to the right of Fort Pitts, and convinced that the position could only be carried with immense loss of life, with keen regret I abandoned all idea of attacking the place from the front, and resolved to execute a flank movement and force the enemy to abandon his position, the strongest I have ever seen except Gibraltar, or fight us in the field. Such a movement was full of difficulties. It was universally believed that the route through Cumberland Gap was the only one practicable within a range of 80 miles for the march of an army with cannon, and as it was, our horses were frequently without forage and the troops on  half rations. To have three days rations ahead was a subject of rejoicing. On the east of Cumberland Gap the mountains rise up like a gigantic wall, on one side nearly perpendicular, while on the west were Baptist, Rogers', and Big Creek Gaps, through which small wagons lightly laden had been known to pass, but they were generally used as bridle-paths, and were now strongly blockaded. In order at the same time to threaten Clinton, one of the enemy's depots of subsistence, and to divert his attention from my real plan, I established Brigadier-General Spears, with three regiments of his command, at the commencement of the 18 miles of blockade, at the foot of the Pine Mountain, and on the route to Big Creek Gap, and 35 miles west of Cumberland Gap. As I had anticipated, the enemy immediately occupied the front of Big Creek Gap with two strong brigades of infantry, two regiments of cavalry, and two batteries of artillery. I now determined to cross the Pine Mountain and pass the Cumberland chain at Rogers' Gap (which is 20 miles west of Cumberland Gap, 15 miles east of Big Creek Gap, and 39 miles southwest of Cumberland Ford, and debouches into Powell's Valley, immediately opposite to the mouth of the road leading to Knoxville. This position once occupied would threaten Knoxville, Cumberland Gap, and Clinton, or three important points, in three different directions), with the brigades of De Courcy and Coburn (now Baird's), and to leave the brigade of General Carter to guard Cumberland Ford. It was my determination to attack the enemy in front, while Spears with his brigade would pass through Elk Gap and take him in the rear. The advance guard had crossed the Cumberland River to execute this maneuver, when one of my scouts came in and announced that Barton's command had withdrawn from Big Creek and was then encamped near Cumberland Gap. For the moment the execution of my plan was postponed, but not abandoned. I now determined to withdraw my entire force from Cumberland Ford, and to cause the sides of the Pine Mountain to be mined, so that a hundred thousand tons of rocks and trees could be hurled into the valley should the enemy attempt to strike at our line of supplies. The mines were constructed by Capt. S. S. Lyon, but they were never sprung. On the 6th instant the march was again resumed, Munday's cavalry and Garrard's Third Kentucky Infantry constituting the advance guard, followed by the siege guns, Foster's battery, and De Courcy3s brigade; next the brigade of Baird, with Wetmore's battery. Carter's brigade and Lanphere's battery brought up the rear. Heavy fatigue parties were constantly employed in front in making and repairing roads, which were again blockaded by Captain Lyon after the rear guard had passed. It was amusing to witness the astonishment of the people at the passage of enormous cannon over roads regarded by them as difficult and dangerous for lightly-laden wagons. Old men, women, and children flocked to the road-side, and everywhere we were welcomed with smiles and tears of joy. Too much praise cannot be awarded to Capt. Jacob T. Foster, First Wisconsin Battery, chief of artillery. As an artillerist of energy and skill he will not unfavorably compare with any officer in the service. The corps under his command is also deserving of the highest commendation. Nor can I pass unnoticed the heroic toil and hardy endurance of the parties detailed from the infantry to aid Captain Foster in advancing his guns along the cliffs of the Pine and Cumberland Mountains, for without their assistance at the block and tackle and the dragropes the march could not have been continued. The duties devolving  upon Carter were both difficult and dangerous, and were executed with skill and energy. The narrow mountain roads were cut into gullies by the brigades which had already gone forward, and there might have been a descent from Cumberland Gap. On the 10th instant the brigades of De Courcy and Baird encamped on the north side of the Cumberland Mountains, and on the following day, after well-conducted marches, they descended into Powell's Valley, and bivouacked in a dense forest, which entirely masked their position. Colonel De Courcy, whose brigade led the advance, displayed through-)ut the entire march skill and ability of a high order, and removed blockades and made roads for the passage of the other troops. On the 9th instant I directed General Spears to clear the blockade from the Big Creek Gap, and to advance by the Valley road to join me at Rogers' Gap. On the 10th instant I instructed him to send a party of 200 men under a cool-headed and daring officer to burn the railroad bridge over the Tennessee at Loudon. The expedition was undertaken, but was not successful, as Loudon was occupied by two regiments of the enemy. However, the party fell back without loss. On the 9th instant I received at Lambdin's a telegram from Major-General Buell, informing me that Negley was fully employed in Middle Tennessee and could give me no assistance; that he was opposite Chattanooga, but that his stay could not be depended upon, and that the force now in Tennessee was so small that no offensive operations against East Tennessee could be attempted, and therefore that I must depend mainly on my own resources. I replied that it was too late to change my plans; that my advance guard was already at the foot of the Cumberland Mountains, and that a bold and determined policy on my part was the only prudent one. On the 11th instant I descended the south side of the Cumberland Mountains with De Courcy's advance guard. The entire day and the day following were occupied in making the passage of the mountain ridge-miscalled a “gap” --and at dark on the night of the 12th instant some of the cannon had not yet reached the summit of the mountain. On that night, while in the act of giving directions as to the destruction of the railroad bridges at Strawberry Plains and Mossy Creek, I received the second telegram of General Buell, dated on the 9th instant, as also that of the date of the 10th instant. It had been my intention to have advanced against Cumberland Gap on the following day with the brigades of Spears, Baird, and De Courcy, but I no longer felt at liberty to do so, and ordered a countermarch upon Williamsburg. I dispatched three couriers to General Spears, one of whom reached him, ordering him to fall back. On the morning of the 13th I was again at Lambdin's, to which point I hastened to meet Carter's column. Soon after my arrival I received a note from Colonel De Courcy (whose brigade had not been able to leave PowelPs V alley in consequence of the narrow road being blocked up by the 30-pounders, which had not yet descended the mountain) saying that there was a rumor that the enemy was evacuating Cumberland Gap. I also received a telegram from Major-General Buell, dated on the 11th instant at his headquarters, beyond Corinth, stating that Mitchel was instructed as far as possible to threaten Chattanooga, but that I would “have to depend mainly upon my own ability to beat the force opposed to me.” Acting upon this information and the telegram last mentioned, which I construed into a permission to act on my own discretion, I determined to resume the offensive. Carter was still at Lambdin's, but the head of his column was 12 miles in advance. I instructed  him to proceed to join me at Rogers' Gap, by way of Big Creek Gap, and directed General Spears to await his arrival and then march up the valley to join me. Baird's brigade, which had returned to. Lambdin's, was ordered to again breast the mountain, and inspired by the admirable example of their commander, and roused at the prospect of going to the front, they cheerfully obeyed the order. Early on the morning of the 14th I was again in Powells Valley, and Baird's brigade arrived there on the 15th and marched down the mountain to the air of “Dixie,” played by the band of Coburn's Thirtythird Indiana. I here received a dispatch from Spears, inclosing a letter from Colonel Carter, of the rebel cavalry, dated Cumberland Gap, June 11, 1862, and addressed to Major Bean, as follows: Major Bean: Maintain your position, if you possibly can, until to-morrow. The general intends sending a force of artillery and infantry down the valley early in the morning to attack the enemy. General Barton's force is on its way back into the valley. Dispatch to Colonel Allston immediately the intention of the general to move a force down the valley in the morning, and tell him that General Stevenson wishes him (Colonel Allston) to dispatch to General Barton the same thing immediately. The dispatch should go by way of Clinton, if possible, as General Barton will soon move by that route. This post will not be evacuated-at least not now. By command of Lieut. Col. J. E. Carter: J. D. Carter, Adjutant Seventy-enth. The enemy was sorely in doubt as to what course to pursue, and evidently greatly exaggerated my strength, which is reported in the rebel papers at 50,000 men. I had now at the foot of Rogers' Gap the brigades of Baird and De Courcy, and as the valley was occupied by the enemy's cavalry I ordered the supply trains to the rear, and was compelled to subsist upon the foe. I felt all the responsibility of my position, for I had adopted my plan of operations contrary to the opinions of three of my brigade commanders, all of whom I hold in high esteem. I had not the opportunity to consult General Spears, who was at the foot of Pine Mountain when I determined upon the line of operations I had resolved to pursue. Hence I was anxious for the arrival of Spears and Carter, the head of whose columns were soon seen to approach from the direction of Fincastle. Spears marched without wagons and without tents, and it would be doing injustice alike to him and to myself not to express my high appreciation of the prompt and soldierly energy he has always displayed in aiding me to execute my plans. His brigade has acted an important part in the strategic game which has been played along these mountains during the past six weeks. Immediately upon the arrival of Carter and Spears I wished to advance upon the enemy, understood to be in position at Thomas' farm, 8 or 9 miles on the Valley road towards the Gap, but Carter had performed a most trying and difficult march of 75 miles, and Spears had cleared the blockade at Big Creek Gap immediately before marching. One day was therefore devoted to rest and preparations for the struggle expected to take place on the following day. Herewith I have the honor to inclose my order of march and plan of attack, and also the reports of brigade commanders and separate corps. I determined to advance upon two parallel roads — the old and new Valley roads, the latter of which starts from the Knoxville road nearly opposite Rogers' Gap, and intersects the old Valley road at Thomas', as indicated in the accompanying map embracing the square of my operations.2 The hour designated for the march was 1 o'clock on the morning  of the 18th, and by 3 o'clock in the morning the rear guards of the two columns were on the march. I feel that I have a right to be proud of the admirable order and promptness with which the noble troops of my division marched out to meet a foe they had good reason to believe was much stronger numerically than themselves. And so I believed myself, but I felt the assurance of victory, though I did not underrate either the gallantry or skill of the enemy. Had Kirby Smith been personally in command we should have had a battle; but it was evident to me that the actual general in command felt uncertain of the ground upon which he stood. Rains, a gallant and dashing officer, was in our immediate front, and Barton was a few miles from our right flank, while Stevenson was in supporting distance. But on arriving at Thomas' we found that the enemy had retreated in hot haste, and after a short halt the march was resumed, and the advance brigade, under De Courcy, took possession of the Gap at about 2 o'clock p. m., the rear guard of the enemy having evacuated the fortress at 10 o'clock a. m. The same afternoon the national colors were unfurled, and a national salute was fired from the summit of the Gap by De Courcy's brigade; and, by a general order, each brigade was authorized to unfurl its colors amid the roar of cannon upon the pinnacle of the mountain, for the honor belongs equally to all. Well, the Gap is ours and without the loss of a single life. I have since carefully examined the works, and I believe that the place could have been taken in a ten days struggle from the front, but to have done so I should have left the bones of two-thirds of my gallant comrades to bleach upon the mountain-side, and, after all, this fastness, all stained with heroic blood, would only have been what it now is, a fortress of the Union, from whose highest peak floats the Stars and Stripes. The result secured by strategy is less brilliant than a victory obtained amid the storm and hurricane of battle, but humanity has gained all that glory has lost, and I am satisfied. I am, and the country should be, grateful to Brigadier-Generals Spears, Baird, and Carter and to Colonel De Courcy for their able and efficient services, and to the gallant officers and soldiers of their respective commands. Three of my brigades are commanded by brigadier-generals and the fourth by Col. John F. De Courcy, whom I again respectfully but earnestly recommend for the commission of brigadier-general. He is an accomplished and well-trained soldier, who came from a distant land to share the fortunes of the Union in this unnatural struggle against her existence. Generosity and justice alike demand his promotion. Great credit is also due to the commanders of regiments, to whose earnest aid and cheerful compliance with every order I owe so much. I cannot but feel some regret that they bad not an opportunity to acquire in the field the laurels which they are so worthy to wear. But I refer you to the reports of the commanders of separate corps for a narrative of the meritorious services of those officers. In this connection I must mention in terms of commendation Lieut. Col. Reuben Munday, with his battalion of Kentucky cavalry. This brave little band have performed the most arduous duties without a murmur, doing picket duty and acting as scouts for the entire division. They were also very efficient as advance and rear guard on the march to this place. The highest praise is also due to my personal staff for their unremitting devotion to the interests of the service, and I therefore commend Capt. C. O. Joline, assistant adjutant-general, chief of staff; Capt. S. S. Lyon, acting topographical engineer; Maj. M. C. Garber, division quartermaster, and Capt. G. M. Adams, commissary  of subsistence, for the immense aid they have given me during the period of my command, and had their services been less zealous and efficient I could not have advanced. Lieuts. E. D. Saunders, C. S. Medary, and R. Montgomery, my aides-de-camp, are also commended to the kindly notice of the Government. My special thanks are also due to Capt. S. B. Brown, assistant quartermaster at Lexington, Ky. (who has performed to my great satisfaction duties which should have devolved on at least three officers); Capt. J. H. Ferry, assistant quartermaster at Flat Lick, Ky., who suggested to me by telegraph an excellent diversion which he proposed to make in my favor, by marching a force of convalescent soldiers to the front of the Gap, as though intending an assault, while I was attacking the place in the rear. It affords me great pleasure to indorse all that Colonel De Courcy has said in commendation of his acting brigade quartermaster, Lieut. J. D. Stubbs, Forty-second Regiment Ohio Volunteers. I am also deeply indebted to Lieut. H. G. Fisher and his corps of signal officers; to Lieut. C. H. Rogers, of the First Tennessee, for many acts of daring service, and to Capt. W. G. Fuller, superintendent of the military telegraph. He has always been efficient, and his telegraphic line has nearly kept pace with the advance of my column. Nor can I close this report without expressing my deep obligations to Capt. W. F. Patterson and the men of his command. He has rendered me constant and invaluable services during the two past months in making roads and constructing bridges on the various routes upon which my troops have moved and supplies have been received. His company was organized by the Military Board of Kentucky, but from some cause was not mustered into the service of the United States, though it has been performing the most arduous services under the command of different generals of the United States Army. General Thomas detailed Captain Patterson's command on extra duty while he commanded in the vicinity of Somerset, and for more than two months he has been discharging similar duty under my command. His company has never been paid, and I respectfully request authority to muster Captain Patterson and his company into the service of the United States. Had the enemy not evacuated I should have taken up a position 2 miles in his rear and pounded him with my heavy guns and cut off his supplies until he should be forced to abandon his stronghold and give us a fair fight in an open field. I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully your obedient servant,