No. 8.-report of Maj. Gen. B. Kirby Smith, C. S. Army, including orders for movement of troops.
headquarters Department of East Tennessee, Knoxville, Tenn., April 30, 1862.The enemy attacked Cumberland Gap yesterday in force. I go to-day to re-enforce General Stevenson with all my available troops. Yesterday the enemy attacked General Leadbetter's command at Bridgeport. It was necessary to retreat, and the bridge there was burned by Genm eral Leadbetter.
Cumberland Gap. Move with all your disposable force toward Jacksborough. I will overtake you to-night or to-morrow morning. You will withdraw all the cavalry, except one company at Clinton and Cobb's Ferry, respectively. Those remaining will be directed to keep up communication with this point, and also to communicate to you across the country any important intelligence. You will take with you, if practicable, six or seven days rations, but be careful to have the wagons in condition to travel lightly. The troops should be without impediments and in fighting order. If the steamboat is at Clinton you will keep it there. Respectfully, your obedient servant,
major-general commanding has received your dispatch of the 28th instant, and directs me to inform you that he will move immediately with all his disposable force up Powells Valley to your assistance. He will be to-morrow at Jacksborough. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
Jacksborough and join Brigadier General Barton. Leave a sufficient force at Kingston.
Colonel: You will move your regiment immediately to the railroad depot, where a train awaits to transport it to the terminus of the Ken tucky Railroad. From that point you will proceed to Clinton, Tenn., and report to Brigadier-General Barton. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, H. L. Clay, Assistant Adjutant-General.
headquarters, Fincastle, Teen., May 3, 1862.Major: Since their repulse at Cumberland Gap, on the 29th ultimo, the enemy have made no demonstration at that point. My intelligence is tnat they are removing the obstructions in the Big Creek Gap road west of Fincastle. With my effective force here (1,500) I shall operate through the mountain on their rear, which is beyond support from the main body at Cumberland Ford. Small as my command at this point is, it is all the disposable force in the department, and was collected from every direction to co-operate with General Stevenson at Cumberland Gap. The Georgia regiments ordered to this department were weak when reported; they have since been so reduced by measles, mumps, and typhoid fever that they do not average an effective strength of 300. Besides their numerical weakness, they are disheartened by sickness and its effects. The troops lately raised in Tennessee are in the same condition. When my intelligence became conclusive that the enemy were concentrating for an attack on Cumberland Gap, I telegraped General Marshall and asked his co-operation. He replied that his command, all told, did not number 1,000, and that he was inclined to doubt the accuracy of my information, having been so often deceived himself, &c. In its present condition I can expect no assistance from General Marshall's command. Whilst the people of East Tennessee believe my force to be large and effective, to the department alone have I exposed its weakness and inefficiency. I shall resist the enemy's entrance into East Tennessee with all the means at my disposal, but with the people in my midst enlisted against me, and with a force of at least four to one, more efficient and better equipped, it will be alone assistance from on High that enables us to maintain possession of the department. In case of any irretrievable disaster, I have given instructions to the chiefs of departments for the quiet and speedy removal of all their stores. Respectfully, your obedient servant,