[104]
There are, generally
speaking, two sorts of jest: the one, coarse, rude,
vicious, indecent; the other, refined, polite, clever,
witty. With this latter sort not only our own
Plautus and the Old Comedy of Athens, but also
the books of Socratic philosophy abound; and we
have many witty sayings of many men—like those
collected by old Cato under the title of Bons Mots
(or Apophthegms). So the distinction between the
elegant and the vulgar jest is an easy matter: the
one kind, if well timed (for instance, in hours of
mental relaxation), is becoming to the most dignified
person; the other is unfit for any gentleman, if the
subject is indecent and the words obscene.
Then, too, certain bounds must be observed in
our amusements and we must be careful not to
carry things too far and, swept away by our passions,
lapse into some shameful excess. Our Campus,
however, and the amusements of the chase are
examples of wholesome recreation.
M. Tullius Cicero. De Officiis. With An English Translation. Walter Miller. Cambridge. Harvard University Press; Cambridge, Mass., London, England. 1913.
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