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twenty-six wagons, and camp-equipage, clothing, and other military property.
The Southern infantry had great advantage over the Northern in their greater familiarity with firearms.
It was the reverse, however, in relation to the artillery; for that of the South had had neither time nor ammunition for practice, while much of that of the North belonged to the regular service.
Still, ours, directed principally by Colonel Pendleton, was more effective even than the regular batteries of the United States army, in that battle.
The pursuit was pressed as long as it was effective.
But when the main column of retreating infantry was encountered, after the parties in its rear and on the flanks had been dispersed or captured, our cavalry found itself too weak to make any serious impression, and returned with the prisoners already taken.
The infantry was not required to pursue far from the field, because by doing so it would have been harassed to no purpose.
It is well known that infantry, unencumbered by baggage-trains, can easily escape pursuing infantry.
The victory was as complete as one gained by infantry and artillery only can be.
The Army of the Potomac, exclusive of the garrison of the intrenched position at Manassas Junction, amounted then to about nineteen thousand men of all arms.
A large proportion of it was not engaged in the battle.
This was a great fault on my part.
When Bee's and Jackson's brigades were ordered to the vicinity of the Stone Bridge, those of Holmes and Early should have been moved to the left also, and placed in the interval on Bonham's left
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