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would be attacked on the right and left flanks very early next morning, I gave orders to General Hays to move his brigade, under cover of the night, from the town into the field on the left of it, where it would not be exposed to the enemy's fire, and would be in position to advance on Cemetery Hill when a favorable opportunity should occur.
This movement was made, and Hays formed his brigade on the right of Avery, and just behind the extension of the low ridge on which a portion of the town is located.
The attack did not begin in the morning of next day, as was expected, and in the course of the morning I rode with Gen. Ewell to examine and select a position for artillery.
Here is a statement of a fact while its recollection was fresh in my memory, and it cannot surely be said that it was made for the purpose of attacking
General Longstreet's war record “because of political differences,” or from any other motive.
On the 19th of January, 1872, the anniversary of
General Lee's birth, I delivered an address at Washington and Lee University, by invitation of the faculty, and in that address, after speaking of the fight on the 1st at
Gettysburg, I said:
General Lee had ordered the concentration of his army at Cashtown, and the battle on this day, brought on by the advance of the enemy's cavalry, was unexpected to him. When he ascertained the advantage that had been gained, he determined to press it as soon as the remainder of his army arrived.
In a conference with General Ewell, General Rodes and myself, when he did reach us, after the enemy had been routed, he expressed his determination to assault the enemy's position at daylight on the next morning, and wished to know whether we could make the attack from our flank — the left-at the designated time.
We informed him of the fact that the ground immediately in our front, leading to the enemy's position, furnished much greater obstacles to a successful assault than existed at any other point, and we concurred in suggesting to him that, as our corps (Ewell's) constituted the only troops then immediately confronting the enemy, he would manifestly concentrate and fortify against us during the night, as proved to be the case, according to subsequent information.
He then determined to make the attack from our right on the enemy's left, and left us for the purpose of ordering up Longstreet's corps in time to begin the attack at dawn next morning.
That corps was not in readiness to make the attack until 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day. By that time Mleade's whole army had arrived on the field and taken its position.
Had the attack been made at daylight, as contemplated, it must have resulted in a brilliant victory, as all of Meade's army had not then arrived, and a
