You will observe from General Lee's report, already referred to, that the attack was to have been made by the whole of Longstreet's corps, and Ewell was to have assailed the enemy's right at the same time, for which latter purpose Johnson had been reinforced by two brigades from Rodes' division and one from mine. Johnson did become engaged about daybreak, the time, Ewell says, that had been designated for the combined attack. Had Longstreet's three divisions moved to the attack at the same time, while Hill had his three divisions ready to support that attack, I verily believe that it would have been successful; but there was again a great delay on our right, and the attack there did not begin until after 2 P. M. In the meantime, Johnson had been compelled to retire from the attack made by him, on account of the accumulation of forces against him, which ought to have been employed by the attacking force from our right. When the attack was made by Pickett's division, and the division and two brigades from Hill's corps, the victory for sometime hung in the balance, and our troops got into the enemy's lines, but were repulsed by reinforcements brought from the enemy's right, which could not have been spared if the attack had been simultaneous with that of Johnson. If this failure of co-operation had been anticipated, of course it would have been injudicious to order the attack; but there was no good reason at the time to expect any such failure. When any movement of any kind is attended with failure, it is a very easy thing to condemn it, and declare that it should never have been made; but in order to judge of the propriety of making the attacks on the 2d and 3d, we should consider the circumstances and conditions under which those attacks were ordered, and not merely their failure from other circumstances and conditions beyond the control of the Commander-in-Chief. Gen. Longstreet's long delay on the 3d seems to have been based mainly on the idea that his right flank was in danger from a body of troops on the enemy's extreme left. By examining the testimony of Gen. Pleasanton before the Committee
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Table of Contents:
Battle of Kelleysville , March 17th , 1863 -Reports of Generals J. E. B. Stuart and Fitz. Lee .
Causes of the defeat of Gen. Lee 's Army at the battle of Gettysburg -opinions of leading Confederate soldiers.
Letter from Gen J. A. Early .
Causes of the Confederate defeat at Gettysburg .
Letter from General E. P. Alexander , late Chief of artillery First corps , A. N. V .
Leading Confederates on the battle of Gettysburg .
Letter from General John B. Hood .
Official Reports of the battle of Gettysburg .
Report of General Patton Anderson of operations of his division from 30th of July to 31st of August , 1864 , including the battle of Jonesboro , Georgia .
The peace Commission .-letter from Ex-President Davis .
Letter from Hon. J. P. Benjamin .
Farewell address of Brigadier-General R. L. Gibson to the Louisiana brigade after the terms of surrender had been agreed upon between Lieut.-Gen. Richard Taylor , C. S. A. , and Major-Gen. E. R. S. Canby , U. S. A.
Reminiscences of torpedo service in Charleston Harbor by W. T. Glassel , Commander Confederate States Navy.
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