Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 4.
Reverend J. William Jones, Ed.

Two of the corps commanders (Ewell arid Hill) were new in their places. Longstreet's attack on the Federal left on the 2d was delayed beyond the expected time, and was not promptly seconded by Hill and Ewell when made. Ewell's divisions were not made to act in concert-Johnson, Early, Rodes attacking in succession. It is difficult to decide where the weight of responsibility for these failures rests, and I shall not attempt it. General Lee always expressed the strongest conviction that if the Confederate corps had attacked General Meade simultaneously.on either day, he would have succeeded in overthrowing the Federal army. I-e declared that “victory trembled in the balance” up to the final repulse of Pickett, and that a united effort, at any hour, would have secured it. Hie said once to me that he had used every effort to obtain the necessary concert of action, but had failed. He said that he consulted Ewell, and told him if he could not carry his part of the line, he would move his corps to the right of Longstreet and threaten the Federal communications with Baltimore, but upon the statement of Generals Ewell and Ed. Johnson that the positions in their fronts could be carried, he did not change his plan. Assured of his ability to carry the Federal lines, and having gained decided successes on both the 1st and 2d days, it is easy to see why Lee, instead of drawing off and changing his mode of attack, should devote all his energies to a supreme effort with his entire army. He urged concert of action on the 3d; but Johnson's division fought and suffered in the morning alone, and Pickett's attack in the afternoon was unsupported. There was nothing “foolish” in Pickett's attack had it been executed as designed. Pickett carried the works before him. Had Pettigrew and Wilcox moved with him, and Hill and Ewell vigorously seconded this onset, General Lee never doubted that the Federal army would have been ruined. It was this great prize, which he believed within his grasp, that induced him to fight the battle as he did, and not to adopt the more cautious plan of merely manoeuvreing Meade away from his position by threatening his communications.