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Second paper by Colonel Walter H. Taylor, of General Lee's staff.

[The following paper by Colonel Taylor has just appeared in the Philadelphia Times and, although it repeats the points made in his “Memorandum” published in our August number, yet, as it enters more fully into details which came under the observation of this accomplished officer, whose close relations to General Lee make his statements of such great value, we deem it best to give it a place in our Gettysburg series.]

From the very necessity of the case, the general theory upon which the war was conducted on the part of the South was one of defence. The great superiority of the North in men and material made it indispensable for the South to husband its resources as much as possible, inasmuch as the hope of ultimate success which the latter entertained, rested rather upon the dissatisfaction and pecuniary distress which a prolonged war would entail upon the former-making the people weary of the struggle-than upon any expectation of conquering a peace by actually subduing so powerful an adversary. Nevertheless, in the judgment of General Lee, it was a part of a true defensive policy to take the aggressive when good opportunity offered; and by delivering an effective blow to the enemy, not only to inflict upon him serious loss, but --at the same time to thwart his designs of invasion, derange the plan of campaign contemplated by him, and thus prolong the conflict. The Federal army, under General I-looker, had reoccupied the heights opposite Fredericksburg, where it could not be attacked except at a disadvantage. Instead of quietly awaiting the pleasure of the Federal commander in designing and putting into execution some new plan of campaign, General Lee determined to manoeuvre to draw him from his impregnable position and if possible to remove the scene of hostilities beyond the Potomac. His design was to free the State of Virginia, for a time at least, from the presence of the enemy, to transfer the theatre of war to Northern soil, and, by selecting a favorable time and place in which to receive the attack which his adversary would be compelled to make on him, to take the reasonable chances of defeating him in a pitched battle; knowing full well that to obtain such .an advantage there would place him in position to attain far more decisive results than could be hoped for from a like advantage [125] gained in Virginia. But even if unable to attain the valuable results which might be expected to follow a decided advantage gained over the enemy in Maryland or Pennsylvania, it was thought that the movement would at least so far disturb the Federal plan for the summer campaign as to prevent its execution during the season for active operations.

In pursuance of this design, early in the month of June, General Lee moved his army northward by way of Culpeper, and thence to and down the Valley of Virginia to Winchester. The army had been reorganized into three army corps, designated the First, Second and Third corps, and commanded respectively by Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, Ewell and A. P. Hill. The Seeonl corps was in advance, and crossed the branches of the Shenandoah, near Front Royal, on the 12th of June. Brushing aside the force of the enemy, under General Milroy, that occupied the lower Valley-most of which was captured and the remnant of which sought refuge in the fortifications at Harper's Ferry-General Ewell crossed the Potomac river with his three divisions in the latter part of June, and, in pursuance of the orders of General Lee, traversed Maryland and advanced into Pennsylvania. General A. P. Hill, whose corps was the last to leave the line of the Rappahannock, followed with his three divisions in Ewell's rear. General Longstreet covered these movements with his corps; then moved by Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps into the Valley and likewise crossed the Potomac river, leaving to General Stuart the task of holding the gaps of the Blue Ridge mountains with his corps of cavalry. The Federal commander had meanwhile moved his army so as to cover Washington city; and, as soon as he was thoroughly informed, by Ewell's rapid advance, of the real intention of his adversary, he too crossed into Maryland. On the 27th of June General Lee was near Chambersburg with the First and Third corps, the Second being still in advance, but within supporting distance. With the exception of the cavalry, the army was well in hand. The absence of that indispensable arm of the service was most seriously felt by General Lee. He had directed General Stuart to use his discretion as to where and when to cross the river — that is, he was to cross east of the mountains, or retire through the mountain passes into the Valley and cross in the immediate rear of the infantry, as the movements of the enemy and [126] his own judgment should determine-but he was expected to maintain communication with the main column, and especially directed to keep the Commanding-General informed of the movements of the Federal army.

The army continued to advance. On the 1st of July General Lee reached Cashtown and stopped to confer with General A. P. Hill, whose corps was concentrating at that point, and who reported that the advance of Heth's division had encountered the cavalry of the enemy near Gettysburg. Instructions had been sent to General Heth to ascertain what force was at Gettysburg, and, if he found infantry opposed to him, to report the fact immediately, without forcing an engagement. No tidings whatever had been received from or of our cavalry under General Stuart since crossing the river; and General Lee was consequently without accurate information of the movements or position of the main Federal army. An army without cavalry in a strange and hostile country is as a man deprived of his eyesight and beset by enemies; he may be ever so brave and strong, but he cannot intelligently administer a single effective blow. The soand of artillery was soon heard in the direction of Gettysburg. General Hill hastened to the front. General Lee followed. On arriving at the scene of battle, General Lee ascertained that the enemy's infantry and artillery were present in considerable force. Heth's division was already hotly engaged, and it was soon evident that a serious engagement could not be avoided. Orders had previously been sent to General Ewell to recall his advanced divisions, and to concentrate about Cashtown. While en route for that point, on the morning of the 1st of July, General Ewell learned that Hill's corps was moving toward Gettysburg, and, on arriving at Middletown, he turned the head of his column in that direction. When within a few miles of the town, General Rodes, whose division was in advance, was made aware, by the sharp cannonading, of the presence of the enemy in force at Gettysburg, and caused immediate preparations for battle to be made.

On reaching the scene of conflict, General Rodes made his dispositions to assail the force with which Hill's troops were engaged, but no sooner were his lines formed than he perceived fresh troops of the enemy extending their right flank, and deploying in his immediate front. With this force he was soon actively engaged. [127] The contest now became sharp and earnest. Neither side sought or expected a general engagement; and yet, brought thus unexpectedly in the presence of each other, found a conflict unavoidable. The battle continued, with varying success, until perhaps 3 P. M., when General Early, of Ewell's corps, reached the field with his division, moved in on Rodes' left, and attacked the enemy with his accustomed vigor and impetuosity. This decided the contest. The enemy's right gave way under Early's assault. Pender's division, of Hill's corps, had meanwhile been advanced to relieve that of Heth; and Rodes, observing the effect of Early's attack, ordered his line forward. There resulted a general and irresistible advance of our entire line; the enemy gave way at all points, and were driven in disorder through and beyond the town of Gettysburg, leaving over five thousand prisoners in our hands. In this action the force engaged on the Confederate side, as already stated, consisted of the divisions of Heth and Pender, of Hill's corps, and those of Early and Rodes, of Ewell's corps. On the side of the Federals there was the First corps, embracing the divisions of Wadsworth, Doubleday and Robinson; the Eleventh corps, embracing the divisions of Schurz, Barlow and Steinwehr; and the cavalry force under General Buford. The infantry force on each side was about the same, and the preponderance in numbers was with the Federals, to the extent of General Buford's cavalry command.

General Lee witnessed the flight of the Federals through Gettysburg and up the hills beyond. He then directed me to go to General Ewell and to say to him that, from the position which he occupied, he could see the enemy retreating over those hills, without organization and in great confusion; that it was only necessary to press “those people” in order to secure possession of the heights, and that, if possible, he wished him to do this. In obedience to these instructions, I proceeded immediately to General Ewell and delivered the order of General Lee; and, after receiving from him some message for the Commanding-General in regard to the prisoners captured, returned to the latter and reported that his order had been delivered. General Ewell did not express any objection, or indicate the existence of any impediment, to the execution of the order conveyed to him, but left the impression upon my mind that it would be executed. In the exercise of that discretion, [128] however, which General Lee was accustomed to accord to his lieutenants, and probably because of an undue regard for his admonition, given early in the day, not to precipitate a general engagement, General Ewell deemed it unwise to make the pursuit. The troops were not moved forward, and the enemy proceeded to occupy and fortify.the position which it was designed that General Ewell should seize. Major-General Edward Johnson, whose division reached the field after the engagement, and formed on the left of Early, in a conversation had with me, since the war, about this circumstance, in which I sought an explanation of our inaction at that time, assured me that there was no hindrance to his moving forward; but that, after getting his command in line of battle, and before it became seriously engaged or had advanced any great distance, for some unexplained reason, he had received orders to halt. This was after General Lee's message was delivered to General Ewell.

Such was the condition of affairs when darkness veiled the scene on the evening of the first day. The prevailing idea with General Lee was, to press forward without delay; to follow up promptly and vigorously the advantage already gained. Having failed to reap the full fruit of the victory bQfore night, his mind was evidently occupied with the idea of renewing the assault upon the enemy's right with the dawn of day on the second. The divisions of Major-Generals Early and Rodes, of Ewell's corps, had been actively engaged, and had sustained some loss, but were still in excellent condition, and in the full enjoyment of the prestige of success and a consequent elation of spirit, in having so gallantly swept the enemy from their front, through the town of Gettysburg, and compelled him to seek refuge behind the heights beyond. The division of Major-General Edward Johnson, of the same corps, was perfectly fresh, not having been engaged. Anderson's division, of Hill's corps, was also now up. With this force General Lee thought that the enemy's position could be assailed with every prospect of success; but, after a conference with the corps and division commanders on our left, who represented that, in their judgment, it would be hazardous to attempt to storm the strong position occupied by the enemy, with troops somewhat fagged by the marching and fighting of the first day; that the ground in their immediate front furnished greater obstacles to a successful [129] assault than existed at other points of the line, and that it could be reasonably concluded, since they had so severely handled the enemy in their front, that he would concentrate and fortify with special reference to resisting a further advance just there, he determined to make the main attack well on the enemy's left, indulging the hope that Longstreet's corps would be up in time to begin the movement at an early hour on the second. He instructed General Ewell to be prepared to co-operate by a simultaneous advance by his corps. General Longstreet was unexpectedly detained, however, as will best appear from the following extract from his report of the Gettysburg campaign. In speaking of his movements on the first day of July, he says:

Our march on this day was greatly delayed by Johnson's division, of the Second corps, which came into the road from Shippensburg, and the long wagon trains that followed him. McLaws' division, however, reached Marsh creek, four miles from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and Hood's division got within nearly the same distance of the town about 12 o'clock at night. Law's brigade was ordered forward to its division during the day, and joined it about noon on the second. Previous to his joining I received instructions from the Commanding-General to move with the portion of my command that was up around to gain the Emmettsburg road on the enemy's left. The enemy, having been driven back by the corps of Lieutenant-Generals Ewell and A. P. Hill the day previous, had taken a strong position, extending from the hill at the Cemetery along the Emmettsburg road. Fearing that my force was too weak to venture to make an attack, I delayed until General Law's brigade joined its division. As soon after his arrival as we could make our preparations, the movement was begun. Engineers, sent out by the Commanding-General and myself, guided us by a road which would have completely disclosed the move. Some delay ensued in seeking a more concealed route. McLaws' division got into position opposite the enemy's left about 4 P. M. Hood's division was moved on farther to our right, and got into position, partially enveloping the enemy's left.

General Longstreet here explains the cause of the delay in bringing up his troops on the first day; but, notwithstanding this, the divisions of Hood and McLaws (with the exception of Law's brigade) encamped within four miles of Gettysburg at midnight [130] of the 1st of July. He then received instructions to move with the portion of his command that was then up, to gain the Emmettsburg road on the enemy's left; but fearing that his force was too weak to venture to make an attack, he delayed until Law's brigade joined its division — about noon on the second. In this, General Longstreet clearly admits that he assumed the responsibility of postponing the execution of the orders of the Commanding-General. Owing to the causes assigned, the troops were not in position to attack until 4 P. M. One can imagine what was going on in the Federal lines meanwhile. Round Top, the key to their position, which was not occupied in the morning, they now held in force, and another corps (Sedgwick's) had reached the field. Late as it was, the original plan was adhered to. The two divisions of Longstreet's corps gallantly advanced, forced the enemy back a considerable distance, and captured some trophies and prisoners. Ewell's divisions were ordered forward, and likewise gained additional ground and trophies. On Cemetery Hill the attack by Early's leading brigades was made with vigor. They drove the enemy back into the works on the crest, into which they forced their way, and seized several pieces of artillery; but they were compelled to relinquish what they had gained, from want of expected support on their right, and retired to their original position, bringing with them some prisoners and four stands of colors. In explanation of this lack of expected support, General Rodes, who was on General Early's right, states in his report that after he had conferred. with General Early on his left, and General Lane on his right, and arranged to attack in concert, he proceeded at once to make the necessary preparations; but as he had to draw his troops out of the town by the flank, change the direction of the line of battle, and then traverse a distance of twelve or fourteen hundred yards, while General Early had to move only half that distance, without change of front, it resulted that, before he drove in the enemy's skirmishers, General Early had attacked, and been compelled to withdraw.

The whole affair was disjointed. There was an utter absence of accord in the movements of the several commands, and no decisive result attended the operations of the second day. It is generally conceded that General Longstreet, on this occasion, was fairly chargeable with tardiness, and I have always thought that his [131] conduct, in this particular, was due to a lack of appreciation on his part of the circumstances which created an urgent and peculiar need for the presence of his troops at the front. As soon as the necessity for the concentration of the army was precipitated by the unexpected encounter on the first of July with a large force of the enemy near Gettysburg, General Longstreet was urged to hasten his march, and this, perhaps, should have sufficed to cause him to push his divisions on toward Gettysburg, from which point he was distant but four miles, early on the second; but I cannot say that he was notified, on the night of the first, of the attack proposed to be made on the morning of the second, and the part his corps was to take therein. Neither do I think it just to charge that he was alone responsible for the delay in attacking that ensued after his arrival on the field. I well remember how General Lee was chafed by the non-appearance of the troops, until he finally became restless, and rode back to meet General Longstreet, and urge him forward; but, then, there was considerable delay in putting the troops to work after they reached the field and much time was spent in discussing what was to be done, which, perhaps, could not be avoided. At any rate, it would be unreasonable to hold General Longstreet alone accountable for this. Indeed, great injustice has been done him in the charge that he had orders from the Commanding-General to attack the enemy at sunrise on the second of July, and that he disobeyed these orders. This would imply that he was in position to attack, whereas General Lee but anticipated his early arrival on the second, and based his calculations upon it. I have shown how he was disappointed, and I need hardly add that the delay was fatal.

General Lee determined to renew the attack upon the enemy's position on the third day of July. In his report of the campaign, in speaking of the operations of the second day, he says:

The result of this day's operations induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed; and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field during the afternoon of the second, was ordered to attack the next morning; and General [132] Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time.

General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected; it appears that he was delayed by apprehensions that his troops would be taken in reverse as they advanced. General Ewell, who had orders to co-operate with General Longstreet, and who was, of course, not aware of any impediment to the main attack arranged to be mode on the enemy's left, having reinforced General Johnsan, whose division was upon our extreme left during the night of the second, ordered him forward early the next morning. In obedience to these instructions General Johnson became hotly engaged before General Ewell could be informed of the halt which had been called on our right. After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to abandon part of his entrenchments, General Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly-fortified crest of the hill. The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to that of General Johnson, and finally to threaten his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original position about 1 P. M. General Lee then had a conference with General Longstreet, and the mode of attack and the troops to make it were thoroughly debated. I was present, and understood the arrangements to be that General Longstreet should endeavor to force the enemy's lines in his front. That front was held by the divisions of Hood and McLaws. To strengthen him for the undertaking, it was decided to reinforce him by such troops as could be drawn from the center.

Pickett's division, of Longstreet's corps, was then up, fresh and available. Heth's division, of Hill's corps, was also mentioned as available, having in great measure recuperated since its active engagement of the first day; so, also, were the brigades of Lane and Scales, of Pender's division, Hill's corps; and as our extreme right was comparatively safe, being well posted, and not at all threatened, one of the divisions of Hood and McLaws, and the greater portion of the other, could be moved out of the lines and be made to take part in the attack. Indeed, it was designed originally that the two divisions last named, reinforced by Pickett, should make the attack; and it was only because of the apprehensions of General Longstreet that his corps was not strong enough for the [133] movement, that General Hill was called on to reinforce him. Orders were sent to General Hill to place Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's at General Longstreet's disposal, and to be prepared to give him further assistance if requested. The assault was to have been made with a column of not less than two divisions, and the remaining divisions were to have been moved forward in support of those in advance. This was the result of the conference alluded to as understood by me. Lieutenant-General A. P. Hill appears to have had the same impression, for he says in his report of the operations of his corps at this time:

I was directed to hold my line with Anderson's division and the half of Pender's, now commanded by General Lane, and to order Heth's division, commanded by Pettigrew, and Lane's and Scales' brigades, of Pender's division, to report to Lieutenant-,General Longstreet as a support to his corps, in the assault on the enemy's lines.

General Longstreet proceeded at once to make the dispositions for attack, and General Lee rode along the portion of the line held by A. P. Hill's corps, and finally took position about the Confederate center, on an elevated point, from which he could survey the field and watch the result of the movement. After a heavy artillery fire along the entire line, and at a given signal, the movement began, but the plan agreed on was not carried out. The only troops that participated in the attack were the divisions of Pickett (First corps) and Heth (Third corps)-the latter, since the wounding of General Heth, commanded by General Pettigrewand the brigades of Lane, Scales and Wilcox. The two divisions were formed in advance — the three brigades as their support. The divisions of Hood and McLaws (First corps) were passive spectators of the movement. To one who observed the charge, it appeared that Pettigrew's line was not a continuation of that of Pickett, but that it advanced in echelon. It would seem that there was some confusion in forming the troops, for Captain Louis G. Young, of General Pettigrew's staff, says:

On the morning of the third of July, General Pettigrew, commanding Heth's division, was instructed to report to General Long-,street, who directed him to form in the rear of Pickett's division, and support his advance upon Cemetery Hill, which would be commenced as soon as the fire from our artillery should have driven [134] the enemy from his guns and prepared the way for attack. And I presume that it was in consequence of this having been the first plan settled on, that the erroneous report was circulated that Heth's division was assigned the duty of supporting that of Pickett. But the order referred to was countermanded almost as soon as given, and General Pettigrew was instructed to advance upon the same line with Pickett, a portion of Pender's division acting as supports.

Wilcox's brigade was ordered to support Pickett's right flank, and the brigades of Lane and Scales acted as supports to Heth's division. General Lane, in his report, says:

General Longstreet ordered me to form in rear of the right of Heth's division, commanded by General Pettigrew. Soon after I had executed this order, putting Lowrance on the right, I was relieved of the command of the division by Major-General Trimble, who acted under the same orders that I had received. Heth's division was much longer than Lowrance's brigade and my own, which constituted its only support, and there was, consequently, no second line in rear of its left.

The assaulting column really consisted of Pickett's divisiontwo brigades in front, and one in the second line as a supportwith the brigade of Wilcox in the rear of its right to protect that flank; while Heth's division moved forward on Pickett's left in echelon, or with the alignment so imperfect and so drooping on the left as to appear in echelon, with Lane's and Scales' brigades in rear of its right, and its left without reserve or support, and entirely exposed. Thus the column moved forward. It is needless to say a word here of the heroic conduct of Pickett's division; that charge has alreary passed into history as “one of the world's great deeds of arms.” While, doubtless, many brave men of other commands reached the crest of the height, this was the only organized body that entered the works of the enemy. Much can be said in excuse for the failure of the other commands to fulfill the task assigned them. As a general rule, the peculiarly rough and wooded character of the country in which our army was accustomed to operate, and which in some respects was unfavorable for the manoeuvres of large armies, was of decided advantage to us; for, in moving upon the enemy through bodies of woods, or in a broken, rolling country, not only was the enemy at a loss how [135] to estimate our strength, but our own men were not impressed with that sense of insecurity which must have resulted from a thorough knowledge of their own weakness.

It was different here. The charge was made down a gentle slope, and then up to the enemy's lines, a distance of over half a mile, denuded of forests, and in full sight of the enemy, and perfect range of their artillery. These combined causes produced their natural effect upon Pettigrew's division and the brigades supporting it-caused them to falter, and finally retire. Then Pickett's division continuing the charge without supports, and in the sight of the enemy, was not half so formidable or effective as it. would have been had trees or hills prevented the enemy from so correctly estimating the strength of the attacking column, and our own troops from experiencing that sense of weakness which the known absence of support necessarily produced. In spite of all this, it steadily and gallantly advanced to its allotted task. As the three brigades, under Garnett, Armistead and Kemper, approach the enemy's lines, a most terrific fire of artillery and small-arms is concentrated upon them; but they swerve not — there is no faltering; steadily moving forward, they rapidly reduce the intervening space, and close with their adversaries; leaping the breastworks, they drive back the enemy and plant their standards on the captured guns, amid shouts of victory-dearly won and shortlived victory.

No more could be exacted, or expected, of those men of brave hearts and nerves of steel; but where are the supports to reap the benefit of their heroic efforts, and, gather the fruits of a victory so nobly won? Was that but a forlorn hope, on whose success, not only in penetrating the enemy's lines, but in maintaining its hold against their combined and united efforts to dislodge it, an entire army was to wait in quiet observation? Was it designed to throw these few brigades-originally, at most, but two divisions-upon the fortified stronghold of the enemy, while, full half a mile away, seven-ninths of the army in breathless suspense, in ardent admiration and fearful anxiety, watched, but moved not? I maintain that such was not the design of the Commanding-General. Had the veteran divisions of Hood and McLaws been moved forward, as was planned, in support of those of Pickett and Pettigrew, not only would the latter division, in all probability, have gained the [136] enemy's works, as did that of Pickett, but these two would have been enabled, with the aid of Hood and McLaws, to resist all efforts of the enemy to dislodge them. The enemy, closing in on Pickett's brigades, concentrating upon that small band of heroes the fire of every gun that could be brought to bear upon them, soon disintegrated and overpowered them. Such as were not killed, disabled and made captive, fell back to our lines.

It appears that General Longstreet deemed it necessary to defend his right flank and rear with the divisions of McLaws and Hood. These divisions, as before stated, constituted all of the Confederate line held by Longstreet's troops, and it is not apparent how they were necessary to defend his flank and rear. The nearest infantry force of the enemy to our right occupied the hills-Round Top and Little Round Top-and the only force that could be said to have threatened our flank and rear consisted of two brigades of cavalry, so posted as to protect the enemy's left. It is not my purpose here to undertake to establish the wisdom of an attack on the enemy's position on the third day, which General Lbngstreet contends was opposed by his judgment, and of which he says he would have stayed the execution, had he felt that he had the privilege so to do; nor do I propose to discuss the necessities of his position, which he represents to have been such as to forbid the employment of McLaws' and Hood's divisions in the attack; neither do I seek any other than a just explanation of the causes of our failure at that time; but well recalling my surprise and disappointment when it was ascertained that only Pickett's division and the troops from Hill's corps had taken part in the movement, and with positively distinct impressions as to the occurrences just related, I deem it proper to record them for confirmation or refutation as the undisputed facts of the case, and the testimony of others may determine.

After the assault on the enemy's works on the third of July, there was no serious fighting at Gettysburg. The fourth passed in comparative quiet. Neither army evinced any disposition to assail the other. Notwithstanding the brilliant achievements of Ewell and Hill on the first day, and the decided advantage gained by Longstreet on the second, the failure of the operations of the third day, involving, as they did, but two divisions of the army, deprived us of the prestige of our previous successes, and gave a [137] shadow of right to our adversary's claim of having gained a victory. Their exultation, however, should be tempered with moderation, when we consider that, after one day of absolute quiet, the Confederates withdrew from their front without serious molestation, and with bridges swept away, and an impassable river in rear, stood in an attitude of defiance until their line of retreat could be rendered practicable, after which they safely recrossed into Virginia. Then, again, so serious was the loss visited upon the Federals in the engagements of the first and second days, and so near success was the effort to storm their position on the third day, that they were themselves undecided as to whether they should stand or retreat. In discussing several councils or conferences held by General Meade with his corps commanders, General Sick-]es testified, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, that the reason the Confederates were not followed up was on account of differences of opinion whether or not the Federals should themselves retreat, as “it was by no means clear, in the judgment of the corps commanders, or of the General in command, whether they had won. or not.”

It appears from the official returns on file in the War Department, that on the 31st of May, 1863, the Army of Northern Virginia numbered: infantry, fifty-four thousand three hundred and fifty-six; cavalry, nine thousand five hundred and thirty-six; artillery, four thousand four hundred and sixty; of all arms, sixtyeight thousand three hundred and fifty-two effective. This was immediately before the invasion of Pennsylvania, and may be regarded as representing the maximum of General Lee's army in the Gettysburg campaign. On the 20th of July, 1863, after the return of General Lee to Virginia, his army numbered forty-one thousand three hundred and eighty-eight effective, exclusive of the cavalry corps, of which no report is made in the return of the date last mentioned; allowing seven thousand six hundred and twelve, a fair estimate for the cavalry, the effective total of the army on the 20th of July was forty-nine thousand. It appears, therefore, that General Lee's loss in the Pennsylvania campaign was about nineteen thousand.

Concerning the strength of the Federal army, General Meade testified as follows before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (second series, vol. I., p. 337): “Including all arms of the service, [138] my strength was a little under one hundred thousand menabout ninety-five thousand. I think General Lee had about ninety thousand infantry, four thousand to five thousand artillery, and about ten thousand cavalry.” Again he testifies: “I think the returns showed me, when I took command of the army, amounted to about one hundred and five thousand men; included in these were the eleven thousand of General French.” In this latter matter the evidence is against General Meade. General Hooker, on the 27th of June, 1863, telegraphed to General Halleck, from Poolesville: “My whole force of enlisted men for duty will not exceed one hundred and five thousand (105,000).” This would make his total effective force (officers and men) full one hundred and twelve thousand. This dispatch was received by General Halleck at nine A. M. On reaching Sandy Hook, subsequently, on the same day, General Hooker telegraphed as follows concerning the garrison at Harper's Ferry, under General French: “I find ten thousand men here in condition to take the field. Here they are of no earthly account. They cannot defend a ford of the river; and, as far as Harper's Ferry is concerned, there is nothing of it. As for the fortifications, the work of the troops, they remain when the troops are withdrawn. No enemy will ever take possession of them for them. This is my opinion. All the public property could have been secured to-night, and the troops marched to where they could have been of some service.” This dispatch was received by General Halleck at 2:55 P. M. It is evident that the garrison at Harper's Ferry was not embraced in the returns alluded to by General Hooker in his first dispatch. Although General Halleck refused these troops to General Hooker, they were immediately awarded to General .Meade on his assuming command when General Hooker was relieved.

Without more accurate returns of the two armies at Gettysburg, we are left to form our conclusions as to their strength from the data given above. I put the Army of the Potomac at one hundred and five thousand, and the Army of Northern Virginia at sixty-two thousand of all arms-fifty thousand infantry, eight thousand cavalry, and four thousand artillery-and believe these figures very nearly correct. In this estimate, I adopt the strength of the Federal army as given by its Commander on the 27th of June, but four days before the first encounter at Gettysburg, excluding [139] all consideration of the troops at Harper's Ferry, although General Meade, on assuming command, at once ordered General French to move to Frederick with seven thousand men, to protect his communications, and thus made available a like number of men of the Army of the Potomac, who would otherwise have been detached for this service.

On the side of the Confederates, the entire cavalry corps is included. That portion which General Stuart accompanied made a complete circuit of the Federal army, and only joined General Lee on the evening of the second day; and the brigades under Generals Jones and Robertson, which had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, did not rejoin the army until the third of July. [140] Report of Brigadier-General R. L. Gibson of Operations in Vicinity of Nashville. [From the original Ms. signed in General Gibson's autograph.]

Headquarters Gibson's brigade, near Tupelo, Miss., January 11th, 1865.
Capt. J. M. Macon, A. A. G.:
Captain: I have the honor, in compliance with orders from Division Headquarters, to submit the following report of operations before Nashville and along the line of our march to Columbia:

About two o'clock on the 15th December I was directed by Lieutenant-General Lee to move my brigade to the extreme left of his corps, and to deploy it in one rank so as to cover as much space as possible. A little while before sunset the troops in line at right angles to the line in which I was posted — a line extending along the left flank of the army-gave way, and soon those immediately upon my left fell back, the whole moving rapidly in some confusion to the rear. The enemy advanced and, seeing that my left flank was exposed and likely to be involved, I withdrew my brigade from the trenches and formed a line of battle at right angles to them, my right resting upon them. I also threw forward a strong line of skirmishers, under Lieutenant A. T. Martin, who at once attacked the enemy, but he showed no disposition to advance. By this time it was twilight, and in a few moments night closed operations.

The next day, the line having been retired about two and a half miles, my skirmishers were attacked early in the morning, but not ordered in until near one o'clock, when it was discovered that preparations were being made to charge us in force. The enemy assaulted my brigade either with one large or two small brigades, and, after several attempts, only came up to within seventy-five yards, and, remaining there a few moments, broke and fled. We killed and wounded a great many for the time they were under fire and the force engaged. I estimate his loss at two hundred killed and from seven hundred to nine hundred wounded. [141]

Observing, just before sundown, troops and ambulances passing into the Franklin turnpike from the left, and double-quicking towards the rear, I at once dispatched my aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Cartwright Eustis, to say to Brigadier-General Pettus that I would co-operate with him in any plan to arrest the progress of the enemy, who had evidently broken the lines somewhere to his left.

Scarcely had my aide reached me and informed me of the intentions of General Pettus, when the enemy was observed already upon our rear, and our troops upon all sides breaking and striving to reach the line of retreat, which was nearly covered. I had ordered Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. Lindsay, commanding Sixteenth Louisiana Volunteers, to get ready to deploy his regiment as skirmishers along the trenches, while I withdrew the brigade and attempted to arrest the enemy; but at this time confusion prevailed over every thing. Arriving at the woods, in front of Colonel Overton's, I formed a line as again directed by Lieutenant-General Lee, and, moving back a half mile further, Major-General Clayton reformed his division, and we continued the retreat until we reached Hollowtree Gap, where we bivouacked. Early the next morning I was sent as a reserve near the Hotel, six hundred yards in rear of the Gap. While there, in accordance with an order from Division Headquarters, I sent Colonel S. E. Hunter with the greater part of the Fourth and Thirtieth Louisiana Volunteers and my inspector-general, to report to Major-General Clayton. He was placed on picket in a gap in rear of the division by order of Lieutenant-General Lee, and while being posted there I moved the balance of my brigade to attack the enemy, who was approaching the road between us and Franklin.

I drove him back very easily, and was moving to the road again, when I was informed by a staff officer of Lieutenant-General Lee, Lieutenant Farish, that Colonel Hunter and his detachment had been captured.

I was again placed in position in an earthwork a thousand yards from Harpeth river, and, before any instructions reached me, our cavalry stampeded. The enemy, five thousand strong, charged in three columns with squadrons covering the intervening ground and connecting them-one in front, one in rear upon the left flank, and one in rear upon the right flank. I found a section of artillery [142] upon the road and a part of a regiment of infantry, under Colonel Hundly. I had the section to open upon the enemy, but it had no effect, except to increase the speed of his flanking columns, and made no impression upon that one advancing directly upon our front. After firing ten rounds with no better effect, I ordered the officer (I do not know his name) to move his pieces to the rear. I also directed Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, commanding Sixteenth Louisiana Volunteers, upon my extreme right, to deploy his regiment as skirmishers in retreat, and Colonel Campbell and Major Flournoy, with the First, Thirteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth, in all about two hundred and fifty muskets, to move to the rear, and to fight as they went. I also directed Colonel Hundly to deploy his men as skirmishers. The cavalry of the enemy charged all around us. Colonel Campbell broke up by a well-delivered fire the column charging down the road, and thus gave time to the section of artillery to cross the river. The enemy came up within less than one hundred yards of the section and fired his revolvers at those about it. My command fought its way to the river, entirely surrounded, with a loss of ten killed, twenty-five wounded and five captured. We continued to make dispositions against this cavalry, under orders of Major-General Clayton, without being engaged, until near sunset, when he again charged, coming from the left, and wheeled into and down the road just where my left flank rested upon it. I immediately changed front upon the left regiment, and ordered Colonel Henderson, Forty-Second Georgia, temporarily in charge of Stovall's brigade, upon my right, to face by the rear rank and wheel to the right so as to cover the road. A few well-directed volleys cut the charging column, and part of two regiments continued down the road while the rest fell back into the woods. Major-General Clayton coming from the front, where he had gone to superintend the advance ot Holtzclaw's brigade, then came up, and made dispositions which resulted in the defeat of this body of cavalry, the killing of many, and the capture of colors and prisoners.

My command was not again engaged. I trust my officers and men behaved themselves, under all circumstances, in a way to entitle them to the confidence of my superior officers. Colonel Hunter, Fourth Louisiana Volunteers; Major Picolet, commanding Thirtieth; Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, Colonel Campbell and [143] Major Flournoy all gave every assistance and conducted their parts with skill and courage. I would particularly commend Lieutenant A. T. Martin, commanding battalion of Sharpshooters, for his conspicuous gallantry and skill, and regret to say he was wounded and captured when quitting the trenches. Lieutenant-Colonel Lindsay, while temporarily in command of my brigade, discovered fine qualities as an officer, and Colonel Henderson was conspicuous for his efficiency and bravery while, for a short time, in command of Stovall's brigade, under trying circumstances. I would again commend Captain A. L. Stuart, A. I. G., for his courage, judgment and promptness. I regret to state that he was severely wounded. Captain H. H. Bain, A. A. G., and Captain G. Norton, A. A. A. G., were always prompt, efficient and gallant; and especially so was Lieutenant C. Eustis, my aide-de-camp. Captain J. Hodges, A. Q. M., and Major W. V. Crouch, C. S., have discharged their duties throughout with fidelity and intelligence. I have to announce and to deplore the death of Qaptain C. W. Cushman, Thirtieth Louisiana Volunteers, who was killed at the trenches. He was a brave, intelligent and efficient officer. Nor less zealous and worthy were Lieutenant J. J. Cawthorn, Nineteenth Louisiana Volunteers, and Lieutenant C. Miller. Twentieth Louisiana Volunteers, who likewise fell in the discharge of their duties.

Yours very respectfully,

R. L. Gibson, Brigadier-General.


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