John Harrison Wilson, The life of Charles Henry Dana

[234] Grant's rear should be actually attacked by an overwhelming force. Such as are familiar with this phase of the great conflict will remember r that Grant, on his way to Vicksburg early in the year, had clearly foreseen the necessity for the consolidation of the various departments in the Mississippi Valley under one supreme commander, and had written a formal letter to the Secretary of War recommending that measure as the best means of securing the necessary cooperation between the great armies already in the field. Like many other important measures, this one was compelled to wait. Meanwhile it was fully discussed with Dana, and he gave it his adherence and support, but not till Grant had received the surrender of Vicksburg and its garrison, and Rosecrans had been defeated by an overwhelming concentration of the Confederate forces at Chickamauga, was that all-important recommendation carried into effect. Dana from the first took the ground that Grant could not be withdrawn from his advanced position, and that it would be far better for Rosecrans to retreat to Nashville than for Grant to retreat from the hills of Vicksburg. The government at Washington, however, instead of heeding Dana's timely and far-sighted suggestion, yielded to the fatuous determination of Halleck, backed as it was by popular clamor, and forced its reluctant commander to push his widely separated columns into northern Georgia, where, as might have been expected, they were destined to meet disaster.

Of course it was always possible, as pointed out in Dana's despatch of June 12th, for Bragg to send his material to Atlanta, fall back upon Bristol and Chattanooga, and detach the larger part of his army to reinforce Johnston. Fortunately this was not done, and Johnston was left with such insufficient means as he could gather up and put in the field to continue his hopeless campaign against Grant. He was active and enterprising, but the odds were against him.