John Harrison Wilson, The life of Charles Henry Dana

[266]

Your letter is so good that I shall send it to the Secretary of War. Remember me kindly to the general, to Rawlins, and to Bowers.

It will be observed that this letter contains no explanation of why Rosecrans did not sally out at daylight on the second day of the battle and “grind up Bragg's flank,” as he must have told Dana he intended to do. It makes no explanation of why he failed entirely to assume the offensive, by a turning movement against the enemy's right, as he might have done. It makes no suggestion that the battle was fought primarily to “save Chattanooga,” although that was the actual result. It gives no explanation of Rosecrans's change of plan from a pursuit of the flying enemy to a defensive battle for the salvation of his strategic base of operations. But no one can read Dana's despatches in connection with this letter, and the Confederate reports, without reaching the conclusion that the controlling factor in the great battle was the timely arrival of Longstreet's corps from the East, and the decisive part it took in the second day's fighting.

From Dana's two despatches of the 20th, as well as from the more deliberate statements of the correspondents and historical writers, there can be no doubt that the fortuitous coming of Granger and Steedman, with five thousand men of the reserve corps, to the right of the line at Chickamauga arrested the progress of Longstreet and saved the Union army from ruin. Dana did all in his power for Granger and Steedman, as he did for many others whose qualities attracted his attention in this campaign. Colonel Harker, whom he mentions with others as having especially distinguished himself, was a young West-Pointer who was promoted to brigadier-general for conspicuous gallantry in this battle. Many other officers who fought at Chickamauga, and especially those who held the field with Thomas, owe much of