John Harrison Wilson, The life of Charles Henry Dana

[387] prepared in the War Department, showing that the National armies in Virginia lost more men killed, wounded, and missing, while under its previous leaders, from May 21, 1861, to May 4, 1864, in their futile efforts to capture the Confederate capital and overthrow the Confederate government, than did the armies operating in Virginia under General Grant from the time he began his campaign on May 4, 1864, till April 9, 1865, when Richmond was in his hands and Lee and his army were prisoners of war. For the first period the aggregate was 143,925; for the second, 124,390. The difference was something more than two years in time and 19,535 in casualties; and while the larger part of the latter was in captured and missing, the effect was to show conclusively that Grant's tactics were not only more successful in results, but better in quality than those of his predecessors. In view of the fact that the forces engaged were larger than ever before, the argument drawn from these tables was all the more unanswerable. As a matter of history it was never answered, and stands good to this day.

It should be observed in connection with this subject that Dana at no time ever contended that Grant was a great organizer or tactician, or that his staff arrangements were perfect. He simply regarded Grant as the best and most successful general we had, and believing with Rawlins and others that he was a modest, disinterested, honest, and unpretending hero, with whom we could win, he did all he could to help him carry his great task through to a successful ending. Nobody knew better than Dana what Grant's limitations were, nor better than he where his tactics were bad and his management defective; but it is to his credit that he confined his criticism, both then and afterwards, to the inner circle of those who shared his knowledge and concurred in the faith with which they predicted Grant's ultimate success.