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the bottom of the whole dreadful business.
Seymour has had the idea of resisting the draft by the forces of the State, but is too great a coward to attempt the execution of the scheme with the large Federal force now concentrated in the city. ...
The foregoing letter is particularly noticeable because it shows that
Dana at least had been considering even at that early day the chance of
Grant's being ordered to the command of the Army of the Potomac.
Before starting East he had discussed the suggestion with
Rawlins and others as a possible consequence of
Grant's great victories in the
West; but the time had not yet come, though the idea was born.
The disgrace of
Chickamauga had yet to be incurred and wiped out, and the defeat of
Bragg's army at
Missionary Ridge had yet to be accomplished before the country and its government could recognize
Grant's great merits and call him to the head of our armies.
As this narrative proceeds it will become apparent that
Dana was destined to play an important part in the accomplishment of that great end.
After a fortnight with his family on the
Connecticut coast, where he greatly enjoyed the rest and recreation he had so well earned, he returned to
Washington for further service.
He wrote to me from the War Department, August 11, 1863.
Omitting purely personal matters, I quote as follows:
... You speak with regret of Sherman's retreat from Pearl River.
I had the same feeling at first, but on reflection have come to doubt the possibility of pursuing Johnston to the Tombigbee with adequate results, owing to the want of water in the country and the exposure of the line of supplies to being cut by the enemy.
The vital place of attack is Mobile, in my judgment, and when you once have that post in your possession you can make the Tombigbee, the Alabama, and all the country about them untenable by the
