John Harrison Wilson, The life of Charles Henry Dana

[294] accomplished, the unaccountable spirit of the troops bore them bodily up those impracticable steels, over bristling rifle-pits on the crest, all thirty cannon enfilading every gully. The order to storm appears to have been given simultaneously by Generals Sheridan and Wood, because the men were not to be held back, dangerous as the attempt appeared to military prudence. Besides, the generals had caught the inspiration of the men, and were ready themselves to undertake impossibilities. ...

As Dana was personally present with the generals in frequent conversations throughout the day, and finally rode with Grant and his staff to the top of the Ridge before the fighting was ended, there is every reason why this account should have contained the exact truth as it did. And yet Grant and Sherman, when they wrote their reports, stated in substance that the battle was fought just as it was planned, and was won just as it was intended. Both made the same contention in their memoirs, and always adhered to that view. They either failed to consult Dana's despatches to the Secretary of War, or deliberately ignored them in favor of their own misconceptions. It may be safely added that history, and especially military history, is far too frequently written in that way.

The military student will find a brief but accurate summary of the remainder of this campaign in Dana's despatches. He was personally present with General Grant in his visits to the various parts of the army up to November 29th, on which day he left Chattanooga again with me for Knoxville. I had been sent to act as chief engineer to the forces detached for the relief of Burnside. Grant had pushed Bragg back from Missionary Ridge towards Resaca and Atlanta, thus separating him hopelessly from Longstreet and rendering effective co-operation between them henceforth impossible. But Longstreet had shut Burnside up and was closely besieging him in Knoxville. The