[351] and changed all disposition to find fault into praise and admiration. The fact that Sherman left Thomas with insufficient forces to fight the rebel army is indisputable, but yet I do not think that Sherman is to be blamed for it. He did not start for Savannah until he had positive information from Rawlins that A. J. Smith's troops would reach Paducah in four days, and from other quarters that the horses and equipments of your cavalry would be got forward in ample season. Those things being determined-and I do not see why he need have had any doubt with regard to them — there was no reason for him to wait any longer. That A. J. Smith should be thirty days instead of four is not astonishing, but Sherman had no cause to anticipate it. But without looking too curiously into the past, let us admit that everything has turned out for the best. The delay to attack Hood, of which Grant, Stanton, and Halleck, in my judgment, quite justifiably complained, especially was of the most beneficial consequences. The ease with which the victory was gained was apparently due very much to the snow-storm, which froze the enemy and starved him, so that he fought at the greatest disadvantage. The only mistake I can now see in the campaign was the misdirection of the pontoon train. I wish you would tell me who is to blame for that. Very likely, however, it was not misdirected at all, for my information respecting it is derived from the newspapers alone. With regard to the organization of your corps, and the probability of its being recognized by the President, I know nothing. The way to get it done is for General Thomas earnestly to request it, and to say that he regards it as indispensable to the future efficiency of his army. As for the Spencer carbines, everything will be done that is possible, but I doubt whether you can get the whole product of the armories now at work on that arm. But I will see General Dyer on the subject. You have perhaps noticed in the newspapers the appointment of a board consisting of Majors Laidley and Benton, Ordnance Corps; Major Maynardier and
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