John Harrison Wilson, The life of Charles Henry Dana

[339] that general might very well have come to a premature end. It is almost equally certain that had Dana, after Chickamauga, done what he could to strengthen Thomas's hands and to build him up as the successor to Rosecrans, Grant might have failed to get the opportunity to add the salvation of Chattanooga and the victory of Missionary Ridge to his previous victories. Again, had Dana minimized Grant's merits and joined the hostile critics in denouncing his management of the campaign against Lee, instead of doing all in his power to magnify his performances, he might have seriously weakened the confidence of the government in the general's abilities and character even at that late day. Finally, had Dana proved unequal to the duties of his position on his return to Washington, and left Grant to learn from others the disagreeable facts which he communicated to him on July 11th and 12th, or had he failed to transmit to Grant the vigorous opinions of the Secretary of War as to the headless condition of military affairs about Washington, or had Grant elected to remain at City Point, and to leave to others the management of the campaign against Early and Ewell, his reputation must have suffered greatly in the public mind, as well as in the estimation of the administration.

Viewing the circumstances as set forth in this narrative, and drawing such conclusions from them as we may, no one can read Dana's letters or consider his connection with the facts related in them without reaching the conclusion that he acted with unusual prudence, good sense, promptitude, and fearlessness in presenting the best interests of the army to the government in reference to the Vicksburg, Chickamauga, Chattanooga, Missionary Ridge, Knoxville, and Petersburg campaigns, as well as in presenting the views of the government to Grant during the Confederate demonstration in the direction of Washington.