John Harrison Wilson, The life of Charles Henry Dana

[287] found to be a man of impressive appearance, but possessing a weak mind full of vagaries. After a long argument, in which we both participated, we succeeded in getting him to adopt the course which kept his army intact till after the victory of Missionary Ridge, when it was relieved of all danger by a strong detachment of Grant's army, under Sherman.

Grant's theory of the campaign in east Tennessee was that Burnside should hold fast to Knoxville, which was the centre of population and of railroads for the entire region, drawing supplies as far as possible from the surrounding country, and yet always operating in such manner as to imperil no part of his command. This it was not difficult to make Burnside understand as a matter of theory, but we found that he had already thrown a strong detachment forward to the Little Tennessee, up the valley of which the foraging was unusually good, and seemed determined to follow with his whole force. He had constructed a bridge across the Holston for that purpose, and appeared to think it would be a pity not to use it. As this movement would have left the road to Knoxville open to the advancing columns of the enemy, and might easily, in the presence of such a leader as Longstreet, have ended in the capture of Burnside and his whole force, we united in earnest remonstrance against the suggestion. It was in allusion to this foolish project that Dana, in his despatch of 12 M., November 18th, said:

Parke argued against this idea in vain, but finally General Wilson overcame it by representing that Grant did not wish him to include the capture of his entire army among the elements of his plan of operations.

Dana's despatches, as published in the Official Records, will well repay the military student by the light they cast