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or lending its cars to other roads.
This condition of affairs fully justified
Dana's statement that “it will be impossible to maintain this army without a complete change in the management of that road.”
His next despatch called for two thousand cavalry remounts, and recommended that the
chief quartermaster of that army should be allowed to purchase them.
1 On the 17th headquarters were still without information of
Longstreet's arrival.
The next day reports were received from various sources that
Longstreet had reached
Atlanta, and this caused
Dana to notify
Stanton that
Burnside's forces were needed by
Rosecrans.
At noon, September 18th, he reported the appearance of rebel cavalry and infantry at the front, that our position behind the
Chickamauga was excellent, and “everything ready for serious attack.”
Later in the day he added:
... Our troops are now being drawn towards our left, and concentrated as much as possible.
Rosecrans has not yet determined whether to make a night march and fall on them at daylight or to await their onset.
On September 19th, at 10.30 A. M., he telegraphed to
Stanton:
... As I write enemy are making diversion on our right. . . An orderly of Bragg's just captured says there are reports in rebel army of Longstreet's arrival, but he does not know that they are true.
Rosecrans has everything ready to grind up Bragg's flank.
At 1 P. M. he corrected his earlier despatch and said the attack was on our left.
There is [the] fighting.
