John Harrison Wilson, The life of Charles Henry Dana

On October 8th he mentions General Rousseau as one “who seems to be regarded throughout this army as an ass of eminent gifts” --that the consolidation of the two corps was well received and “must produce the most happy consequences” --but to avoid the impression that the measure was intended as “a token of disgrace and punishment,” he recommended that an order should be issued from Washington complimenting the steadiness and gallantry of the men, and putting the consolidation on its true grounds. On the 11th he called attention to the fact that his despatches had been deciphered and their contents partly made known while in transit through Nashville and Louisville, and that he should have a new cipher whose meaning no operator could guess out. The next day he called attention to the fact that if Bragg should make a serious effort to march into Kentucky, “this army will find itself in a very helpless and dangerous condition,” that “it has on hand but two days rations for the troops,” that the mountain and bottom roads north of the river “might any day be made impracticable by a little rain,” that a fatal mistake had been made in “the abandonment of Lookout Mountain to the rebels” against the earnest protest of Granger and Garfield, that they were “unquestionably right,” and that

Rosecrans, who is sometimes as obstinate and inaccessible to reason, as at others he is irresolute, vacillating, and inconclusive, pettishly rejected all their arguments, and the mountain was given up. It is difficult to say which was the greater error, this order or that which on the day of battle created the gap in our lines. At any rate, such is our present situation: our animals starved, and the men with starvation before them, and the enemy bound to make desperate efforts to dislodge us.

In the midst of this the commanding general devotes that part of the time which is not employed in pleasant gossip to the composition of a long report to prove that the