John Harrison Wilson, The life of Charles Henry Dana

[325] them to their coats for the identification of their bodies in case of death. It was this series of disjointed, disconnected, and unsupported attacks, extending over three days and several miles of front, which Smith afterwards characterized as “murderous.” Knowing that Grant had, from the first, left the details of carrying his orders into effect to Meade and his corps commanders, he held that officer primarily responsible for the useless loss of life, and criticised his generalship in unmeasured terms. It was in allusion to these attacks, and the absence of any provision whatever to make them successful, or even to take advantage of such success as chance might give to them, that the young but experienced Upton frankly confessed that there was no position in connection with that army to which he did not aspire.¹ It was in connection with the costly series of battles from the Pamunkey to the Chickahominy that the newspapers now joined in the flood of criticism, which, for the first time, was concentrated upon Grant rather than upon Meade.

To those who took part in the campaign, it at once became a question of absorbing interest as to who was responsible for it all. After having attacked Lee's left flank in rear, I closed in upon the infantry, and for the first time in ten days found myself within reach of Grant's headquarters. Dana made his way to my bivouac on the evening of June 4th, and after dining with me on coffee, hardtack, roasted wheat, and fried bacon, told me the story of the marches and battles as he had learned it from personal observation. On the 7th, after conference with Grant, Meade, and Humphreys, I had conversations with Rawlins, Dana, Comstock, Porter, and Babcock, during which each gave me interesting details of what had taken place. On the afternoon of the 8th Dana and Rawlins