John Harrison Wilson, The life of Charles Henry Dana

[333] come to grief, while Sheridan had stopped north of the James River to rest. To make matters worse, Grant was losing confidence in Meade, who had the reputation of being ill-tempered towards his subordinates, and was becoming unpopular with them. He had besides begun to show signs of impatience and discouragement. It had come to be almost a habit with him to ask, “When is Grant going to take Richmond?” His position was doubtless embarrassing; he had but little independent authority, but was expected to receive orders and arrange all the details for their execution, while others would necessarily get most of the credit. The staff arrangements could not well be worse; the organization of the forces was fatal to close and efficient co-operation. While Grant, as generalissimo, had full power, and was primarily responsible, he was disposed to place much of the blame for the inconclusive results on Meade, and by July 7th seriously thought of relieving him from command. This is shown by Dana's despatch of 8 A. M. that day, stating that

A change in the commander of the Army of the Potomac now seems probable. . . . Grant seems to be coming to the conviction that Meade must be relieved. The facts in the matter have come very slowly to my knowledge, and it was not until yesterday that I became certain of some of the most important. I have long known Meade to be a man of the worst possible temper, especially towards his subordinates. I do not think he has a friend in the whole army.... At the same time — as far as I am able to ascertain-his generals have lost their confidence in him as a commander. His orders for the last series of assaults upon Petersburg, in which he lost ten thousand men without gaining any decisive advantage, was to the effect that he had found it impracticable to secure the co-operation of corps commanders, and therefore each one was to attack on his own account, and do the best he could by himself. Consequently, each gained