John Harrison Wilson, The life of Charles Henry Dana

[327] its adoption, they called attention to the fact that the lieutenant-general's working staff was now composed mainly of regulars, of but recent acquaintance with Grant and but little experience with troops, and that, while they had perhaps not intended it, they had supplanted Rawlins in the dominating influence which he had hitherto exercised with his chief. The criticisms to which I have alluded had not yet become known to the army. Smith gave me his views, a few days later, in a letter which, with his permission, I sent to Dana to be used as he thought best, but both Dana and Rawlins were powerless. There was no one to whom they could appeal as against Grant, who was now in supreme command, by their concurrence, and this satisfactorily accounts for the fact that no mention of these criticisms is to be found in Dana's despatches. Their only course, with all the help they could get, was to exert their influence directly upon Grant himself as opportunity offered. What they or others may have said after that to Grant I have no means of knowing, but it is certain that Rawlins remained at his post to the end, never changing nor concealing his opinions, and never failing to condemn the policy of “Smash 'em up” when he had a proper opportunity. It is also certain that Grant at once resumed his sounder practice of resorting to turning movements, and never afterwards butted into intrenchments when it could be avoided. Whether this decision was due to his own reflections and good judgment, or to the weight of criticism and influence to which he had been subjected, must forever remain an unsettled question.

Fortunately for the country, Grant was not a general to remain long idle or in doubt. On June 7th Dana reported, with many other details, that Sheridan had set out at 3 A. M. to destroy the railroads north and west of Richmond; that Grant “is now nearly ready to strike for the James.” Later the same day he reported that