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ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὡς ἐξαπατηθὲν κ.τ.λ. 36 § 25 ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὑμῖν ἡττηθεὶς τάχ᾽ ἂν εἴποι τοῦθ̓ ὡς ἐξηπατήθηθ̓ ὑμεῖς. καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ‘And with respect to the other cases mentioned in the law, a plausible objection may be raised to every one of them.’ Kennedy. αὐτὸς i.e. τις in ἔχοι τις ἂν εἰπεῖν.—οὐκ ἔνι, οὐκ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῷ πράγματι, ‘the very nature of the case does not allow him to charge himself with injustice.’ For this would be ἑκόντα ἀδικεῖσθαι, which Aristotle (in Eth. Nic. v) shows to be barely possible. Kennedy rather quaintly renders it, ‘it does not lie in his mouth surely, to object to his own act, and charge himself with injustice.’—παρὰ—τι, contrary to what is prescribed in other matters than such as are settled by himself. (Or perhaps, ‘For any of these other reasons.’) The sentiment here is similarly expressed in Or. 36 § 25. τοῖς ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ sc. ὡρισμένοις οὐκ ἐμμένει, ‘He who brings an action again for claims of which he has given a discharge, fails to abide by his own act.’
Select Private Orations of Demosthenes, Part I. F. A. Paley, M.A., LL.D., and J. E. Sandys, Litt. D. 1898. Cambridge University Press.
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