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§ 41. I signed the challenge though I thought it unfair that I should have to pay so much for damages on the testimony of a slave who might be tortured to death, and made to say anything. But no sooner was this done, than he makes another challenge, again to bring the matter before the jury, though it had in fact been quashed by the former challenge. ποῦ γὰρ ‘It cannot be right that.’ So Eur. Ion 528 ποῦ δέ μοι πατὴρ σύ; Heracl. 369 ποῦ ταῦτα καλῶς ἂν εἴη παρά γ̔ εὖ φρονοῦσιν; ἢ μηδὲν κ.τ.λ. It was unfair that his risk should be nothing at all, supposing the result of the torture was in my favour. It would seem from this that in the case of a πρόκλησις, or challenge voluntarily accepted, no fine attended a failure in the case, like the ἐπωβελία in ordinary trials. ἀλλ̓ resumptive, after parenthesis. πολλῷ τῷ δικαίῳ i.e. to have on my side a περιουσία, or more than the bare justice necessary for supporting my plea. ἀνείλετο It seems that, on cancelling or withdrawing an action, not for a frivolous reason, but by a πρόκλησις or some other way of settling it, the plaintiff was entitled to ‘take up’ or recover the deposit he had paid into court, the general term for such court fees being πρυτανεῖα. Ar. Nub. 1136, Vesp. 659. Boeckh, p. 345. [Meier and Schömann, p. 820 Lipsius.]
Select Private Orations of Demosthenes, Part I. F. A. Paley, M.A., LL.D., and J. E. Sandys, Litt. D. 1898. Cambridge University Press.
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