Benson J. Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the Civil War. Volume 1.

In this the President acted consistently. He well knew that the political constitution of the two Houses at that time was such, that no Force-bill could be passed. Besides, Attorney-General Black had expressed his doubts whether Congress had the ability “to find constitutional powers to furnish the President with authority to use military force” ¹ in the execution of the laws; and in view of the position which he had assumed in his Annual Message on the subject of “coercion” and “subjugation of a State,” ² he would feel in conscience bound to veto any Force-bill looking to such action. He did not ask Congress for any more power, nor did he give a word of encouragement to the loyal people that he would heed the warning voice of the veteran General Wool, and others, who implored the Government not to yield Fort Sumter to the insurgents, and thereby cause the kindling of a civil war. “So long as the United States keep possession of that fort,” said Wool, “the independence of South Carolina will only be in name, and not in fact.” Then, with prophetic words, whose predictions were fulfilled a few weeks later, he said:--“If, however, it should be surrendered to South Carolina, the smothered indignation of the Free States would be roused beyond control. It would not be in the power of any one to restrain it. In twenty days two hundred thousand men would be in readiness to take vengeance on all who would betray the Union into the hands of its enemies. Be assured that I do not exaggerate the feelings of the people.” ³ The soldier, with a statesman's sagacity, correctly interpreted the will of that people.

As the plot thickened, and the designs of the conspirators became more manifest, the loyal men in Congress were more firmly rooted in a determination to withstand the further aggressions of the Slave interest and the malice of the public enemies. This determination was specially apparent when the Crittenden Compromise, and other measures looking toward conciliation, were considered in the Senate and House of Representatives. Appalled by visions of civil war, distracted by discordant oracles and counselors, and anxious to have reconciliation, and union, and peace at almost any sacrifice, the people, no doubt, would have acquiesced in Mr. Crittenden's propositions.⁴ But their true representatives, better instructed by experience and observation concerning the perfidy of the traitors before them, who might accept those measures as a concession, but not as a settlement, and would be ready to make a more insolent demand another year, could not be induced to wrong posterity by a desertion of the high and holy principles of the Declaration of Independence for the sake of temporary ease. They could not consent to have the National Constitution so amended, that it should be forever subservient to the truculent Slave interest and its desolating influence. They plainly saw that such would be the effect of the most vital of the amendments of it proposed by Mr. Crittenden. They did not doubt his patriotism, yet they deemed it wise and prudent to act upon the suggestions of the first President of the Republic, when, warning his countrymen against attempts to destroy the Union, he said :--“One method of assault may be to effect, in the forms of the Constitution, alterations which impair the energy of the system, and ”