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than
McDowell's by at least four thousand men. He was the
senior officer, and took the chief command of the army.
He approved of
Beauregard's plan for an attack on the left wing of the Nationals; and both generals, before daybreak on the morning of the 21st, made active preparations for its execution.
A few hours later the
Confederates, instead of being the aggressors, were fighting on the defensive on their side of
Bull's Run.
The general disposition of the Confederate army on the 21st
was nearly the same as on the 18th.
1 The arrival of re-enforcements, and preparations for the attack on the
National left, had made some changes.
The detachments of the brigades of
Bee of
South Carolina, and
Bartow of
Georgia, that came from the Shenandoah Valley with
Johnston, about three thousand in number, had been placed in reserve between McLean's and Blackburn's Fords; and
Colonel Cocke's brigade, with which were connected two companies of cavalry and a battery of four 6-pounders, occupied a line in front of
Bull's Run, below the
Stone Bridge, to guard
Island, Ball's, and Lewis's Fords. Three hundred of
Stuart's cavalry, of the Army of the Shenandoah, and two companies of
Radford's cavalry, were in reserve not far from Mitchell's Ford.
Near them was a small brigade under
General Holmes, and some cavalry.
2
The three divisions of the
National army moved from
Centreville in the bright moonlight at the appointed hour.
They advanced slowly, for raw troops were difficult to handle.
After crossing
Cub Run,
Hunter and
Heintzelman turned into the road to the right that led through the “Big woods,” whilst
Tyler moved along the
Warrenton turnpike directly toward the
Stone Bridge, with the brigades of
Schenck and
Sherman, leaving
Keyes to watch the road that came up from
Manassas, and
Richardson |
Fourteenth Virginia Cavalry. |
to co-operate with Miles in keeping ward over Blackburn's Ford and vicinity, on the extreme left.
Tyler's division was accompanied by the batteries of
Ayres and
Carlisle; and its first business was to make a feigned attack near the bridge at dawn, to deceive the foe and divert his attention until
Hunter and
Heintzelman should fall upon the flank and rear of his left wing.
McDowell, who was ill, had followed the columns from
Centreville in a carriage, and he took a position at the junction of the turnpike and the forest road, where he might be in quick communication with all his forces.
These movements were all much slower than had been calculated upon, and the mistake in not making an advance the previous evening was soon painfully apparent.
The advantage of a surprise was lost.
It was half-past 6 o'clock, when the sun had been shining on the
Stone Bridge nearly two hours, before
Tyler was ready to open fire on the
Confederates there; and