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the opinion of Mr. Buchanan, be a sufficient justification of the people of the Slave-labor States in “revolutionary resistance to the Government of the Union.”
Knowledge concerning them is essential to a proper understanding of the early history of the rebellion.
In the year 1850, an act was passed by the National Congress, under the provisions of the third clause, second section, and fourth Article of the Constitution, providing for the rendition of slaves who might escape from bondage into the Free-labor States.
The sixth section of that law provided that the master of a fugitive slave, or his agent, might go into any State or Territory of the Republic, and, with or without legal warrant there obtained, seize such fugitive, and take him forthwith before any judge or commissioner whose duty it should be to hear and determine the case.
On satisfactory proof being furnished him, such as the affidavit in writing, or other acceptable testimony, by the pursuing owner or agent, that the arrested person “owes labor” to the party that had arrested him, or to his principal, it was made the duty of said judge or commissioner to use the power of his office to assist the claimant in taking the fugitive back into bondage.
It was further provided, that in no trial or hearing under the act, should the testimony of such alleged fugitive be admitted in evidence; and that the parties claiming the fugitive should not be molested in their work of carrying the person back “by any process issued by any court, judge, magistrate, or other person whomsoever.”
The last clause of the act was so offensive to every sentiment of humanity and justice, and so repugnant to the feelings of the people in the Free-labor States, that while respect for law, so deeply interwoven in the texture of American society, caused a general acquiescence in the requirements of the statute, there was rebellion against it in every Christian heart.
It was plainly seen that, under that law, free negroes might, by the perjury of kidnappers, and the denial of the common right to defense allowed to the vilest criminal, be carried away into hopeless slavery, beyond the reach of pity, mercy, or law. This perception of possible wrong caused the Legislatures of several of the Free-labor States to pass laws for the protection of free colored citizens within their borders, made so by the circumstance of birth or existing laws.1
In the framing of laws consonant with the public sentiment against the Fugitive Slave Law, some of the Legislatures perhaps transcended the constitutional limits, and enacted statutes in direct contravention of the National law. Others were strictly within the limits of constitutional requirements; and all might be speedily made inoperative by a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, a majority of whose nine judges were slaveholders, and decidedly in sympathy with that class.
Up to the time of the delivery of the President's Message, not a single case had been adjudicated under a Personal Liberty Law in any State, and their practical hostility to the interests of the slaveholders was as unreal as the tyranny and oppression of
1 The law in Maine provided, that no public officer of the State should arrest or detain (or aid in so doing) in any prison or building belonging to the State, or county or town in it, any person, on account of a claim on him as a fugitive slave. This was to leave the whole business of arrests to United States officers.
The law in New Hampshire provided, that any slave brought into the State, by or with the consent of the master, should be free; and declared that the attempt to hold any person as a slave within the State was a felony, unless done by United States officers in the execution of legal process. This was to relieve the people from the duty of becoming slave-catchers by command of United States officers. The law in Vermont provided, that no court, justice of the peace, or magistrate, should take cognizance of any certificate, warrant, or process, under the Fugitive Slave Law, and that no person should assist in the removal of an alleged fugitive slave from the State, excepting United States officers. It also ordered that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and a trial of facts by a jury, should be given to the alleged fugitive, with the State's Attorney as counsel; and also that any person coming into the State a slave, shall be forever free. This was a nullification of the Fugitive Slave Law. The law in Massachusetts provided for trials by jury of alleged fugitive slaves, who might have the services of any attorney. It forbade the issuing of any process, under the Fugitive Slave Law, by any legal officer in the State, or “to do any official act in furtherance of the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793, or that of 1850.” It forbade the use of any prisons in the State for the same purpose. All public officers were forbidden to arrest, or assist in arresting, any alleged fugitive slave. And no officer of the State, acting as United States commissioner, was allowed to issue any warrant, excepting for the summoning of witnesses, nor allowed to hear and try any cause under the Fugitive Slave Law. This was a virtual nullification of the Fugitive Slave Law. The law in Connecticut was made only to prevent the kidnapping of free persons of color within its borders, by imposing a heavy penalty upon those who should arrest, or cause to be arrested, any free colored person, with intent to reduce him or her to slavery. The law in Rhode Island forbade the carrying away of any person by force out of the State; and provided that no public officer should officially aid the execution of the Fugitive Slave Law, and denied the use of the jails for that purpose. New York took no action on the subject; neither did New Jersey or Pennsylvania. Their statute-books had laws already therein relating to slavery. The law in Michigan secured to the person arrested the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, a trial by jury, and the employment of the State's Attorney as counsel for the prisoners. It denied the use of the jails of the State for the purposes contemplated in the Fugitive Slave Law, and imposed a heavy penalty for the arrest of a free colored person as an alleged fugitive slave. The law in Wisconsin was substantially the same as that in Michigan, with an additional clause for the protection of its citizens from any penalties incurred by a refusal to aid or obey the Fugitive Slave Law. Iowa, Ohio, Illinois, Minnesota, California, and Oregon, made no laws on the subject. It is worthy of note, in this connection, that the statute-books of every Slave-labor State in the Union contained, at that time, Personal Liberty Acts, all of them as much in opposition to the letter and spirit of the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850 as any act passed by the Legislatures of Free-labor States. Some of them had penalties more severe. All of them provided for the use of law by the alleged slave; most of them gave him a trial by jury; and those of North Carolina and Texas punished the stealer and seller of a free negro with death. The spirit and object of all were expressed in the preamble to the law in Georgia, as follows:--“Whereas free persons of color are liable to be taken and held fraudulently and illegally in a state of slavery by wicked white men, and to be secretly removed whenever an effort may be made to redress their grievances, so that due inquiry may not be had into the circumstances of the detention of the same, and their right of freedom,” et coetera, “Be it enacted,” &c.
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