 |
| Robert Patterson. |
June 17. |
This text is part of:
Table of Contents:
[522]
Charlestown a strong force, gradually and securely advancing a portion of them toward Winchester, and with a column from that point, operate toward Woodstock, thus cutting off all the communication of the insurgents with
Northwestern Virginia, and force them to retire and leave that region in the possession of the loyal people.
By that means he expected to keep open a free communication with the great West, by the Baltimore and Ohio Railway.
The General-in-chief disapproved the plan; repeated the order to send to Washington the designated troops; told Patterson that McClellan had been ordered to send nothing across the mountains to support him, and directed him to remain where he was until he could satisfy his Chief that he ought to go forward.
This was followed by another, saying: “You tell me you arrived last night at Hagerstown, and McClellan writes that you are checked at Harper's Ferry.
Where are you?”
Early the next morning
the Chief telegraphed again, saying:--“We are pressed here.
Send the troops I have twice called for, without delay.”
This order was imperative, and was instantly obeyed.
The troops were sent, and Patterson was left without a single piece of available artillery, with only one troop of raw cavalry, and a total force of not more than ten thousand men, the most of them undisciplined.
A larger portion of them were on the Virginia side of the Potomac, exposed to much peril.
Cadwalader had marched down toward Harper's Ferry as far as Falling Waters, to cover the fords; and Johnston, with full fifteen thousand well-drilled troops, including a considerable force of cavalry and twenty cannon, was lying only a few miles off.1 Patterson had only the alternative of exposing the greater part of his army to destruction, or to recall them.
He chose the latter, mortifying as it was, and they re-crossed the river at Williamsport, with the loss of only one man. Patterson was severely censured by the public, who did not know the circumstances, for not pushing on against the insurgents; but the welfare of the cause compelled him to keep silence and bear the blame.2
At that time there was an indescribable state of feverish anxiety in Washington City.
It was shared by the Government and the General-in-chief.
Exaggerated accounts of immense forces of insurgents at Manassas were continually reaching the Capital.
It was known that General Beauregard, whose success at Charleston had made him famous, had been placed in command of the troops at Manassas at the beginning of June; and there was a general
1 Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, II. 78, 79, and 80. Narrative of the Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah: by Major-General Robert Patterson.
2 John Sherman, a representative of Ohio in Congress, was on General Patterson's staff at that time. On the 30th of June, he wrote to the General from Washington, saying:--“Great injustice is done you and your command here, and by persons in the highest military positions. I have been asked, over and over again, why you did not push on to Martinsburg, Harper's Ferry, and Winchester. I have been restrained, by my being on your staff, from saying more than simply that you had executed your orders, and that, when you were prepared to advance, your best troops were recalled to Washington.”
Scanned printed text.
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 United States License.
An XML version of this text is available for download, with the additional restriction that you offer Perseus any modifications you make. Perseus provides credit for all accepted changes, storing new additions in a versioning system.