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Cumberland,
where it remained, near the banks of the
Potomac, until the next day. Its advent astonished all, and gave pleasure to the Unionists, for there was an insurgent force at
Romney, only a day's march south from
Cumberland, said to be twelve hundred strong; while at
Winchester there was a much heavier one.
General Morris, at
Grafton, had warned
Wallace of the proximity of these insurgents, and directed him to be watchful.
Wallace believed that the best security for his troops and the safety of the railway was to place his foes on the defensive, and he resolved to attack those at
Romney at once.
He procured two trusty guides at
Piedmont, from whom he learned that there was a rude and perilous mountain road, but little traveled, and probably unguarded, leading from New Creek Station, westward of
Cumberland, to
Romney, a distance of twenty-three miles. That road he resolved to traverse at night, and surprise the insurgents, before he should pitch a tent anywhere.
For the purpose of deceiving the secessionists of
Cumberland,
Wallace went about on the 10th with his staff, pretending to seek for a good place to encamp, but found none, and he told the citizens that he would be compelled to go back a few miles on the railway to a suitable spot.
All that day his men rested, and at evening the train took them to
New Creek, where
Wallace and eight hundred of his command left the cars, and pushed on toward
Romney in the darkness, following their guides, one of whom was afterward caught and hanged for his “treason to the
Confederacy.”
It was a perilous and most fatiguing march, and they did not get near
Romney until about
