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and make a lodgment to-morrow morning, but don't be drawn into battle.’
On the 8th,
General Thomas was ordered ‘to get, if possible, a small force on
Rocky Face Ridge,’ and
General Schofield ‘to follow from
Lee's along down
Rocky Face to the enemy's signal station, if possible.’
On the same day, the 8th, he telegraphed from
Tunnel Hill, in front of
Buzzard Roost, to
General Halleck, at
Washington:
‘I have been all day reconnoitering the mountain range through whose gap the railroad and common road pass.
By to-night McPherson will be in Snake Creek Gap threatening Resaca, and to-morrow all will move to the attack.
Army in good spirits and condition.
I hope Johnston will fight here instead of drawing me far down into Georgia.’
On the 9th he telegraphed
General J. D. Webster, at
Nashville:
‘Have been fighting all day against rocks and defiles.
General McPherson was at 2 P. M. within two miles of Resaca, and will there break the road, and leave Johnston out of rations.
To-morrow will tell the story.’
And on the 9th, at 8 P. M., from
Tunnel Hill, to
General Halleck as follows:
We have been fighting all day against precipices and mountain gaps to keep Johnston's army busy, while McPherson could march to Resaca to destroy the railroad behind him. I heard from McPherson up to 2 P. M., when he was within a mile and a half of the railroad.
‘After breaking the road good, his orders are to retire to the mouth of Snake Creek Gap and be ready to work on Johnston's flank in case he retreats south.
I will pitch in again early in the morning.’
Which shows conclusively that
Sherman ordered
McPherson back to Snake Gap, and that the charge of timidity is gratuitous.
It also shows that on the night of the 9th,
Sherman was still expecting to attack by
Rocky Face and
Buzzard Roost.
On the 9th,
General Thomas, from his headquarters at
Tunnel Hill, sent to
General Sherman the following statement
