William Boynton, Sherman's Historical Raid

[75] enemy concentrated on one, the other would be able to assist. General Rosecrans was attacked on Chickamauga Creek and driven back to Chattanooga, which he holds, waiting for your assistance. Telegram after telegram has been sent to you to go to his assistance with all available force, you being the judge of what troops it was necessary, under the circumstances, to leave in East Tennessee. The route by which you were to reach General Rosecrans was also left to your discretion. When he was forced to fall back on Chattanooga you were advised, not ordered, to move on the north side of the Tennessee River, lest you might be cut up by the enemy on the south side. The danger of the latter movement being pointed out to you, you were left to decide for yourself. The substance of all telegrams from the President and from me was: you must go to General Rosecrans' assistance with all your available forces, by such route as, under the advice given you from us, and such information as you can get, you might deem most practicable. The orders are very plain, and you can not mistake their purport. It only remains for you to execute them. General Rosecrans is holding Chattanooga, and awaiting reinforcements from you. East Tennessee must be held at all hazards, if possible.

‘The President has just signed his telegram, which is added, in which I fully concur.’

October 1st.—Yours of yesterday is received, the purport of all your instructions have been that you should hold some point near the upper end of the valley, and with all the remainder of your available force, march to the assistance of General Rosecrans. The route of march and all details were left to your own judgment. Since the battle of Chickamauga and the retreat of our forces to Chattanooga, you have been repeatedly informed that it would be dangerous to attempt to form a connection on the south side of the Tennessee River, and consequently that you ought to march on the northern side. General Rosecrans has now telegraphed to you that it is not necessary to join him at Chattanooga, but only to move down to such a position that you can come to his assistance if he should require it. You are in direct communication with him, and can learn his condition, and needs, sooner than I can.

‘Distant expeditions into Georgia are not now contemplated. The object is to hold East Tennessee by forcing the enemy south of the mountains and barring the passes against his return.’

‘October 3d.—General Rosecrans reports that enemy's cavalry have crossed the river below Kingston, for a raid upon his connections. I can only repeat what I have so often urged, the importance of your communicating with General Rosecrans' army on the north side of the river, so far as to command the crossing.’

‘October 5th.—I can only repeat former instructions, to leave sufficient force in the upper end of the valley to hold Jones in check, and with the remainder to march down on the north side of the Tennessee River, guarding the fords, and connecting with General Rosecrans. I can not make them plainer.’

October 14th.—I have received no dispatch from you since the 7th until this